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ABSTRACT
The theological virtue of hope is rarely associated with Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian
Realism, which was developed in during the twentieth century's world conflicts.
Because of their carefully constructed analyses of the problems of human sin, their
understanding ofGod and the human and their interpretation of the place of Christian
ethics in the midst of a chaotic existence, Niebuhr's writings were indispensable to
Christians of his time period. His profound influence on the fields of theology, ethics
and Christian political thought has resulted in a revitalised interest in Niebuhrian
realism in recent years. Most of this resurgent interest, however, has resulted chiefly
in analysis ofNiebuhr's political thought.
This doctoral thesis examines the philosophical and theological foundations of
Niebuhr's Christian realism and finds in that examination a basis for associating
theological hope with Niebuhr's thought. Attention is given primarily to Niebuhr's
formal writings, where his theology is most sharply defined. The first part of the
thesis considers the association between twentieth-century moral philosophy and
Christian realism; Niebuhr's relationship to post-Vatican II Catholic moral theology;
the social hermeneutics of Christian realism; and, a popular criticism ofNiebuhr's
realism from one of the leading intellectuals ofpostmodern theology today. From
these investigations, we are able to discern particular philosophical themes that serve
key roles for interpreting Niebuhr's realism.
Part two of the thesis explores how the themes determined in part one are carried
over to help understand the basis of theological hope in Christian realism. Here the
place of the "Christ of Faith" and the "Christ ofHistory" are considered in light of
previous investigations and placed within the context ofNiebuhr's overall theology.
Having been served by the assistance ofmany interlocutors along the way, the thesis
concludes that there is good reason to associate Niebuhr's articulation of Christian
realism with theological hope. Though this is primarily a theological investigation, it
will prove relevant for the new generation of Christian realists in present times.
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Part I: The Foundations ofChristian Realism
We have all been expelledfrom the Garden, but the ones who suffer most in exile are
those who are stillpermitted to dream ofperfection.
-Stanley Kunitz
From the preface to The CollectedPoems'
1
Stanley Kunitz, The Collected Poems, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), n.p.
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction and Reasons for This Thesis
Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971) is a significant figure for the study of
Christian ethics and the articulation he gave of Christian realism in the mid-twentieth
century is still considered relevant in theology, ethics and politics. Niebuhr
understood Christian realism to be a way of interpreting the realities ofhuman
existence in social and political contexts and of dealing frankly with the problems of
sin and injustice found in those realities. Biographies, scholarly books, PhD theses—
even stage plays2 —that have been written about him both during his life and after
his death attest to the influence and insight ofNiebuhr's work.
There is still more that can be said about Niebuhr and Christian realism, and
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with a revitalised interest in his thought, now is an appropriate time to do so. If this
thesis can be summarised in one sentence it is that the foundation ofNiebuhr's
Christian realism provides a framework for a hopeful theological ethic. There are at
least three reasons why such a thesis is important now: timeliness, the correction of
misinterpretations ofNiebuhr's realism and the cultivation of research in an
unexplored area of Christian realism.
First, as suggested, there has been an upsurge of interest in Christian realism
over the past decade or so which has given rise to the political writings dedicated to
Niebuhr's interpretation of Christian realism. I am, however, not concerned in this
thesis to account for the political voice Christian realism continues to gain. Where
possible, I have tried to avoid overt political discussions as they relate to Christian
realism or to Niebuhr's involvement in politics, both peripheral and direct. In some
instances this has been difficult if for no other reason than Niebuhr's writings reflect
his certainty of the obligation of Christian ethics to speak a word ofmeaning—
2 Ben Brantley, "The Eternal Vaudeville of the Spiritual Mind" in The New York Times, (June 6,
2007), http://theater2.nytimes.com/2007/06/06/theater/reviews/06bran.html
3 For some of the recent work in this revitalization, see Robin W. Lovin, Christian Realism and the
New Realities, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Anatol Lieven and John Hulsman,
Ethical Realism: A Vision forAmerica's Role in the World, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Peter
Beinart, The Good Fight: Why Liberals—and Only Liberals—Can Win the War on Terror and Make
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ultimate meaning—to our fractured, seemingly dystopic existences. But lately much
has been written on the subject ofNiebuhr and realist politics and the call to enter the
fray is being well enough answered that I have chosen to leave that well enough
alone.
Instead, I offer an account of some of the more foundational aspects of
Niebuhr's realism, the comprehension ofwhich is indispensable ifwe want to
understand his realism in the first place. In a sense, this is a revisiting of some of the
seminal work done in the 1990s on the fundamental theological and philosophical
ideas in Niebuhr's work.4 Here I am more concerned here to understand these
fundamental ideas in light of some of the more recent postmodern critiques Niebuhr
has received, and to put them in conversation with theologically hopeful enquiries.
Second, I am concerned to understand these foundational issues, in part, to
offer a correction of those postmodern critiques. The resurgence of interest in
Niebuhrian realism is simultaneously renewing criticism of it, particularly in the
United States and the United Kingdom. So far such criticisms in the UK have gone
without much response—a deficiency worth correcting—because some of the
criticisms have misinterpreted Niebuhr on the points they are criticising. This will be
made clear later in the thesis.
Third, these foundational issues and responses to postmodern criticisms lead
to the cultivation of a largely unexplored area in Niebuhr's thought: theological hope.
Niebuhr is often associated with the so-called "hopeless" theologians of the mid-
twentieth century because his stark analyses of human nature and the pervasiveness
of sin lead him to the conclusion that humans have the ability to achieve only
modicums of justice in a fallen world. The designation of "hopeless" is unfair, I
think, particularly because there has been minimal work completed on the
exploration of theological hope in Niebuhrian realism. Thus, in the chapters that
follow, a fresh way to think about Niebuhr's realism is suggested. I am unconvinced
that one need disregard stark analyses of the problems ofhuman existence in order to
maintain the confidence that though this world is "not as it ought to be", we may still
America Great Again, (New York: Harper CoWmsPublishers, 2006); Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War
Against Terror: The Burden ofAmerican Power in a Violent World, (New York: Basic Books, 2004).
4
Cf., Robin W. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995); Langdon Gilkey, On Niebuhr: A Theological Study, (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2001).
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hope in a final resolution that transcends our comprehension of it. Indeed, whence
hope if not stark analyses of the human condition? For what would we be otherwise
hoping ifwe were resigned to accept the imperfect order of our lives; or, ifwe were
satisfied with the way things are? The polarity between hope and despair is great, but
the intermediary alternatives are few. In an existence where Niebuhr rightly found
few absolutes, one thing seems an unalterable given: we choose either hope or
despair when we choose how to face the world we inhabit. If the principal feature of
despair is resignation, then, in my reading ofNiebuhr, it seems clear that Niebuhr
chose the opposite in his application of Christian realism to the contexts in which we
find ourselves.
There is also a note of both timelessness and timeliness in this focus on hope.
Not only is hope one of the theological virtues championed in Paul's letter to the
Corinthians (1 Cor. 13:13), but it is a virtue which is also recently gaining much
attention. On one side of the globe, politicians and theologians alike assure us of the
"audacity" of hope, while on the other, the most recent encyclical from Pope
Benedict XVI entitled Spe Salvi [facti sumus] ("In hope we were saved"),5 finds that
hope and Christian faith are identical.
For these reasons—timeliness, reconsideration of criticisms and the
presentation of fresh perspectives—I have chosen now to write on Niebuhrian
realism and hope. The importance of this choice lies precisely in the fact that both
Niebuhr and hope are receiving the amount of attention that they are, though they
have until now to be considered jointly at great length.
1.2. Methodology
The methodological approach of this thesis is straightforward. Ultimately
this is a theological work, with the major theological themes addressed in the final
chapters, after the foundational work is completed in the earlier chapters.
Part one of the thesis contains chapters two through five, all ofwhich serve to
introduce the major foundational themes of Christian realism and the ways in which
they are incorporated into Niebuhr's interpretation ofChristian realism. Part two,
5
Pope Benedict XVI, Spe Salvi, November 30, 2007, on the Vatican website:
http://www.Vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_enc_20071130_spe-salvi_en.html
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which contains chapters six and seven, is the place where the discussion of hope
takes place, incorporating the ideas that were outlined in part one.
Chapter two introduces most of the terms that will be used throughout the
remainder of the work. Its focus is primarily on the philosophical issues inherent to
discussions about realism and the attendant ideas involved with Niebuhrian realism.
As the sources used make clear, Christian realism and moral philosophy in the
twentieth century are closely aligned. In this sense, chapter two is primarily an
expansion on a conversation that is ongoing. Moreover, the link between moral
philosophical ideas and the theological foundations of Christian realism has been
established, but in order for the thesis fully to develop, the necessary supports must
be put in place. In this way, chapter two serves as the plinth to the rest of the thesis.
Chapter three is a discussion about the relationship between the Catholic
natural moral law tradition and Niebuhrian realism. This is a topic which received
some modest attention both during and after Niebuhr's life. However, chapter three
focuses more on the developments ofpost-Vatican II moral theology and the ways in
which Niebuhr's realism finds consonance with them, a discussion that has not been
sustained at any great length. Because Niebuhr's writings are frequently critical of
Catholicism on the issue of its natural moral law tradition, the emphasis given to this
discussion helps better to illuminate the foundational issues involved in the thesis.
Chapter four builds on the previous two chapters and places their
foundational concerns within the broader context of social hermeneutics. In some
ways, chapter three anticipates chapter five, but needs the necessary diversion
through chapter four in order to make the connection. This is so because chapter
four focuses on the methodology ofNiebuhr's realism, paying particular attention to
the viability of Christian ethics in social contexts today. This emphasis draws
attention to the influence of existentialism on Niebuhr's realism, and conversation
partners like William Schweiker are incorporated to help better understand the
relevance ofNiebuhrian realism in modern discourse.
Chapter five is reliant on the issues raised in the previous three chapters to
address a criticism ofNiebuhrian realism by John Milbank, one of the most
prominent postmodern theologians writing today. Milbank, an architect of the
theology ofRadical Orthodoxy popularised in the United Kingdom, wrote an essay
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in 1997 entitled "The Poverty ofNiebuhrianism". To date, this essay has gone
without intensive response. Because the issues raised by Milbank are precisely
related to the foundational concerns of chapters two through four, the inclusion of a
response to his criticisms is a natural fit for the thesis. Primarily, Milbank is
concerned that Niebuhr is too heavily reliant on a Stoic ethic which, Milbank thinks,
prohibits Niebuhr's realism from proffering a truly Christian ethic. This criticism, as
seen in that chapter, indirectly raises the issue ofhow Niebuhr's realism can be
hopeful. This can be answered by suggesting that Milbank misreads Niebuhr on the
issue of Stoicism and actually agrees with Niebuhr on the issue of evil, which leaves
room for theological hopefulness.
Chapter six addresses the importance ofChristology for Niebuhr (a topic left
largely untouched in the study ofNiebuhr's thought) and relates one facet of
theological hope to what I call the "essential" Christ. Hope takes on a particularly
metaphysical character in this chapter, similar to the moral foundational issues found
in the first part of the thesis.
Chapter seven then discusses the role of eschatology in shaping hope for
Niebuhr. No theological discussion of hope is complete without the affiliated
discussion of eschatology and, despite the fact that Niebuhr was so critical ofwhat he
considered an overemphasis on this kind of doctrine, the eschatology latent in his
own, later theological works bears relevance for such a discussion. Additionally,
Niebuhr's Christology continues to be important as I discuss what is called the
"existential" Christ in relation to realism's eschatological hope. All of these chapters
are summarised in the concluding chapter eight.
Before offering a brief history of research, two remarks are in order. First,
Niebuhr is written about in the present tense. This is an acknowledgement of the fact
that Niebuhr's thoughts and ideas about Christian realism are still as important today
as they were during the time that he wrote. As Roger Shinn perceptively noted in
1974, "To evaluate [Niebuhr's] ideas in his presence was always to enter into
dialogue with him, awaiting the next reply. His thought was vibrant enough that the
dialogue will continue, in the sense that dialogue often continues with thinkers of the
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past".6 The influence of Christian realism on social ethics and Niebuhr's contribution
to that influence continues to be recognised. If that is the case, it is important to
signal deference to the intellectual predecessor who helped contribute to our
understanding ofwhat the possibilities for the Christian life are. The choice in tense
is my small way of doing just that.
The second point worth mentioning is that there are many interlocutors aside
from Niebuhr throughout this work; John Milbank, William Schweiker, Sabina
Lovibond and Charles Matthewes to name a few. These other voices help make the
point that Niebuhr's vision of Christian realism is not a fixed one. Interpreting the
world realistically is an evolutionary process which requires a sense ofjustice that
seeks to conform to the "law of love" ofChrist, an imagination creative enough to
"dream ofperfection" in spite of our perennial failures and a disposition humble
enough to "accept those things" which we cannot change. I am not interested only in
being an apologist for Niebuhr's realism, nor am I interested in finding the faults of
Niebuhr for his interpretation of Christian realism. I am, however, interested in the
renaissance of Christian realism and its reception. Any piece that results from that
interest requires a foundation from which to build its understanding of Christian
realism and a knowledge of the reception of Christian realism today. Consequently, I
have chosen to put Niebuhr in conversation with both individuals and traditions.
This, I think, affirms the ways in which Niebuhr's realism shaped the mid-twentieth
century and continues to do so today.
1.3. Previous Research
The body of scholarship on Niebuhr is already expansive and still growing, as
are the areas of focus for studies in Christian realism. But sustained work on the
topic of hope in Niebuhr's realism has yet to be completed. In terms of this thesis,
the most important research that has been conducted is in the foundational areas of
the first part of the thesis. Two seminal works are particularly important for those
concerns. The first is Robin Lovin's Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism.
Lovin provides a helpful account of the philosophical and theological foundations of
Niebuhr's Christian realism and how those foundations give voice to the issues with
which Niebuhr was most concerned, such as freedom and politics. It is Lovin's book
6
Roger L. Shinn, "Realism, Radicalism and Eschatology in Reinhold Niebuhr: A Reassessment", The
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which gives the most systematic treatment to some of the ideas that are covered in
chapter two here.
The second work is Langdon Gilkey's On Niebuhr: A Theological Study.
Gilkey provides the most thorough account ofNiebuhr's theology to date, and
helpfully divides his enquiry into the early and mature periods ofNiebuhr's life. A
discursive approach is adopted instead in this thesis. This is primarily due to the fact
that the issues covered in the thesis were influential for Niebuhr throughout the
whole of his career; not in any one epoch. Though Niebuhr certainly gave them
more clarity in his later writings, the foundational issues which influenced his
understanding ofChristian realism remained important throughout his career.
Nevertheless, Gilkey's work is instrumental for understanding the theological issues
involved in Niebuhr's realism.
There are obviouslymore works which are consulted, many at great length.
But these two initially provided the motivation for my study in Christian realism in
the first place, and they stimulated the ideas about hope and realism that are found in
the following pages.
Having given an outline ofwhat is to follow, there is little else to say in terms
of an introduction. Let us, therefore, begin.
Journal ofReligion, Vol. 54, no. 4, (Oct. 1974): 409-423.
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Chapter Two
THE FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN REALISM
2.1. Abstract
In the introductory chapter the terms were set for the framework
which will be used throughout the duration of the project. One
undertaking necessary for a successful completion of the task at hand
is to outline the influence of moral philosophy on theological ethics
and Reinhold Niebuhr's interpretation of Christian realism, which
will be accomplished in this chapter. After offering a synopsis of
some of the moral philosophical approaches to realism in the
twentieth century, I will also discuss some other realist approaches to
ethics. Following that, a discussion of the relationship between moral
philosophy and theological ethics will be offered. Finally, two
approaches in theological ethics representative of different ethical
methodologies are considered in relation to the preceding discussion.
2.2. Introducing Realism
A realistic person is one who is colloquially thought of as a person who
contemplates the realities (facts) of a particular state of affairs in his or her life and
who attempts to deal frankly with the likeliest result of that state. For instance, if I
tell you that I am trying to be "realistic" about the prognosis ofmy cancer, you will
understand me to mean that I have considered the facts aboutmy cancer, weighed
the various possible outcomes associated with those facts and have resolved to deal
as forthrightly as possible with whatever those facts portend formy future. This may
mean that I realistically hope to recover from my cancer because my medical
advisers have told me that the facts concerningmy condition mean that there is a
viable potential for the cancer to enter remission. This may also mean, however, that
I have to deal with the fact ofmy death if I have been advised that the cancer will not
enter remission. Such a disposition is as equally realistic as the first.
When we speak of a person as someone who is morally, theologically or
philosophically realistic, we mean something not altogether dissimilar from our
colloquial use of the word, though the distinctions are great and the nuances many.
If one is considered a moral realist, that person is generally understood as one who,
when faced with moral challenges, attempts to correct any injustices in his or her
social contexts by pointing to a moral reality—a "good" of some sort—as a plumb
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line which serves as a measure and balance for attempts to rectify the injustices
perceived in the given situation. It is not, however, simple enough to say that a
morally realistic person only observes the carnage of a moral shipwreck, points her
moral compass to the good and charts a new journey which avoids the mistakes
which led to the shipwreck in the first place. That is a moral fantasy disconnected
from the realities which actually comprise moral enquiry. Human existence is not
tidy enough to suggest that injustices are corrected simply by pointing to a good as a
reality to which we can assent with a certain degree ofmoral reflection or a greater
deal ofmoral sensitivity.1
The problems arise when we stop to consider the capacity of the moral agent
to apprehend the nature of that moral status. If I am the agent, how do I know that I
have rightly discerned the objective nature of good? How do I know how best to
correct the injustices I face in my social context when I think I have discerned the
good? Generally, moral realists answer that though we cannot with certainty know
that we have either apprehended the good, or that we have properly assented to it, we
must nevertheless act to correct those situations we know to be unjust, but we must
act with the knowledge not only that we may be wrong in our present actions and
judgments, but that we have been wrong previously and that we will be wrong again
in the future. It is no exaggeration, then, to suggest that this crucial detail informs
the basis ofmoral, theological and philosophical realisms, and it is a theme that will
be reiterated frequently in the following pages. Thus, what is problematic with
suggesting that injustices are corrected by appeals to some sort of autonomous moral
principle is not the notion that the moral principle itself possesses an objective status.
' Of course, using terms like the "good" in such a definitive sense is, by virtue of its ambiguity, a
dangerous way to try to conduct moral dialogue. The concept of good—definitive or not—as a device
for moral reflection has a tortuous history, effecting difficulty in defining what, precisely, is meant by
its usage. However, moral dialogue cannot do otherwise than to offer a conception of what good is if
it hopes to be useful dialogue. Even in the preceding sentence I have claimed good as both a
"concept" and a "device", which implicitly suggests that it is something both to be assented to and
something to be used. I have made this suggestion deliberately because it relates to Niebuhrian
understandings of the same term. In this and the chapters that follow, I will use the term "good" in the
way I think that Niebuhr understands it, which is not essentially different from the way that moral
realists use the term. That is to say that when Niebuhr speaks of the good—or, interchangeably, the
"impossible ideal"—he does so understanding that it stands transcendentally apart from human
existence, but is immanently relevant for that existence. There will be more on that later. At present
it is sufficient to note that Niebuhr characterises good in this way. For a generally useful introduction
to the changes in the ways good has been understood in (Western) moral philosophy, see Alasdair
Maclntyre's A Short History ofEthics: A History ofMoral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the
Twentieth Century, (London: Routledge, 1998), especially chapters 1-3.
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As we will see in a moment, the central motif that separates realists from anti-realists
is this: the claim that morality possesses an objective nature which subsists
independently of what the moral agent thinks about it.
Emphasis on the objectivity ofmorality does not, however, restrict the
essential relativity ofmoral judgment. Realists of any sort would agree that the
judgments of the moral agent are susceptible to human error, and are thus relative in
their very nature. So to the "question asked about any moral rule or social
practice... Is it part of the essentially local realm of.. .(convention or custom) or of
the essentially universal realm of... (nature)?", the moral realist answers Yes. In
other words, the moral agent affirms that: a) ifx is the good, then x belongs to a
reality independent of hers; b) nevertheless, though her reality is ultimately related to
x, the meaning ofx is determined by the customs and mores ofparticular
communities in particular times, and her conceptions ofx are based in those
particularities; c) therefore, if the conventions and traditions of her community lead
her to define something as x, one from a community with different conventions and
traditions from hers will not necessarily agree with her assessment of x. Though
there is room for disagreement on either side, either side may plausibly alter their
opinions about x based on the persuasiveness of the other's appeals. Either way, the
realist affirms that x both exists independently of, and is related to the moral agent's
interpretation of x.4 It is important to note, though, that for the Christian realist, this
is not "to claim that we cannot judge things about Christianity at all—that we just
have to take each local variety as we find it.. ..It is to say that Christianity constitutes
a world, a reality, a self-defining comprehensiveness that we have to stand within to
understand on its own terms.. ,".5 That is, Christianity provides an interpretive
2
They would hasten to add, though, that the moral agent does not will erroneous judgments, but that
such error is a natural fact of human existence. Niebuhr's emphasis on original sin makes this clear,
as we will see in the section on post-Kantian radical evil in chapter five.
3
Mclntyre, pp. 10-11.
4 Kant's discussion of "practical laws" and "practical principles" makes a similar distinction.
Practical laws are those objective laws which all (rational) people recognise and under which they
live, while practical principles are subject to the individual's "will", guided by his or her desires. See
Immanuel Kant, The Critique ofPractical Reason, Part One: Doctrine ofthe elements ofpure
practical reason, in Mary J. Gregor and AllenWood (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 153-164.
Sue Patterson, Realist Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), p. 10.
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framework for the realist, but any interpretation of a particular social context is
subject to alteration when necessary.
Theological6 and philosophical realists treat their respective subject matters
similarly to the ways moral realists treat theirs. For the theological realist the
considered subject is God, and "[statements about God are not simply expressions
of emotion or acts ofpersonal commitment. Theological claims have cognitive
content. They may be true or false. True statements about God are true because
they accurately represent a reality independent of the concepts, theories, and
n
evidence we have pertaining to that reality". In other words, one can say that there
is an objective moral order made known and validated through the "concepts,
theories, and evidence" we have for that order, and further claim that this moral
order is ordered by God. This is either a universally true or false claim: if it is true, it
is true for everyone; if it is false, it is false for everyone. But this claim, regardless
of its veracity, does not demand from me any kind of personal commitment or
emotional involvement. Note that this does not mean that claims about, or
expressions related to, God are also not only cognitive statements; they can be a
manifestation ofpersonal or emotive commitments or appeals, though they do not
have to be. The importance of Lovin's statement is that these claims are not
contingent on personal commitments or emotional expressions of the person making
the statement. In fact, we might add that a realistic disposition about claims that
involve some sort ofpersonal commitment would be wariness vis-a-vis the possible
prejudices associated with that claim.
Philosophical realism, on the other hand, explicitly does not rely on the same
claims about reality that theological realism does. Philosophical realism claims an
objective, independent reality that exists apart from human conceptions about it.
However, this reality need not be contingent on causality for its origin. That is to
say that while some theological realists argue in favour of a realism which
understands the regulation of the universe as a divine ordering—natural law theorists
could plausibly be included in this group—philosophical realism does not need the
same causality to make its claims. Two things are significant about philosophical
6 For a helpful introduction to theological realism, see Peter Byrne, God and Realism, (Aldershot:
Ashgate Publishing, 2003), pp. 1-20.
7 Robin W. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 20.
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realism's claims regarding reality, as Michael Devitt has highlighted. First is the
claim to reality's independence, or objectivity. "For the realist the material or
o
physical world he believes in has to exist not only objectively but non-mentally".
This is nothing more than an ontological claim about an external reality which does
little to satisfy our curiosity about what it is that we say exists when we say
something exists independently.
This brings us to the second point. Devitt calls a realism that simply
identifies an ontological claim (i.e., "reality exists objectively") "weak realism", and
categorises it as problematic because it does not offer any basis ofmeaning for the
universe due to the fact that "[i]t cannot play a role in explaining any phenomenon.
It is an idle addition to idealism: anti-realism with a fig-leaf'.9 He suggests that weak
realism can be remedied, albeit only slightly, ifwe acknowledge that "the world
consists not just of something but of a structured set of entities".10 What will bolster
this claim more, though, is a "description of the world to which the realist is
committed as that of common-sense physical or material objects; for example,
stones, trees and cats". When realism is framed in these terms, "we make [it] much
more specific by committing it to the existence of common-sense physical
entities".11 Now, it should be noted that Devitt suggests these modifications to the
too-generalised definition of realism to scientific realism, which is itself a more
specific version ofphilosophical realism. The modifications are useful to a point,
but they may not be very convincing to the one still sceptical ofmoral realism.
Scientific realists, demanding more specificity from the claims of a weak realism,
can at the very least agree that some things (i.e., stones, trees and cats) are physical
objects constitutive of the physical universe to which these objects belong. Of
course, not all intellectual debts are cancelled by this account because while
scientific realists may agree that certain objects are physical objects, they may
plausibly disagree about the meaning or significance of those objects. "Scientists do
not take the same epistemic attitude to all theories, even to the ones they 'accept'.
8 Michael Devitt, Realism and Truth, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp. 13-14.
9
Ibid, p. 15.
10 Ibid. Italics mine.
11 Ibid.
12
Attitudes range from strong belief, through mild belief and agnosticism, to outright
disbelief'.12
Moral and theological realists, on the other hand, do not have at their disposal
the same "common-sense" physical objects about which they can agree when they
speak ofmorality and the nature of the good, or of God. Thus their provisos are not
the same as that of a scientific realist when she speaks about external reality. Moral
and theological realists may agree that external reality is related to the existence of
good or of God, but they cannot expect any sort of consensus about what they are
saying exists when they say these things exist objectively. Thus, moral and
theological realists encounter an epistemological problem that is not as easily
resolved as philosophical realism appears to be.
Acknowledging that moral and theological realists cannot support their
claims to objectivity in the way that scientific realists do does not mean that we
should prematurely discard any babies in murky epistemic bathwaters. What both
moral and theological realists presuppose for objective order is a universe in which
meaningfulness trumps meaninglessness. A meaningful universe is tied up in an
order that is mind-independent of human existence, though related to it. This is a
paradox within which Reinhold Niebuhr is comfortable living, precisely because he
is both a theological and moral realist, and he presupposes a meaningful universe for
theological and ethical reflection. "It is", as Niebuhr notes, "impossible to examine
the details of the human picture without assuming a framework ofmeaning for the
1-5
details". The meaning of our lives is not synonymous with our existence itself,
what Niebuhr calls the "natural process". So, "[tjhere is in every individual life a
depth or a height ofmeaning incongruous with the natural process".14 In other
words, some sense of order must be presupposed ifmeaning is to be determined.
Thus, the philosophical scientific realist stands in the park, calls a tree a tree
and says that it is part of an external reality. But the moral realist will not be able to
stand alongside, point to another object and call it good; nor will the theological
realist be able to call some other object God. Both of these realists are dependent on
12 Ibid, p. 17.
13 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers,
1999), p. 3.
14 Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Comparison ofChristian andModern Views ofHistory,
(London: Nisbet & Co., 1949), p. 75.
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belief about the external reality to which they ascribe meaning, so that when they
call something "good", for example, they are appealing to a belief about an external
authority from which they derive that particular thing's goodness, not referring to the
intrinsic qualities of the thing-in-itself.
Lovin thus rightly points out that claims about God are not simply
expressions of personal commitment. But we might add that while our claims about
the good or God are not only expressions ofpersonal commitment, they are still
inextricably related to personal belief. In this instance, Lovin's point still stands. I
can believe something to be true (i.e., "I believe God exists") without being
personally committed to any demands I might associate with this belief (i.e., "My
belief in God's existence compels me to give to the poor, but I do not commit myself
to that enterprise"), though my moral reasonability ought to be questioned in this
instance.15 Beliefs still have cognitive content here, and the moral or theological
realist who allows for belief in something must also allow for the possibility that her
beliefmay be false.
As philosophical realists need not be committed to the same kind of
objectivity ofmoral or theological realists (though their understandings of
objectivity as a characteristic of existence-independence are similar), moral realists
do not need to make the same kind of causal claims concerning God that theological
realists do. As previously mentioned, the moral realist and the theological realist
both rely on the notion that their respective claims about the good or about God are
contingent upon beliefs about what kind ofmetaphysics are involved in those claims.
But interpretations of these metaphysics can differ. Moral realists can believe in the
objective nature of the good without being theistic in their claims about the good.
Theological realists, on the other hand, tie their claims about the objectivity of the
good to the claim that God exists objectively and independently from human
conceptions. Any moral realism that understands the properties ofmoral goodness
as existing objectively and naturally (ethical naturalism) is not countermanded by
15 In this case it may be right to suggest that the person who holds false beliefs, but acts in ways he or
she believes are in accord with those beliefs may be more morally reasonable than the person who
holds true beliefs but refuses any commitment derived from those beliefs. The former may be morally
deranged or be a sociopath (David Koresh's conclusion that because he was the messiah, he was
committed to engaging in sexual acts with minors to promote his "kingdom" comes to mind in this
case). The latter, however, may hold the capacity for moral reasonability, but simply be a liar.
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theological realism; neither is theological realism countermanded by such a moral
realism.16
We can summarise the preceding by saying that (and for the moment we use
these terms generally): 1) All moral realists are philosophical realists. Indeed, moral
realism is philosophical realism. 2) Not all moral realists are theological realists.
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3) Not all philosophical realists are moral realists. 4) Not all moral realists are
theological realists. 5) All theological realists are (again, generally) in some sense
moral realists. Niebuhr's understanding of Christian realism is most appropriately
identified with the fifth statement.
The point to take away from this introduction is that we can understand these
realisms in two ways. In the first instance, the object of any of the above mentioned
realisms serves a descriptive function. So when the moral realist says, "x is good",
he or she simply means to describe what the good is. In the second instance, the
object of any of the realisms serves a prescriptive function. When the moral realist
says something about the good, the statement is appealing to the good in a
propositional fashion. Thus, when he or she says that feeding children nutritious
meals is a good act, he or she will assume that any hearers of that statement will
16 It is difficult to make the claims ofmoral realism about good's objectivity without recourse to some
explanation of whence the good comes, or what it demands of us. David Brink goes some way toward
explaining how the moral realist—more specifically, the moral realist who is also an ethical naturalist
(which we will discuss in the following section)—need not be a theological objectivist, or realist, but
that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive. He thinks of the theological objectivist as the one
who argues that God exists and has ordered the universe in such a way that good exists objectively
and makes certain moral claims on us; and, because they are put in order by God, they are God's
moral demands on us. "[I]fmoral properties, though actually constituted by natural properties, could
have been realized by some properties that are not natural—say, by supernatural properties of a divine
being—then moral properties are not necessarily natural properties. Though constituted by natural
properties, moral properties, on this counterfactual assumption, cannot be identified with natural
properties". Brink does not think this is necessarily the case. He continues in the footnote, "Of
course, we shall not accept this counterfactual assumption, even though we agree that theism is
possible, ifwe accept theological objectivism....For if theological objectivism is true, we will not
think that moral properties consist in properties of divine will even in those worlds in which God
exists and commands all and only morally correct actions. So ethical naturalism, construed (even) as
an identity thesis, is not undermined by God's possible existence if theological objectivism is true".
See David O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations ofEthics, (New York: Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 158. For an interesting account of a comparison between
philosophical ethics which rely on theological conceptions ofGod and those which do not (though the
comparison is not explicitly between realist accounts), see John E. Hare, God andMorality: A
Philosophical History, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007).
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'Philosophical realism' in these terms simply means that one holds a view of the universe that
affirms that entities exist independently of human thought. What I mean when I suggest here that not
all philosophical realists are moral realists is that one can affirm that entities exist independently of
human conceptions about them without affirming that moral concepts (i.e., 'good', 'just', 'right' etc.)
are part of those ideas.
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understand what is being said, and will know that the good is not the acts
themselves. If that were the case, one could plausibly argue that acting in a way that
potentially harms a child is also a "good" act, insofar as one understands the
goodness in acts as bound up in the acts themselves. The point in saying that feeding
a child well is a good act is that the act is informed by the understanding of good as
objective, and that it thus coheres with what is known to be good; a telos, or an end
18*
to which the act is directed. Aristotle famously makes this point when he says
[i]f it is true that in the sphere of action there is an end which we wish
for its own sake, and for the sake of which we wish everything else,
and that we do not desire to act for the sake of something else (for, if
that is so, the process will go on ad infinitum, and our desire will be
idle and futile) it is clear that this will be the good or the supreme
good.19
The good in this instance is in that end to which our moral acts aim. It is an
incarnate good, rather than a simple ideal.
Realism is now generally outlined and we are prepared to consider moral
realism more particularly. We will do this in the following section, and will
subsequently devote time to considering some of the many nuances in moral realism,
especially as they apply to Niebuhr's articulation ofChristian realism. Let us now
turn our attention to these important distinctives in moral realism.
2.3. Moral Realism
Briefhistories of ideas are difficult to write ifonly by virtue of the fact that
culling selected parts of those histories and presenting them as the most important
parts of those ideas can result in careless scholarship or uncritical generalisations.
With those admonitions in mind, it is important to consider the history ofmoral
realism in order better to understand the foundations with which Niebuhr's Christian
realism is identified. We will begin by retracing the developments in moral realism
in the twentieth century. Important to this endeavour is a consideration of the major
players involved in the debates surrounding moral realism and what those debates
18 As David Fergusson notes, "A tradition arises in part through a provisional consensus about how
the goods sought in a wide variety of practices and institutions are to be ordered, and how they are to
serve some overall telos of human life". David Fergusson, Community, Liberalism and Christian
Ethics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 114.
19
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J.E.C. Welldon, (Amherst, Prometheus Books,
1987), p. 10.
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were about. From this we will be able to identify what the various kinds ofmoral
realisms are, and those with which we should identify Niebuhr's understanding of
Christian realism.
2.3.1.Moral Realism in the Twentieth Century
Realist thought has long been prevalent in the history ofWestern
20
philosophy. Even Plato's use of the "forms" in The Republic is in some sense a
realist idea: the enlightened person discovers (through intellectual assent) that
something objective exists behind the shadows cast on a cave wall, and that it exists
independently of human conceptions about it. The shadows are simulacra of an
independent reality (the sun), but they draw their meaning from that reality, making
the reality "knowable", at least in part, to all people capable of observing the
shadows (i.e., those who are not shackled in the cave). Realism's established
presence in the history of philosophy notwithstanding, the most important timeframe
for considering moral realism for present purposes is the early to mid-twentieth
century because it was during this time that accounts of realism began significantly
to be challenged by other, anti-realist accounts.
For example, the ideas associated with this moral realism received the most
negative attention in the twentieth century due, perhaps, to the publication ofG.E.
Moore's 1903 publication ofPrincipia Ethica. Here Moore attacks what he calls the
"naturalistic fallacy", which he associates with philosophers who rely on some
notion of objectivity for their thought. The problem Moore has with the idea of
objectivity, particularly as it relates to ethics, is with the singularity associated with
that idea. He notes that when we
[cjonsider yellow....We may try to define it, by describing its
physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light-vibrations are
not themselves what we mean by yellow. They are not what we
perceive....
Yet a mistake of this simple kind has commonly been made
about 'good.' It may be true that all things which are good are also
something else, just as it is true that all things which are yellow
produce a certain kind of vibration in the light. And it is a fact, that
Ethics aims at discovering what are those other properties belonging
20
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord suggests that though realism is often disputed, it "involves embracing just
two theses: (1) the claims in question, when literally construed, are literally true or false (cognitivism),
and (2) some are literally true. Nothing more". Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, "Introduction: The Many
Moral Realisms" in Essays in Moral Realism, edited by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, (London: Cornell
University Press, 1988), p. 5.
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to all things which are good. But far too many philosophers have
thought that when they named those other properties they were
actually defining good; that these properties, in fact, were simply not
9 1
'other,' but absolutely and entirely the same with goodness.
In other words, it is insufficient to associate, as Moore thinks realism does,
something like the objectivity ofmorality with certain natural features we can
identify as intrinsic to the character ofmorality. Moore's attack on the "naturalistic
fallacy" is what is considered representative of "ethical non-naturalism" at its
strongest. We will momentarily give attention both to naturalism and non-
naturalism. The point for now, however, is to stress the importance ofMoore's work
for the field ofmoral philosophy in the twentieth century. As a result of the
publication ofPrincipia Ethica, some of the more stalwart defences ofmoral realism
ensued, giving it an appeal much greater than had before been associated with it.
Though by the turn of the twentieth century the kind ofmetaphysics
important to methodologies for philosophies of ethics like moral realism had begun
to fall out of favour in American and English contexts, metaphysical enquiries were
still popular elsewhere, particularly in continental philosophy. Mary Warnock, in
her history of ethics covering the first sixty years of the twentieth century, notes that
[sjince 1900, both [in England] and in the United States, metaphysics
has been virtually dead. The influence of Wittgenstein.. .opened the
way for a much wider view of moral philosophy than was generally
held at the beginning of the century....But on the continent a very
different sort of moral philosophy has been flourishing...[sjystem-
building has not been discredited on the continent....Moral
philosophy has taken a place as part of the general theory of man, of
human nature and its place in the universe.22
Warnock thinks the loss of grand metaphysical schemes that attempt to
answer questions about the meaning ofhistory is a good thing, and she credits
Moore as one of the chief demolishers of this system. It is not her point about the
loss ofmetaphysics that is interesting for our purposes, though. What is interesting
is Warnock's highlighting of continental philosophy's preservation ofmetaphysics,
which is of greater importance for consideration ofNiebuhr's Christian realism; for
it was the kind ofmetaphysical enquiryWarnock thinks so beneficially absent from
21 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, Rev. Ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 62.
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twentieth century moral philosophy that energised Niebuhr's own understanding of
Christian realism. This is perhaps most evident in the existentialist themes—
prevalent in continental philosophy in the middle of the twentieth century—that
Niebuhr picks up from his continental contemporaries like Nicolas Berdyaev and
Jacques Maritain. One sees the correlations between Niebuhr and these thinkers
even in the titles of their respective works. For example, Berdyaev's The Destiny of
Man predates by three years Niebuhr's second set ofGifford lectures by the same
title. The respective works deal with many similar themes including moral
epistemology, the problem ofprivative evil, human freedom, the end of history and
the establishment of the kingdom ofGod.24 Niebuhr's later Faith andHistory also
picks up on these themes, particularly the paradox of human freedom and historical
9 S
evil in classical and modern thought.
Warnock's point that metaphysics absconded in the wake of the rising tides
of British and American moral philosophies at the beginning of the twentieth century
does not mean that metaphysics was lost altogether. Metaphysics is still important
for understanding realism and there is a wide diversity about what those
metaphysical structures entail. It is therefore worth devoting time to some of the
themes in realism so that we can gain a better appreciation for the kinds of
influences there are on Christian realism.
2.4. "The ManyMoral Realisms "
The preceding discussion highlighted general understandings of realistic
thinking. From those, we will primarily be concerned with moral and theological
22
MaryWarnock, Ethics Since 1900, Third Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 107.
23 Niebuhr makes frequent references to these two thinkers throughout his work. Cf., An
Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, (New York: Harper & Brother Publishers, 1935), p. 14, n.l; The
Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. 1, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), p. 294, n. 10;
The Irony ofAmerican History, (London: Nisbet & Co., 1952), p. 62, n. 1.; Faith and History, pp.
204-205. Richard Fox recounts in his biography ofNiebuhr that Niebuhr read and was appreciative of
Berdyaev's account of evil and human freedom in the 1930s. See Richard Wightman Fox, Reinhold
Niebuhr: A Biography, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 179.
24 See Nicolas Berdyaev, The Destiny ofMan, (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1936) and Reinhold Niebuhr
The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. II. The question of privative evil and Christian realism is given
consideration in chapter five. Paul Ramsey develops the links between Niebuhr and Maritain, and
highlights their differences (particularly their differences over the issue of human reason) in his essay,
"Love and Law" in Charles W. Kegley and RobertW. Bretall (eds.), Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious,
Social, and Political Thought, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), pp. 80-123. For a
comparison ofNiebuhr and Maritain, see Dennis McCann, "Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain
on Marxism: A Comparison ofTwo Traditional Models of Practical Theology" in Journal ofReligion,
58 (April, 1978): 140-168.
25 See Niebuhr, Faith and History, especially chapters four and eight.
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realism from this point forward. Because of this, it is important to note, as is
indicated in the title of Sayre-McCord's essay, the important fact that it is impossible
to speak about moral realism monolithically. Saying that Bruce is a lawyer may well
be true, but this leaves unanswered the questions about what kind of law Bruce
traffics in, the typical demographic ofBrace's clients and what kind of opposition
Bruce typically faces in his legal career. In the same way, saying that Niebuhr is a
realist is a true statement, but it does not answer what kind of realist Niebuhr is, why
realism is important to Niebuhr's theological hermeneutic or what the other types of
moral philosophy that typically stand in opposition to realism are. Specificity is
needed for the associations that will be made with Niebuhr's version of Christian
realism throughout the rest of the work undertaken here.
Niebuhr's association with Christian realism is well-evidenced by the work
that has been undertaken on his thought from the mid-twentieth century onward.
But, just as with moral realism, Christian realism should not be spoken of
monolithically. Neither, though, can Christian realism be understood without moral
realism. For this reason, understanding the nuances of contemporary moral realism
is important. Though discussing all of the nuances ofmoral realism is beyond the
scope of the current project, highlighting those that are most relevant to
understanding Christian realism is important. For this, it is valuable to consider
those versions ofmoral philosophy which are counted as oppositional to moral
realism—anti-realism, broadly—and some of the variations therein. These include
emotivism, non-cognitivism and non-naturalism.
2.4.1. Anti-Realism
Ifmoral realism is a commitment to the notion that moral properties exist and
do so regardless of what we think of them, then moral anti-realism is a commitment
to a proposition of an opposite nature.26 The moral anti-realist is one who argues for
the opposite ofwhat the moral realist proposes, which is to say that the moral anti-
realist proposes that descriptors like good, right or just find their existence and
relationship to moral acts in non-objective ways. For example, the truth-conditions
ofmoral facts are contingent precisely on what the moral agent believes about those
26 This does not, as Brink points out, mean that an anti-realist must be anti-realistic about other
disciplines independent of debates in moral philosophy. Instead, "it is possible to be a metaphysical
realist about such nonmoral disciplines but a moral antirealist". Brink, p. 22
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conditions. Brink introduces anti-realism by dividing its representatives into two
categories: "(a) nihilists, emotivists, prescriptivists, and other noncognitivists who
deny that there are moral facts or truths and (b) constructivists or idealists in ethics
who are cognitivists because they recognize the existence ofmoral facts and true
moral propositions but who claim that these more facts are constituted by some
97
function of our moral beliefs". Though we will not consider the second category
here, the important thing to note is that what appears to distinguish realism from
anti-realism is the beliefwe hold about our beliefs; or, cognitivism.
The realist claims the objectivity ofmorality independent of our beliefs about
it while the anti-realist claims the non-objectivity ofmorality, because morality is
fundamentally related to what we believe about it. It is outside of the parameters of
our current project to discuss all of the distinctions drawn by Brink among the anti-
realists, but it will be beneficial in the long run to take into consideration emotivist
and prescriptivist accounts of anti-realism as representative of the kind ofmoral
philosophy that stands in opposition to that with which we will associate Niebuhr's
realism.
2.4.1.1. Emotivism
Moral anti-realism challenges moral realism in several places, including on
the grounds of the cognitive content involved in moral claims. But as Brink's above
distinction makes clear, there are even disagreements about the cognition involved in
making moral claims in anti-realistic thinking. The noncognitivist argues that moral
judgments find their content not in the claim that moral properties exist
autonomously, but that the content ofmoral judgment is to be found in the moral
agent's approbation of the judgment made, or of the moral act committed. In other
words, "[i]fwe reject moral realism.. .[w]e must treat putative assertions ofmoral
fact, such as 'x is wrong', as disguised expressions of the appraiser's disapproval of
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x or as disguised prescriptions to avoid x".
Emotivism is one popular expression of noncognitivism from mid-twentieth
century moral philosophy. The perceived deficiencies emotivists found in the moral
claims of intuitionists of the early twentieth century gave rise to the influence and
21 Ibid, p. 18.
28
Ibid, p. 26.
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(albeit, brief) popularity of emotivism in the mid-twentieth century. The emotivist
is an anti-realist in so far as she argues for the non-objectivity ofmoral facts and
principles. The emotivist is also a noncognitivist by virtue of the fact that she does
not accord any cognitive content to her moral judgements.
The central thesis of emotivism is exactly what it sounds like: moral
judgments are related to the feelings and emotions of the moral agent who makes
those judgments. The point of emotivism is to convince other moral agents to
support a particular moral judgment, or adopt a particular position by appealing to
that moral agent's emotional sensibilities. Thus, emphasis is placed both on the
words the moral agent uses to describe moral acts, and on the emotions or feelings
they arouse in the hearer of those words. Warnock highlights three distinctions
necessary for an understanding of emotivism. First, emotivism is to be understood
by distinguishing between beliefs and attitudes. Second, emotivism is the
proposition that moral judgments are related to the feelings of the moral agent.
Third, the point of emotivism is to influence a person's attitudes, not his or her
30
beliefs, which will likely lead to a change in behaviour.
Thus, for the emotivist, the moral content ofwords is based on their
interpretations, not on any natural properties to which the moral realist would appeal.
For example, if I tell Chris that Nancy has a rabid personality, the response I elicit
from Chris will likely be one of caution: he will want to avoid Nancy, if possible, for
fear ofher unpredictable nature. But if I tell Chris that Nancy is rabidly devoted to
the cause of justice for the poor, he will have a much different response to her and
will be inclined to think of her as a good person. Thus, "what makes [my description
ofNancy] moral is that the terms applied to [her] also both express and induce a
•3 1
favourable attitude towards [her]...". The point is that the words I choose to
describe Nancy only have moral meaning at the moment that they are interpreted by
Chris. Prior to that, no cognitive content or natural properties can be assigned to
them; they are morally neutral. Emotivism is only one position which challenges
moral realism on the grounds of objectivity and cognition. There are others which
make similar claims about the cognitive function of the moral agent without
29 G. J. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 18.
30 Ibid, pp. 21-23.
31
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thrusting aside adherence to beliefs in the objectivity ofmorality. Let us turn to one
of those now.
2.4.1.2. Cognitivist Anti-Realism: Constructivism
While emotivists are representative of anti-realists who are also
noncognitivists, it is not universally the case that anti-realists must be
noncognitivists, though those positions which are cognitivist and anti-realist are
"less traditional opponents ofmoral realism". A constructivist is exemplary of an
anti-realist who is also a cognitivist. As such, constructivists share similarities with
moral realists.
The constructivist "agrees with moral realism that there are moral facts and
true moral propositions but disagrees with realism about the nature or status of these
moral facts and truths". For the constructivist, moral facts and properties do
possess an objective nature, but the objectivity of these facts and principles does not
exist autonomously from human conceptions about them. The similarity
constructivists and moral realists share thus pertains to the cognitive function of the
moral agent. But there are differences in how each delineates what is meant by
cognition. The differences come in the second part of the sentence, "moral facts and
principles exist independently of what the moral agent thinks about them". The
moral realist and constructivist will agree on the first part ("moral facts exist") of
that statement and disagree on the second ("independently ofwhat the moral agent
thinks about them"). What this means is that "[the first clause] distinguishes moral
realism from nihilism and noncognitivism; [the second] distinguishes moral realism
from constructivist versions of cognitivism".34 The constructivist, then, stands apart
from the moral realist on the issue of cognition. For this person, the cognition of the
moral agent plays a significant role in the understanding ofmoral facts and
principles. John Rawls's "theory of justice" is perhaps the most familiar example of
the role that the cognitive function plays for the constructivist.
There is a diversity of interpretations about the nature and interpretation of
morality among different constructivists. This fact duly noted, I point here to
Rawls's version of constructivism because it came to prominence during the same
32 Brink, p. 19.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid, p. 20.
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period of time with which we have to this point been concerned; the mid-twentieth
century. Rawls's "original position" is a constructivist account ofhow moral agents
arrive at an understanding of justice which "holds that there is a single set ofmoral
facts that are constituted by some function of our beliefs, often by our moral beliefs
"5 r
in some favourable or idealized epistemic conditions". Rawls argues that, in the
original position, the moral agent is capable of deducing, through cognition, those
principles ("first principles") which would enable a society to function justly. To
achieve this Rawls famously posits the "veil of ignorance" behind which moral
agents attend to the question of how a society begets justice at the most fundamental
level. That is, with all else being equal (i.e., "place in society.. .class position or
social status", etc.),36 Rawls assumes that the hypothetical veil will provide the
position from which the moral agent is able to ask the question ofwhat constitutes
(i.e., "constructs") justice for all people of a society.
The reason Rawls's description ofjustice as fairness is a philosophically
constructivist account is because "it specifies a particular conception of the person as
an element in a reasonable procedure of construction, the outcome ofwhich
determines the content of the first principles ofjustice". First principles refer to
those characteristics ofmorality—good, right, just, etc.—that are used to describe
moral judgments. In this case, the objectivity ofmoral facts—that which is
constituted by the first principles—does not exist autonomously from human
cognition. Quite the opposite. Moral objectivity is bound up precisely in how the
moral agent interprets the facts ofmorality's existence. In other words, the
constructivist, pace the moral realist who claims that the meaning intrinsic to moral
TO
objectivity exists regardless of any agent's cognition of it, says instead that the
meaning ofmoral objectivity is determined precisely by the agent's cognitive act of
interpreting it.
Emotivism and constructivism pose different challenges to moral realism on
the grounds of objectivity and cognition. It is not my interest here to defend a
35 Ibid.
36 John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice, Rev. Ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 118.
37 John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory", The Journal ofPhilosophy 77.9 (1980):
515-572. In this article, Rawls undertakes the task of explaining how his understanding of justice as
fairness is a version of constructivism, particularly Kantian constructivism.
38 The moral realist would, however, not allow for the existence ofmorality without the moral agent.
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particular version ofmoral realism over rival understandings of ethics. Instead, I am
only concerned to associate Niebuhr's Christian realism with the trends ofmoral
philosophy from the mid-twentieth century. However, I have pointed to emotivism
and constructivism as two important opposing moral philosophies for specific
reasons, which will now be considered.
2.4.2. Emotivism and Constructivism: Rival Liberalisms?
Niebuhr's early ecclesiological and academic life was a broad struggle
against liberalism. "Liberalism", though, can be variously understood in relation to
the religious and intellectual contexts Niebuhr inhabited. On the one hand,
Niebuhr's struggle was against the generic social ethic of religious liberalism,
particularly liberal Protestantism, which sought to resolve the complex problems of
human existence such as violent conflicts and social inequalities through appeals to
simplistic interpretations of the ethic of Christ. Though not quite as flatly vacuous
as mid-twentieth century popular culture whose ambassadors urged others to
"imagine" a "brotherhood ofman", liberal Protestantism in the earlier part of the
century was noted for its emphasis on appropriating the sacrificial ethic ofChrist
into its social environs, which, if taken seriously, would still effect some sort of
universal harmony; or, so claimed its adherents. On the other hand, an alternative
kind of liberalism Niebuhr found himself at odds with was the liberalism of
intellectuals who championed the developments of things like scientific discovery as
bases for confidence in human progress and as the vehicles that would finally pull
human reason out of the cul-de-sac of religious dogma.39
MoralMan and Immoral Society is Niebuhr's first full-length answer to the
problems posed by these kinds of liberalisms. There he rebukes religious liberals for
their veneration ofChrist's ethic to the degree that it appears as though this ethic can
be commodified as currency in social ethics. Though he affirms that religion must
be involved in any quest for social justice because "[ejvery genuine passion for
39 For a helpful discussion of these two kinds of liberalism, see June Bingham, Courage to Change:
An Introduction to the Life and Thought ofReinhold Niebuhr, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1961), especially chapter 18, "Battling with the Liberals", pp. 221-243. See also RichardWightman
Fox, "The Niebuhr brothers and the liberal Protestant heritage", in Religion & Twentieth-Century
American Intellectual Life, ed. by Michael J. Lacey, (Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars and Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 94-115.
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social justice will always contain a religious element within it",40 he does not think
that social justice can be achieved simply by decontextualising Christ's ethic and
anachronistically attaching it to a social context that Christ knew nothing about.
"The devotion", says Niebuhr, "of Christianity to the cross is an unconscious
glorification of the individual moral ideal [of Christ], The cross is the symbol of
love triumphant in its own integrity, but not triumphant in the world and society".41
In other words, the ethic of Christ cannot be realised in the complicated contexts of
the modern world, and its relevance is in the recognition of this fact.
Ultimately, though he does not frame them in these terms, Niebuhr's
criticisms of liberal Protestantism are criticisms of an emotivist mindset such as the
one defined above, though he never uses that terminology. The religious liberals of
the early twentieth century exhorted their contemporaries to heed the ethic of Jesus
as something realisable in their particular social contexts. This familiar refrain of
liberal Protestantism is most obvious in the works ofWalter Rauschenbusch, one
frequent recipient ofNiebuhr's criticisms, but can be traced back even further to the
liberal theology of Albrecht Ritschl. Concerning the ethic of Christ, Ritschl says
that
what in the historically complete figure of Christ we recognise to be
the real worth of his existence, gains for ourselves, through the
uniqueness of the phenomenon and its normative bearing upon our
own religious and ethical destiny, the worth of an abiding rule, since
we at the same time discover that only through the impulse and
direction we receive from him, is it possible for us to enter into his
relation to God and to the world.42
The problem Niebuhr sees with these kinds of sentiments, and with Ritschl in
particular, is that they "[do] not appreciate that the uniqueness of the Biblical
approach to the human problem lies in its subordination of the problem of finiteness
to the problem of sin".43 For Niebuhr, Christ's ethic is never a "rule", though it is the
ideal against which are measured all other ethical judgments. Moreover, when
Niebuhr refers to the "law of love" ofChristianity, he is inverting Ritschl's above
40 Reinhold Niebuhr, MoralMan and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), p. 80.
41
Ibid, p. 82.
42 Albrecht Ritschl, The Christian Doctrine ofJustification and Reconciliation, (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1900), p. 387.
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proposition 44 The law of love belongs to God, exhibited in Christ, and is that which
transcends the human inability to love others. The person of Christ does not make it
possible to enter into relation with the world; that relationship is already possible by
virtue of the fact that we are created as communal creatures. To be human is already
to be in relation with the world. What Christ's ethic does make possible, in
Niebuhr's purview, is an understanding ofwhat it means to be in right relation with
the world; that is, what it means to "love" the Other in the world. In that sense,
Christ's ethic is the ideal. But it is also impossible precisely because of the sin that
Niebuhr thinks Ritschl disregards.
Rauschenbusch, one of the theological heirs of nineteenth century liberal
Protestantism, suggests that the significant problem facing Christianity in the
twentieth century is the schism between the doctrinal requisition of the Kingdom of
God and modern Christian theology. In A Theologyfor the Social Gospel
Rauschenbusch gives the theological justifications for the sociological claims made
in his earlier Christianity and the Social Crisis. Here Rauschenbusch asserts
(without giving a specific timeframe) that "[wjhen the doctrine of the Kingdom of
God shrivelled to an undeveloped and pathetic remnant in Christian thought, this loss
was bound to have far-reaching consequences".45 These consequences, to
Rauschenbusch, are systemic sins, particularly evident in socioeconomic inequality.
Rauschenbusch offers eight "propositions" to remedy the division between
Christian theology and doctrinal interpretations of the Kingdom of God. Two of
these—the fourth and fifth—appeal specifically to the ethic of Christ. First,
although the Kingdom ofGod existed pre-Christ, Christ "imposed his own mind, his
personality, his love and holy will on the idea of the Kingdom. ...[Therefore, the task
of theology] is to infuse the distinctive qualities of Jesus Christ into its teaching
about the Kingdom, and this will be a fresh competitive test of his continued
headship ofhumanity".46 Second, Rauschenbusch continues,
[t]he Kingdom of God is humanity organized according to the will of
God. Interpreting it through the consciousness of Jesus we may
affirm these convictions about the ethical relations within the
43
Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol I., p. 178.
44 The law of love is discussed more fully in chapter three.
45 Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social Gospel, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox
Press, 1997), p. 133.
46 Ibid, pp. 141-142.
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Kingdom: (a) Since Christ revealed the divine worth of life and
personality, and since his salvation seeks the restoration and
fulfilment of even the least, it follows that the Kingdom of God, at
every stage of human development, tends toward a social order which
will best guarantee to all personalities their freest and highest
development. This involves the redemption of social life from the
cramping influence of religious bigotry, from the repression of self-
assertion in the relation of upper and lower classes, and from all
forms of slavery in which human beings are treated as mere means to
serve the ends of others, (b) Since love is the supreme law of Christ,
the Kingdom of God implies a progressive reign of love in human
affairs. We can see its advance wherever the free will of love
supersedes the use of force and legal coercion as a regulative of the
social order. This involves the redemption of society from political
autocracies and economic oligarchies; the substitution of redemptive
for vindictive penology; the abolition of constraint through hunger as
part of the industrial system; and the completest cessation of
freedom.47
This is the syllogism Rauschenbusch proposes: The Kingdom ofGod is the
absence of sin, which is complete human freedom. The Kingdom of God has been
historically realised in Christ's love. The progressive overcoming of systemic
injustice is happening and will continue to happen until the Kingdom ofGod is once
again historically realised.
This is an emotivist plea because it attempts to appeal to the feelings of the
moral agent and influence his or her attitudes as regards the ethic of Christ. Though
not a moral philosopher, the point Rauschenbusch hopes to make is that the
Kingdom of God, which is the eradication of sin, can be established here and now.
Utopia is at hand, if only we modify our attitudes about how we treat others, and
who does not want Utopia? No one. That is, no one until those who have social
advantages realise what they would have to forsake in order for such a kingdom to
be established. This is why Niebuhr is so adamant about the inveterate effects of
47 Ibid, pp. 142-143.
48 Niebuhr cannot easily make the same accusation of Rauschenbusch that Rauschenbusch glosses the
gravitas of sin in social ethics as he does of Ritschl. Indeed, Niebuhr takes note of the fact that
Rauschenbusch's A Theologyfor the Social Gospel devotes a significant amount of attention to the
problem of sin in social contexts. Nevertheless, Niebuhr does still criticise Rauschenbusch because he
thinks that Rauschenbusch's insistence on the simple application ofChrist's ethic to modern social
contexts underscores the fact that Rauschenbusch does not "understand either the height of the
pinnacle of love or the base of justice. For the height of love is certainly more unprudential and
uncalculating than mutual love [which Rauschenbusch equates with Christian agape] and it contains
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Given Niebuhr's criticisms ofRauschenbusch, ifwe think of
Rauschenbusch's theology as an emotivist appeal, it is little wonder that Niebuhr is
not best thought of as an emotivist himself. What may be much less clear is why one
cannot make the link between Niebuhr's realism and Rawls's liberal constructivism.
Rawls's liberalism was developed around the same world events that shaped
Niebuhr's perception ofChristian realism, and the two share some commonalities in
their critiques and defences of liberalism.49 To answer the question ofwhy
Niebuhrian realism and Rawls's (or any) version of constructivism are similar, but
different, we will now turn our attention to the kinds ofmoral philosophy Christian
realism with which Christian realism is best associated.
2.4.3. Cognitivist Realism: Ethical Naturalism and Christian Realism
As stated, realist claims of any sort are claims about objective realities. But
what, exactly, do the descriptions ofmoral properties as good, right or just mean for
the person who is making those claims? What is the content of those claims? It is
important to note that there is a difference between the form ofmoral claims and the
content ofmoral judgment. On one hand, "moral discourse is typically declarative
or assertive in form".50 On the other, the content of "such moral judgments...
seem[s] to presuppose the existence ofmoral facts and principles and the possibility
ofmoral knowledge [by those who make the judgments]. The form and content of
our moral judgments, therefore, presuppose cognitivism".51 That is, the moral realist
who makes moral judgments does so expecting that he or she knows something—is
cognizant—about the constitution ofmoral properties. These properties are simply
universalistic demands which challenge any particular community". In other words, the problem is
not that Rauschenbusch does not take the ethic ofChrist seriously; it is that he does not take the ethic
of Christ seriously enough. If he did, he would realise that "[i]t is obviously not easy to construct a
social ethic from [the] nonprudential, heroic and ecstatic dimensions of the love ethic. That is one of
the many reasons why Christianity in its various versions has not been too successful in guiding the
collective morality ofmankind; which is not to say that these pinnacles of the love ethic are
irrelevant". See Reinhold Niebuhr, "Walter Rauschenbusch in Historical Perspective" in Religion in
Life 27 (1958): 527-536.
49 Two interesting accounts of the similarities between Niebuhr and Rawls have recently been
published. For the first, see Eric Gregory, "Before the Original Position: The Neo-Orthodox
Theology of the Young John Rawls", Journal ofReligious Ethics 35.2 (2007): 179-206. Gregory
argues that Rawls's early intellectual life was profoundly influenced by neo-orthodoxy (particularly
by Emil Brunner), as is evident in Rawls's undergraduate thesis written during his senior year at
Princeton. See also Edmund Santurri, "Global Justice After the Fall: Christian Realism and the 'Law
of the Peoples'", Journal ofReligious Ethics 33.4 (2005): 783-814. Santurri's argument is that
Rawls's later political philosophy demonstrates an unacknowledged dependence on Christian political
realism, particularly of the kind associated with Niebuhr.
50 Brink, p. 25.
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the natural constituents of objective moral reality. "Natural facts and properties are
presumably something like those facts and properties as picked out and studied by
the natural and social sciences.. ..Ethical naturalism is the claim that moral facts and
properties just are natural facts and properties". In other words, the moral realist
who is also an ethical naturalist appeals to the natural properties of the autonomous
morality from which moral judgments are derived.
Lovin has offered the most thorough account ofNiebuhr as realist, and has
suggested that Niebuhr be identified as a moral realist who is also an ethical
naturalist. Lovin is quick to point out, however, that understanding Niebuhr as an
ethical naturalist does not mean that Niebuhr's ethical naturalism is identical to the
contemporary philosophical articulations of that term. That is, even though
Niebuhr's articulation ofChristian Realism as ethical naturalism does not mean that
"we should.. .expect that the substance of the Christian Realist's moral reflection
ri
will exactly match that of the contemporary.. .naturalist". Instead, there are features
ofNiebuhr's realism which resemble contemporary accounts of ethical naturalism.
For example, Niebuhr's Christian realism already resembles naturalist and
cognitivist accounts of realism at both early and late stages of his career, but he puts
a distinctive twist on the discussion by framing it in terms of the role of the law of
love in the moral agent's life. The law of love is the natural law for Niebuhr. In the
same way that the moral realist who is also an ethical naturalist appeals to moral
terms like goodness as property-possessing and objective, Niebuhr appeals to love.
He understands love in essentialist terms because "God is love" (1 John 4:8). Love
is thus part ofGod's essence (who is also the "ground ofhuman existence")54. The
fact that God quite literally is love means that when Niebuhr speaks about the "law
of love" as transcendent over human existence, he is articulating the same reality as
the moral realist who is an ethical naturalist; that is, love (which is all-encompassing
of objective morality, particularly of the regulative principles of equality and
51 Ibid, pp. 25-26.
52 Ibid, p. 22.
55
Lovm, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 111.
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Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, p. 105.
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justice), exists independently ("transcendently", for Niebuhr) of, but is still bound to,
human existence. Human existence can never be separated from God's essence.55
Love is also interpreted by Niebuhr in cognitivist terms. The moral agent
knows that she is called to love her neighbour. How does she know this? By virtue
of the fact that her love for the other has been commanded by God.56
The Christian love commandment does not demand love of the fellow
man because he is with us equally divine (Stoicism), or because we
ought to 'have respect for personality' (Christian liberalism), but
because God loves him. The obligation is derived, in other words,
not from the obvious unities and affinities of historic existence, but
S7
from the transcendent unity of essential reality.
This is a similar sort of claim to the moral realist who is an ethical naturalist
and who appeals to autonomous moral principles. In this case, Niebuhr claims that
love stands independently ofwhat the agent thinks about it, but this does not mean
CO
that love is dialectically divided from human cognition. As with the inseparable
relationship between essence and existence, the ideal of love, or the objective
autonomy ofmorality, still bears relevance for human contexts. We know that we
are to love because we know that God loved us first (1 John 4:19). We know how
we are to love because God loved us in the person and work of Christ. We also
55
Jacques Maritain, puts it thus: "... [Tjhe concept of existence cannot be detached from the concept
essence. Inseparable from each other, these two make up one and the same concept, simple although
intrinsically varied; one and the same essentially analogous concept, that ofbeing". Jacques Maritain,
Existence and the Existent: An Essay on Christian Existentialism, (New York: Image Books, 1956), p.
34.
56
Obviously the question of how one knows that he or she ought to love his or her neighbour is an
epistemological question. Niebuhr, though he claims disinterest in the subject, does possess
something of an epistemological understanding for how moral agents interpret ethics. Though I do
not examine fully this epistemology here, it is not unimportant to the cognitivist and naturalist
interpretations ofNiebuhrian realism and is worth noting that Niebuhr appropriates elements from
both romanticism and rationalism as part of his epistemological understanding, while at the same time
maintaining critical distance from both. See Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics,
pp. 203-212.
Ibid, p. 213. In light of his use of the word "command" here, it is important to note that Niebuhr's
realism should not be thought of as the kind ofDivine command ethic frequently associated with Karl
Barth. Niebuhr was critical of such an ethic generally, and ofBarth's moral theology specifically.
58 So this statement by Niebuhr should not be identified with the dialectical theology of Barth's neo-
orthodoxy. Niebuhr was critical ofBarth's dialecticism because he thought that it rendered
Christianity a faith "which can easily degenerate into a too simple moralism, [and] may also
degenerate into a too simple determinism and irresponsibility when the divine graces is regarded as a
way of escape from, rather than a source of engagement with, the anxieties, perplexities, sins, and
pretensions of human existence. The certainty of the final inadequacy must not be allowed to become
the source of cultural obscurantism". Reinhold Niebuhr, "We are Men and Not God" in Essays in
Applied Christianity, ed. by D. B. Robertson, (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 174.
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know that we are unable to love as God has loved us in Christ because of the
problem of sin.
2.4.4. Intuitionism and Christian Realism
Based on the above similarities between the descriptions of a Niebuhrian
Christian realist and a particular kind ofmoral realist, we can agree that, on the
ground of naturalism and cognitivism, "[t]he Niebuhrian version ofmoral realism
thus leads us in the direction of ethical naturalism.. ,".59 What Lovin does not think
the Niebuhrian version ofmoral realism leads us in the direction of, though, is
intuitionism. Intuitionism is still a morally realistic approach to moral judgment in
that it affirms the existence and autonomy ofmoral facts, though it makes a
distinction between autonomous facts ofmoral and non-moral judgments. It is also a
cognitivist account ofmoral realism because, for the intuitionist, moral judgments
are apprehended by a universally shared cognitive reason which enables the moral
agent to know what kinds ofmoral judgments to make. The reason Lovin
dissociates Niebuhrian moral realism from intuitionism is precisely because of the
intuitionist account of cognition. "For the intuitionist, the fact that so often we 'just
know' that an act is wrong suggests that these moral aspects of experience are
unique properties of actions and situations, not discerned by examining and drawing
conclusions about natural properties".60 As Lovin rightly notes, the problem with
intuitionism for the Niebuhrian realist is that this kind of cognitive emphasis may
lead to a too-simplistic reductionism about how moral discernment is carried out.
We might even plausibly associate intuitionism with the account ofmoral judgment
articulated in Rauschenbusch's interpretation of the social gospel: the moral agent
intuits that a particular moral act is right or wrong based on whether or not it
promotes a universal harmony established by God's kingdom. Everymoral enquiry
is thus reducible to simplistic approaches to moral judgment.
But intuitionism is a problem for the Niebuhrian realist only if that realist
understands the cognitive function of intuitionism to be reductive to the point that it
uncritically narrows alternative moral judgments to stand as "right" or "wrong"
choices with little regard for the complications that attend to all moral judgments.
Not all accounts of intuitionism are that reductive, though. For example, Mark Platts
59
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defends a particular kind of intuitionism that stands apart from a reductive account
of cognition. This kind of intuitionism "is designed to admit.. .the possibility of
genuine moral dilemmas, of genuine moral conflicts. For this version, there are
many distinct ethical properties whose occurrence can be detected—sincerity,
loyalty, honest, and so on—and there is no reason apriori to assume that they
cannot conflict, even, perhaps, in tortuous ways". 61
Brink, though not an intuitionist, likewise finds implausible the argument that
because of the complications of disagreement in moral judgment, intuitionism's
cognitive account suffers from its simplicity. ".. ,[T]he existence of conflicting
moral beliefs does not demonstrate the existence of conflicting strong objective
foundational moral beliefs.. ..People may hold conflicting moral views quite firmly,
fO
but these moral views need not be foundational". In other words, intuitionism is
not irreducibly reductionistic if the intuitionist allows for the conflict ofmoral
judgment without presuming the conflict ofmoral facts and principles. The point of
Brink's presentation of intuitionism is that the intuitionist still appeals to presence
and objectivity ofmoral facts and principles as non-competing, though moral
judgments frequently do compete with one another. There is, therefore, a
differentiation between the form and content ofmoral discourse of the kind observed
above. In this kind of intuitionism, the intuitionist's moral judgments assume varied
forms and allow for moral disagreement. The content of their moral judgments
presuppose, like the cognitivist above, the existence of objective morality. This is an
appeal to foundationalism,64 and it is on this point that the Christian moral realist can
agree. That is, the Christian moral realist who is also an ethical naturalist makes
arguments based on foundationalism in the same way that the intuitionist in this case
60
Ibid, p. 108.
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MarkPlatts, "Moral Reality", in Sayre-McCord, p. 284.
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Brink, p. 111.
63 To be sure, though, the intuitionist, even in Brink's account, must still argue in favour of the
knowledge ofmoral facts and principles as inferred from the knowledge of non-moral facts and
principles. This is still a morally realistic position, but the moral realist who is also an ethical
naturalist would not agree because that moral agent argues for the necessity ofmoral facts and
principles as possessing natural properties.
4 "Foundationalism holds that one's beliefp is justified just in casep is either (a) foundational (i.e.,
noninferentially justified or self-justifying) or (b) based on the appropriate kind of inference from
foundational beliefs....Moral foundationalism represents the application of foundationalism to the
justification ofmoral beliefs". The moral foundationalist affirms the same premises of the
foundationalist, relating them to moral belief. As Brink notes, intuitionists tend to be moral
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does. These moral arguments allow for disagreement in form, but not in content.
The intuitionist and Christian moral realist can agree, then, that the point about the
differences between the form and content ofmoral judgment is an important one to
make because, "[i]fwe get the facts [or, content] wrong, we will be wrong about the
ethics [or, form ofmoral judgment], too; for the reality to which moral realism [and
in this case, intuitionism] refers is not a separate realm ofmoral ideas, independent
of the facts".65
In short, then, the Christian moral realist that we have associated with
Niebuhrian realism looks much like the one Lovin presents. However, this realist
does not find the same difficulties with intuitionism as that one, if intuitionism is
interpreted non-reductively in relation to the form ofmoral judgment. This is an
important point because it was the notion of reductive accounts ofmoral judgment
and the presupposition of a universal moral faculty (reason) that gave Niebuhr so
much fodder for his criticisms of the Catholic natural moral law tradition which,
prior to Vatican II, appeared very similar to reductive accounts of intuitionism.
However, as we will see in chapter three, these criticisms only stand ifwe allow for
a particular kind of reductive intuitionism. Post-Vatican II moral theology found
much more consonance with Niebuhr's Christian realism, which is why the link with
intuitionism and Niebuhrian realism is a significant one to reconsider.
2.5. Moral Realism's Reception in Theological Ethics
The preceding has been developed so that we can formulate how it is that we
are to understand Niebuhr's Christian realism in the chapters that remain.
Additionally, I have accentuated some particular forms ofmoral philosophy popular
in the twentieth century which either (a) further clarify delineations between
Christian realism and other theological ethics of the same time period (i.e.,
Rauschenbusch's liberalism as representative of a particular type of emotivism); or,
(b) emphasise the similarities between some versions ofmoral philosophy and
Niebuhrian Christian realism (i.e., intuitionism).
It might be a temptation at this point to ask what Athens has to do with
Jerusalem, particularly with regard to Christian realism. That is, one might plausibly
foundationalists. Brink, pp. 101-102. Moral realists, on the other hand, tend at least to be
foundationalists.
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wonder why it is that a discussion ofmoral philosophy has any bearing at all on
Niebuhr's theological ethics. More to the point, the question might be better asked
what makes Niebuhr's realism Christian. These are fair questions, and need
answering before we move on to the remaining chapters in which we will be drawing
both on the philosophical and theological terminology drafted in this chapter.
Moreover, it will make the more explicitly theological discussion that follows in the
final two chapters easier to follow, ifwe note here the necessary associations
between theological ethics and moral philosophy.
2.5.1. What Good is Christian Moral Realism?
If the only difference between theological realism and philosophical moral
realism is the substitution of "God" for "objective morality" as that which
independently exists, it is difficult to see how, or why, there is any need to speak of
ethics as theological in the first place. What does moral discourse gain by the
addition of talk about God to ethics? It seems that realist ethical enquiry is sufficient
to provide a coherent system of ethics without relying on specifically religious, or
even Christian, propositions about God. Christian realism is only one way of
Christian thinking about the relationship between the kinds of foundational beliefs
that inform our understanding of the nature of God and the choices we make in our
everyday lives, and there are even disagreements among those who consider
themselves Christian realists in the Niebuhrian tradition. This variety in approaches
notwithstanding, all theological enquiries must ultimately answer what, if anything,
language concerning God adds to moral conversation.
The answers to these questions are as varied as the approaches that proffer
them, but I want here to draw attention to two. Both are important in terms of the
emphasis given to them by Niebuhrian realism. However, neither, I think, accounts
for the kind of foundational premise upon which they are constructed. It is therefore
worth our time to consider both of these answers before suggesting a different point
of emphasis for interpreting Niebuhr's realism.
2.5.1.1. Christian Ethics?
One answer to the above question is that nothing can be gained by presenting
ethics as Christian in any form, realist or not. Indeed, this is the argument of John
Milbank and of Radical Orthodoxy, and it is the reason Milbank finds such problems
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with Niebuhrianism in the first place.66 In the past several years, Radical Orthodoxy
has developed into an impressive industry by presenting orthodox Christianity as the
foundation for all other social sciences.
It is Radical Orthodoxy's understanding that Christian theological enquiry is
an intellectual enterprise whish reorients all forms ofpublic enquiry (i.e., "secular"
social sciences) to their properly Christian theological locus, thus emphasising the
primacy of theological over public discourse. The argument is that all social
sciences have their origins in Christian theology and therefore, Christian theology
f\7
needs once again to identify itself as a social science. This is not an attempt simply
to recapitulate Christian history from a bygone era; it is a serious consideration of
Christian ethics as a discipline. It also differs significantly from the kind of
Christian ethic we have to this point associated with Niebuhrian realism, primarily
on the issue of the foundational suppositions of realist thought.
Milbank's Christian engages public moral discourse by losing the
metaphysical distinctions of realist thought. Pointing to George Lindbeck's post-
liberalism, Milbank notes that theology today "has to refuse the idea that faith is
grounded in a series of propositions about 'objects' available to our rational gaze:
God, eternity, the soul, or incarnate divinity [and, we might add, 'goodness,
68
tightness or justness']...". The problem with maintaining this idea is that it
accentuates the notion that there is a sphere of neutrality (e.g., the public or,
"secular" square) where questions ofmoral enquiry are answered. There is no such
neutrality for Radical Orthodoxy because all socio-ethical enquiry is related
ultimately to theology. There is also, therefore, no true "secular" if, by that term, we
mean something that has its origin outside of theology. So while it is true that the
theology of Radical Orthodoxy finds itself conversant with those who share its
theological bases, it is also equally true that Radical Orthodoxy believes every public
enquirer, whether the sociologist or anthropologist, to share similar origins, rooted in
the theological, though they may not all recognise those shared bases.
66 Milbank's critique ofNiebuhr in "The Poverty ofNiebuhrianism" is considered fully in chapter
five.
67 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, second edition, (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishing, 2006). See especially Milbank's chapter, "The Other City: Theology as a
Social Science", pp. 382-442.
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Milbank's discarding of the metaphysical realism associated with Christian
realism, however, does not come at the expense of theological objectivism generally.
He still thinks a particular kind of theological objectivism important to moral
discourse. Yet,
[f]or Milbank, theological realism is a kind of confessional realism.
Philosophical realism is problematic in terms of both epistemology
and ontology. Epistemologically, it tends to assume a sort of neutral
access to the way things are, which is then capable of universal
rational demonstration. Ontologically, it assumes that there are
things, substances to be known.69
That is, an altogether different kind ofmetaphysic is involved with
70
"confessional" realism, which is of central importance. "Thus, what Milbank seeks
to unveil vis-a-vis modern social theory.. .is that supposedly neutral, rational
conclusions in fact stem from prerational commitments...[but] those commitments
are either classically pagan or heretical modifications of orthodox Christian
71
accounts". This is essentially Milbank's critique ofNiebuhrianism: Niebuhr's
realism, Milbank thinks, is a pagan (and thus, liberal) modification of Christian
orthodoxy. Confessional realism instead seeks to counteract the logic of a neutral
square under the command of universal rationality, attempting to turn away from the
aberrations of liberalism to the true source on which the excrescences of this
liberalism have grown: Christian orthodoxy.
Because of the emphasis on Christian theology's need to understand itself in
social scientific terms, we might expect Milbank to answer our question about
whether there is such a thing a specifically theological ethics positively. He does
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not. The reason for this is, according to Milbank, that "Christian morality is a thing
so strange, that it must be declared immoral or amoral according all other human
69 James K. A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology, (Grand
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), p. 146.
70
Though we are not fully concerned with Radical Orthodoxy's extremely complicated metaphysic
here, it is worth noting that Milbank goes on to describe a modified "metanarrative" realism, different
from the postliberalism of Lindbeck, which emphasises that the objective component of theology
exists, not autonomously, but in the "performative" acts of human existence. Moreover, these
performative acts are related to the narrative of Christ told by the Church, and so are acts which
already have their origin in God. See Milbank, Theology and Social Science, pp. 387-391.
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Smith, p. 145.
72 John Milbank, The WordMade Strange: Theology, Language, Culture, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997),
"Can Morality be Christian?", pp. 219-232.
37
n-j
norms and codes ofmorality". Christian morality, that is, can only be understood in
terms of the language of Christian theology. Attempts to understand Christian
morality using the language ofmoral philosophy will only result in hybrid,
meaningless languages. Ethics, for Milbank, is in the service of theology.
Thus, one way negatively to answer the question ofwhat is gained by
specifically theological ethics is given in the postmodern account of Radical
Orthodoxy. Here we have observed the essential position ofRadical Orthodoxy's
interpretation of Christian theology. As will be demonstrated in chapter five, I find
several points of contention in Milbank's theological ethic, particularly as it applies
to his criticism ofNiebuhrian realism. It is thus worth keeping in mind these claims
of Radical Orthodoxy as we move forward.
2.5.1.2. Christian Ethics
Others, as we will see in the next section, answer the question posed above
positively and, therefore, differently from Milbank. That is, when asked whether
anything can be gained by a specifically religious account of ethics, there are those
who say Yes. They also offer different points of emphasis than Milbank.
Sometimes those emphases are on the responsibility of the moral agent to guard and
protect the rights of the Other in society.74
In liberal societies, when we speak about being "responsible" citizens, we
putatively mean something along the lines of fulfilling one's social duties (i.e.,
obeying the law, contributing to society, etc.) and not interfering with the 'human
rights' of other citizens. Human rights talk, though, did not originate with modern
liberalism; it has been an integral part ofWestern society for the past 2,000 years.75
There is a distinction to be made on the subject of rights, especially between
objective and subjective rights. On the one hand, "A 'subjective right' is vested in a
73 Ibid, p. 219. Milbank never makes clear why other "codes" ofmorality are not at least as equally
strange to "human norms". That is, why is something like the metaphysics of moral realism, which
claims that moral properties exist independently of human conceptions about them less strange than
"Christian morality", particularly if, as Radical Orthodoxy claims, Christian theology is the bedrock
where the spade of all other social sciences stops turning?
74 Milbank finds the notion ofmoral responsibility "in history" too individualistic to be ofmuch use
for Christian theology, because he thinks it aligns theology excessively to western capitalism. See
John Milbank, "On Baseless Suspicion: Christianity and the Crisis of Socialism" in New Blackfriars,
Vol. 69, Issue 812 (January 1988): 4-19.
75 For a helpful introduction to the history of "rights talks", see JohnWitte, Jr., God's Joust, God's
Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition, (Grand Rapids, Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 2006), especially "A Short History ofWestern Rights", pp. 31-48.
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subject (whether an individual, group, or entity), and the subject usually can have
that right vindicated before an appropriate authority when the right is threatened or
violated.... 'Objective right' (or 'rightness') means that something is the objectively
right thing or action in the [contexts where moral judgments are made]...". 76 For
example, "[y]ou can say [subjectively] that 'a victim of theft has a right to have his
property restored' or [objectively] that 'it is right for a victim of theft to have his
77
property restored'". To relate this to the discussion ofmoral philosophy, we could
say that subjective rights are those rights that pertain to the moral agent, while
objective rights are those rights that are related to the status ofmoral judgments
independent of our thoughts about them. There is, consequently, a foundational
aspect to the question of rights, particularly with regard to objective rights.78
Historically speaking, objective rights have been linked to classical
formulations of the natural moral law tradition, while subjective rights have been
associated with developments in Enlightenment thought.79 Natural law formulations
of objective rights have been understood to derive from a universal natural moral
order. With Enlightenment formulations, however, subjective rights are thought to
80
originate in human nature. But recent developments in rights talk has transitioned
from talk about the rights inherently possessed in human nature, to human rights
o 1
"predicated on 'human dignity'". This emphasis on human dignity provides a
strong basis for the association ofChristian ethics with human rights, which lends
authority to the argument that moral enquiry benefits from the inclusion of
theological language, and may even be inextricably bound to it. Let us now consider
one version of this argument.82
16 Ibid, p. 32.
11
Ibid,-p. 33.
78 Cf. Benedict XVI's April 2008 address to the United Nations on the subject of rights.
http://www.vatican.va/holv father/benedict xvi/sneeches/2008/at>ril/documents/hf ben-
xvi spe 20080418 un-visit en.html. I am grateful to Michael Purcell for pointing this out to me.
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Rights: Continuity andDiscontinuity in the History ofIdeas, (New York, London: The Continuum
International Publishing Group Inc, 2005), pp. 87-109.
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82 Another account comes from Robin W. Lovin, Christian Realism and the New Realities, pp. 183-
221. Lovin presents an interpretation of Christian realism that sees associations with William
Galston's presentation of the "value pluralism" of Isaiah Berlin, which is based on moral realism.
Ibid, p. 79. Lovin thinks Christian realism has much to gain from value pluralism because the latter
presents a secularised version ofmany of the claims that Christian realism makes, and the two
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2.6.. The "Ineliminably" Religious?
If objective rights are indeed related to the status of objective moral
judgments, then subjective rights are linked to ontological considerations because
this kind of discussion is about what kinds of rights are accorded to a human based
on nothing less than his or her being.
One noteworthy account ofhuman rights that attempts to answer the question
of whether or not anything is gained by the inclusion of religious discourse to moral
judgments comes from Michael Perry, whose position is that human rights begins
with the acknowledgement that all humans have a certain dignity due to the fact that
they have been created by God, and that any discussion of human rights which
begins with the claim that the human is sacred is "ineliminably religious".83 Not only
do such claims benefit from theological or religious language; they are predicated
upon it.
Perry does not wish to "defend the (particular) claim that every human being
is sacred", but rather wishes to "inquire whether there is an intelligible secular
version of the claim.. .that every human being is sacred, or whether, instead, the
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claim is inescapably religious". He concludes that it is, and his argument runs like
this. Ifwe start with the foundational premise that all humans are sacred, we must
say that their sacredness comes from something else. This something is God,
"Ultimate Reality", or the divine. All humans are of equal standing before God by
virtue of the fact that they are all sacred. Human rights are therefore ineliminably
religious because they are given by God in the creation of humans. In short,
[i]f.. .the conviction that every human being is sacred is inescapably
religious, it follows that the idea of human rights is ineliminably
religious, because the conviction is an essential, even foundational,
constituent of the idea. The possibility that the idea of human rights
is ineliminably religious poses a problem for the secular enthusiast of
o
human rights, whether she be antireligious or only agnostic.
together help us understand the moral meaning of life and moral responsibility therein. Though we
deal with moral meaning and responsibility some in chapters three and four, Lovin gives a more
political interpretation to Christian realism than I intend to do here. Nevertheless, it is worth noting
here.
83 Michael J. Perry, The Idea ofHuman Rights: Four Inquiries, (New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), pp. 11-41.
M Ibid, p. 39.
85 Ibid, p. 29. Perry importantly notes that this problem notwithstanding, emphasis on the sacredness
of the human finally does not exclude atheists or agnostics from this discussion of human rights. "To
suggest that the idea of human rights is ineliminably religious—that there is finally, no intelligible
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What this means in terms ofwhat is added to moral discourse by specifically
religious language is that the sacredness of other human beings obligates the moral
agent to act in certain ways in order to safeguard the subjective rights of those
around them. Perry grounds this responsibility in love for the Other and replies to
the question ofwhy we are to love the Other, that "the Other, too, no less than
oneself and the members of one's family.. .is a 'child' ofGod—God the creator and
sustainer of the universe... loving 'parent'—and therefore a 'sister'/'brother'".86 But
unlike Niebuhr who views the responsibility to love the Other as that which is borne
out of a response to God who loved us first, Perry says that
[t]he imperative to 'love one another as I have loved you' can be
understood...not as a piece of divine legislation, but as a...human
response to the question of how to live. However, to say that the
response is a human one does not entail that it is not also a religious
response. What makes the imperative a religious human response and
not merely a secular one is that the response is the existential yield of
a religious conviction about how the world.. .hangs together: in
particular, the conviction that the Other is, finally, one's own
sister/brother—and should receive, therefore, the gift of one's loving
87
concern.
That is, according to Perry, my responsibility to love (and thereby recognise
the subjective rights of the Other) emerges from the fact that I acknowledge a dignity
affirmed by the status of the Other as a child of God. To denymy neighbour's
dignified status before God is tantamount to a violation of his or her rights because
the two are inseparable.
If, as stared in the introduction, an emphasis on moral metaphysics is
important for understanding Niebuhrian realism, it would seem that Perry presents a
plausible case for the inclusion of religious language in moral enquiry. Not only
does moral enquiry benefit from the inclusion of religious language, it cannot get
away from that kind of language, as evidenced by the language of the "sacredness"
of our neighbours. Moreover, such a position emphasises the importance ofmoral
secular version of the idea of human rights.. .is not to deny that one can take human rights very
seriously indeed without being religious, that agnostics, too, even atheists, can take human rights
seriously, that they, too, can love the Other. Undeniably, atheists.. .can take human rights seriously;
undeniably, they and other nonreligious persons can love the Other". Perry, p. 35. This is so because
of the definition Perry gives to religious belief. "A 'religious' vision.. .is a vision of final and radical
reconciliation, a set ofbeliefs about how one is or can be bound or connected to the world—to the
'other' and to 'nature'—and, above all, to Ultimate Reality in a profoundly intimate way". Ibid, pp.
14-15.
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obligations and the place metaphysics ought to hold in our moral enquiries. While
metaphysics is important, the Christian realist is suspicious of a too-heavy reliance
on it as a way ofunderstanding Christian responsibility. However, this does not
lessen the importance ofmetaphysics. Indeed, Niebuhr's presentation of Christian
realism is linked to a certain metaphysical structure—moral realism—and without an
understanding of these realist foundations we would not be very successful in our
attempts to understand what it means to be Christian realists. Yet Niebuhr
understands Christian realism to derive its strength, not from metaphysical
assumptions, but from the ability to provide a coherent ethic which speaks to the
common experiences shared by everyone, regardless of religious belief. This is why,
even early in his career, Niebuhr writes that
[i]t is in fact better for religion to forego perfect metaphysical
consistency for the sake of moral potency. In a sense religion is
always forced to choose between an adequate metaphysics and an
adequate ethics. That is not to say that the two interests are
incompatible, but that they are not identical. When there is a conflict
between them it is better to leave the metaphysical problem with
some loose ends than to develop a religion which is inimical to moral
values.88
In other words, metaphysics is important, but not so important as to usurp the
place ofmoral "potency". When there is conflict between metaphysical beliefs and
moral judgments, we leave the conflict in metaphysics unresolved precisely because
we are incapable of resolving all of those disputes, and we can expect that we are
wrong in some of our metaphysical beliefs. For this reason, we should never be
under the illusion that "the Christian faith will endow the believer with a superior
wisdom which will enable him to escape errors, miscalculations, and faulty analyses
OQ
of the common life ofman". Nevertheless, we may have more than a modicum of
control over the outcomes of our moral judgments. This is the nature of realist
thinking in the first place; moral agents must always choose between the "nicely
calculated less and more" of human existence.90 One of the distinguishing
characteristics ofNiebuhrian realism, then, is this: that moral engagement and
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deliberation is with everyone in our social contexts who is capable of that kind of
interaction, regardless of the religious beliefs held by any party involved.
Yet, while it may be suitable to say that Christian ethics instil in the moral
agent a sense of obligation to care for others and ourselves, presumably so do all
moral enquiries, whether Christian or not. Those who engage in moral enquiry are
not seeking out the best ways to be irresponsible to ourselves or to our neighbours.
We do not ask, "Can some good be achieved through careless treatment ofmy
child?" We instead assume that dedicated, careful attention to a child's needs will
put that child in the best position to receive the goods that come from our attention.
Though one who believes in God may very well likewise think that certain
obligations and duties are derived from that belief, it is equally the case that another
who does not possess the same beliefs can, like the religious believer, devote herself
to the task of responsible living and work toward the same good.91 Thus, for the
Niebuhrian realist, the inclusion of theological belief in ethics neither significantly
augments nor abates any moral obligation moral agents might perceive.
The important point to consider is that the prioritisation of living responsibly
for the Other in Niebuhrian realism renders this version of realism not only
Christian, but also public. That is, Christian ethics is not something so strange as to
be unintelligible to those who do not accept the claims of the Christian faith. Those
who do not accept the claims ofChristianitymay accept a Christian vision ofwhat is
good or hopeful for their lives. Thus, Niebuhr, unlike the Radically Orthodox,
recognises the need for shared language about moral discourse without the need for
shared foundational bases rooted in specifically Christian theological language. For
the Christian realist, there can be a common language concerning the good, right or
90
Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, p. 103.
Consider, for example, Andre and Magda Trocme, who lived in the French village of Le Chambon
during the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Andre was the village pastor who, because of his theological
beliefs, felt responsible for the protection of Jewish refugees. Under his leadership, Le Chambon
became known as a safe haven to Jews fleeing Nazi death camps and persecution. Andre's wife,
Magda, played a key role in the village's subversive operations and in the protection of the Jewish
refugees. She, like her husband, felt a sense of responsibility to protect the Jews, but without the
same theological convictions. She understood her moral obligations to be grounded in nothing other
than the fact that there were others who were suffering and that they needed help. "Magda's ethic
[could] be called a horizontal one: she recognized no imperatives from above; she saw only another's
need, and felt only a need to satisfy that need as best she could. She would work for those who
needed her help.. .but she did not work out of awe for any superior being beyond mankind". Philip P.
43
just without forsaking belief in, and discourse about, God, on the one hand; or,
dismissing participation in the public conversation about what is good or hopeful on
the other. The nature of responsibility for the Niebuhrian realist
is not to demonstrate universal rational principles of which the
Christian traditions merely provide examples. Nor it is to use the
Christian narrative to construct an alternative polity in which love
prevails and violence is absent. The task of Christian ethics is to
determine what the power of love and non-violence can mean for the
moral life of an existing society. That determination takes place with
varying degrees of specificity, from the Christian citizen who tries to
say what justice means at a City Council meeting, to a theologian
who tries to articulate the meaning of Christianity for the
transformations of Western history....In all cases, however...[wjhat
is wanted is a 'critical' attitude and a 'responsible' attitude, an
approach that joins in one person the conviction of ultimate meaning
and the test of experience.9*"
In other words, morally responsible living gives our lives meaning, because
when we seek to love the other, we are ultimately seeking to love Christ, who is the
ground of that meaning. The inclusion of theological language in moral enquiry
gives us one version ofwhat this means. But not everyone will accept our moral
account ofmeaningful lives,94 regardless of the kind ofmetaphysics we embrace to
help explain our understanding of goodness, rightness and justness. What, then, is
left?
2.7. Conclusions
The Christian realist does think that there is something to be added by the
inclusion of theological language in moral enquiries. However, this realist is willing
to forego the articulation of the metaphysical beliefs to those who do not share them
in order to find a more "potent" ethic, though the metaphysical beliefs are still
important. But in terms of Christian realism, can the metaphysics presented in the
first part of this chapter give us anything other than a common language that we
share with those who also call themselves Christian realists? Perhaps it is sufficient
to emphasise the language and singularity of Christian theology such as Radical
Hallie, Lest Innocent Blood Be Shed: The Story ofthe Village ofLe Chambon and How Goodness
Happened There, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1994), p. 161.
92
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93 Cf. Lovin, Christian Realism and the New Realities, pp. 192-200. Chapter seven below covers this
more thoroughly.
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Orthodoxy attempts to do; or, perhaps emphasis on the rights of our neighbours and
our moral obligations to protect those rights do give us an understanding of
meaningful lives. There is much, I think, to be commended in the latter claim,
particularly as it pertains to articulating the hopeful implications of Christian
realism. As the chapters unfold, this will be the emphasis ofmy argument.
Put differently, I think what the metaphysics ofChristian realism gives us is a
foundation for theological hope. Christian realism neither tells us what to hope for,
nor how to go about hoping. It does, however, by the virtue of its framework, give
us the interpretive tools necessary for understanding what it is that we are doing
when we hope.
This chapter began the discussion about how that framework is constructed.
After investigating some of the general features of realistic thought, we considered
how those features are relevant to theological ethics. We then observed two
different accounts ofChristian ethics and how they approach the question of how
theological ethics relate to broader moral appeals.
In the next chapter the relationship ofNiebuhr's realism to post-Vatican II
moral theology will be considered in order to contextualise the discussions from this
chapter. By placing Niebuhrian realism in conversation with Catholic moral
theology, we are better placed to understand some of the thematic elements in his
thought that have been discussed to this point.
94
Ibid, p. 193.
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Chapter Three
CHRISTIAN REALISM AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION
3.1 Abstract
This chapter considers Niebuhr's realism and the Catholic natural
moral law tradition. Despite the fact that Niebuhr is frequently critical
of natural law thinking, his realism nevertheless shares similarities
with the natural moral law tradition, particularly with regard to some
of the Vatican II reforms that were established in 1965. Here we will
explore Niebuhr's criticisms of the natural moral law's metaphysics,
epistemology and theology and compare them to the Vatican II
developments in those areas. Following this, the New Natural Law
Theory will be considered in relation to Niebuhr's pre-Vatican II
critiques of the natural moral law tradition. The chapter will end with
a reflection on the issue of "proportionalism" and a comparison of
Niebuhr's thought to that of Catholic theologian Josef Fuchs. All of
this is undertaken in order better to contextualise the discussion from
the previous chapter.
3.2 Introduction
Throughout his writings, Niebuhr is critical of Catholicism moral theology's
natural law tradition, which suggests that there is a divinely ordered law by which
humans are to live and which is understood through human reason. Mindful of the
problem of human sin, the natural law tradition argues that humans are nevertheless
capable of comprehending the law because of their reason, which is a part of their
natural constitution.
In the later years ofNiebuhr's career, however, some began to make the
suggestion that though Niebuhr found fault in natural law thinking, much in his
articulation ofChristian realism embodies features of this tradition, particularly with
regard to metaphysics.1 Those who made this argument did so by associating
Niebuhr's realism with the natural law tradition prior to the final 1965 Vatican II
reforms, which affected interpretations of natural law thinking. This chapter
considers the associations between Niebuhr's realism and the Vatican II reforms.
There is still much, perhaps more, that links Niebuhr's interpretation of Christian
1 See especially, George A. Lindbeck, "Revelation, Natural Law, and the Thought ofReinhold
Niebuhr". Natural Law Forum 4.1 (1959): 148, 151; and Paul Ramsey, "Love and Law", in Kegley
and Brettall, pp. 79-123.
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realism to the Catholic natural law tradition post-Vatican II, and it is worth our time
to discuss these links.
Chapter two set the framework for understanding what realistic thinking
means and argued that Christian realism offers a groundwork for thinking hopefully
about Christian ethics. Considering the relationship between Niebuhr's realism and
the natural law tradition provides a helpful context for continuing the argument
begun in the previous chapter.
3.3. The Context ofNiebuhr's Criticisms
By the time the second Vatican council had concluded its reforms in 1965,
Niebuhr had suffered a stroke that negatively affected his ability to work in the last
years of his life. His theological, ethical, and political writings ranging from the
mid-1950s to the time of his death largely repeat many of the arguments from his
previous writings, though without the creativity and trenchant social analyses of the
earlier works. The same can be said for Niebuhr's criticisms of Catholic natural
moral law theories, which he considered particularly inauspicious to a Christian
social ethic because of their rigidly imperious restrictions on the human moral agent.
Though Niebuhr was aware of the second Vatican council's conclusions, he did not
address in writing any of the changes that were implemented in the Catholic Church
post-Vatican II.2 Consequently, what we have in Niebuhr's writings that do address
the natural moral law are frequently demonstrations of a deep mistrust for what he
saw as the systematic methodology of Catholic ethics to pronounce morally final and
binding fiats without consideration of the human condition, and a related tendency
toward what he called "absolutisation"—the notion that the Catholic Church claims
too much for itself in matters pertaining to religious and moral authority—of the
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natural moral law tradition. Nevertheless, Niebuhr "would no doubt be surprised to
2 It is true that while he never engaged or analysed the resolutions ofVatican II, in 1966 Niebuhr did
make note of the fact that he was "more recently [appreciative of] the Catholic tradition...". See
Reinhold Niebuhr, Man's Nature and His Communities: Essays on the Dynamics and Enigmas of
Man's Personal and Social Existence, (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1966), p. 19; cited in Lovin, Reinhold
Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 15.
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See, for example, William G. Chrystal (ed.), Young Reinhold Niebuhr: His Early Writings, 1911-
1931, (New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1977), pp. 69-74; Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of
Christian Ethics, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935), pp. 232-233; Niebuhr, Faith andHistory: A
Comparison ofChristian andModern Views ofHistory, pp. 204-206, 271; Reinhold Niebuhr, "The
Catholic Heresy" in D.B. Robertson (ed.), Essays in Applied Christianity, pp. 195-263; Reinhold
Niebuhr, "Christian Faith and Natural Law" in D.B. Robertson (ed.), Love and Justice: Selections
from the Shorter Writings ofReinhold Niebuhr, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1959), pp.
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see how closely the revisions of natural law that have developed in Catholic ethics
since Vatican II have paralleled his own criticism of.. .previous moral theology".4
Indeed Niebuhr himself suggested just before Vatican II that "[pjerhaps there is
nothing more important in the ethical reorientation ofmodem Christianity than a new
study of the doctrine of natural law"5 for modem social contexts.
George Lindbeck's article argues that though "the basic metaphysical,
epistemological, and theological affirmations of natural law all seem to be rejected"
in Niebuhr's thought, what Niebuhr's readers are ultimately left with is a thinker
"whose references to natural law are generally critical, and who rarely has a kind
word for Aristotle or St. Thomas Aquinas, [but who] is actually continuing that
tradition in the modem world" because ofNiebuhr's emphasis on the "one law which
is fully and immutably adequate to man's freedom, the law of love".6
Regardless ofwhether or not Lindbeck is correct to argue that Niebuhr
continues the tradition of the natural moral law in Niebuhr's articulation ofChristian
realism (and it will be argued here that he is correct, at least in part), he does rightly
suggest that the criticisms Niebuhr offers of the Catholic natural moral law are
primarily reactions against metaphysics, epistemology, and theology. However,
these are criticisms of categories that largely were made obsolete in favour a new
metaphysics, epistemology, and theology in the wake of the second Vatican council's
reforms. It will be useful here to consider briefly what those criticisms were, before
turning our attention to the ways in which Catholic moral theology itselfwas
modified in the years immediately following the resolutions ofVatican II, as well as
how those changes make Catholic moral theology more amenable to Niebuhr's
interpretation of Christian realism.
3.4. Criticism ofMetaphysics
The metaphysical elements of pre-Vatican II Catholic natural moral law
thinking Niebuhr finds problematic have to do with the relationship between the
properties ofmoral goodness and the social existence ofmoral agents. More
46-54; Reinhold Niebuhr, "Love, Justice and the Question of the Natural Law" in Harry R. Davis and
Robert C. Good (eds.), Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Political Philosophy and Its Application to
OurAge as Expressed in His Writings, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), pp. 163-179.
4
Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 16. See also p. 108 n. 58.
5
Niebuhr, Love and Justice, p. 154.
6 Lindbeck, "Revelation, Natural Law, and the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr", pp. 148, 149, 151.
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precisely, Niebuhr is suspicious ofCatholic conceptions ofjustitia originalis and the
natural law. To Niebuhr, a natural law theory which supposes the loss of original
righteousness at the Fall is problematic because it fails to consider the role of human
action in the culpability of sin, instead emphasising the impact of a single reality lost
at a particular point in history. Additionally, a theory ofjustitia orginalis which
issues certain requirements affiliated with the moral agent's freedom as human
creature is equally problematic because that "freedom can only be tentative and
provisional".7 Nevertheless, "[t]his righteousness.. .is not completely lost in the Fall
but remains with sinful man as the knowledge ofwhat he ought to be, as the law of
o
his freedom". The natural moral law, then, "is roughly synonymous with the
requirements ofman as creature" while justitia originalis is comprised of "the virtues
faith, hope and love, [which] are the requirements of his freedom...".9 This creates a
division between the natural law (the requirements of creatureliness) and justitia
orginalis (the freedom inherent to creatureliness). Niebuhr does not want to
disregard either the requirements or the freedom of humans, and instead thinks that
the two need to be brought together in order better to understand what the natural law
can provide for Christian ethics.
In other words, overemphasis on the natural law and justitia originalis is
inadequate to the task of constructing a realistic Christian ethic because these
categories do not sufficiently account for the socio-political existence ofmoral
beings. On the other hand, positing—as Niebuhr thinks Catholic natural moral law
theories do—such a sharp divide between the two categories is equally problematic
because "[t]his distinction obscures the complex relation of human freedom to all of
man's natural functions, and the consequent involvement of all "natural" or
"rational" standards and norms in sin".10 What Niebuhr proposes as a buttress to
these two categories is an understanding of human moral nature as it relates to the
"law of love". Love, for Niebuhr, takes into consideration the paradox of human
existence and offers a composite ofboth the law and freedom requisite to Catholic
natural moral law theories. Love is thus a law ofboth transcendence and
7
Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. I, p. 280.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10
Ibid, pp. 280-281.
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immanence;11 that is, love encompasses the paradox ofbeing free, yet bound, which
is unique to humans. Here is the point at which Niebuhr agrees with the metaphysics
of Catholic natural moral law theories, and it is worth quoting him at length to
demonstrate how:
This character of the theological virtues as "law" to sinful man is
perfectly revealed in the "thou shalt" of the law of love: "Thou shalt
love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and all thy soul, and all thy
mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is
like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." Here
something is commanded and demanded. That means law. But what
is commanded is a state of heart and mind, a harmony between the
soul and God...a harmony within the soul...and a harmony between
the self and the neighbour.. .which, if attained, would exclude all
commandment. Such a commandment can be understood as stating
an ultimate condition of complete harmony between the soul and God,
its neighbour and itself in a situation in which this harmony is not a
reality. If it were a reality the "thou shalt" would be meaningless. If
there were not some possibility of sensing the ultimate perfection in a
state of sin the "thou shalt" would be irrelevant. It is significant that
philosophical treatises on morals have universally misunderstood the
"law of love" because they lacked the concept of sin as a basis for
12their analysis.
In other words, emphasis on the law of obligation is essential for ethics, but is
irrelevant without an appreciation for the problem of sin. Thus, what is also
contained here is the point at which Niebuhr most strongly disagrees with Catholic
natural moral law theories reliant on the distinction between natural law and justitia
originalis: sin. He thinks Catholic natural moral law theories fail to offer adequate
accounts of the relationship between ultimate standards ofjustice/moral nature to the
conditions of human nature and finiteness precisely because they fail to consider the
fissure in this relationship caused by sin. What results when this fissure is
1 ^
overlooked is the sin ofpride; for once the moral agent believes that her actions
11 Ibid.
12
Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. I, p. 286.
13
Pride, for Niebuhr, is the universal sin which sits atop all other sins as the eventual product of
anxiety and greed. As Langdon Gilkey says, "Our anxiety—hence our will to power and our greed
and hence again our imperialism against every potential neighbor—is unlimited. Once we have
become the center of our own world, conflict with and injustice toward every other inevitably arises.
Here for Niebuhr in the union of finitude and spirit shorn of transcendent thrust lies the source of the
inordinate egotism that he termspride ofpower, which in turn is the source of the social, economic,
and political conflicts that plague history". Langdon Gilkey, On Niebuhr, p. 104. Gilkey goes on to
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cohere with ultimate principles of goodness, she begins to believe that her reason is
uncorrupted by the taint of sin. Nevertheless, sin does not abrogate justitia
originalis, and what should be salvaged from natural moral law theories is an
emphasis on "the continued presence in man of the justitia originalis, the law of
love, as law and requirement".14 Love's "presence" is the "moral sense" that "things
are not as they should be"; it is the good toward which we are drawn, and that for
which we attempt to act.15 The law of love is never finally achieved in history; it
transcends history, and brings history to completion. "Love is thus the end term of
any system ofmorals. It is the moral requirement in which all schemes of justice are
fulfilled and negated".16 But this love is historically enacted in human acts.
However, what prevents the complete realisation of love in history is the human
proclivity to sin. Ironically, then, theories of natural moral law become "a
quintessential 'vehicle of human sin' for the fundamental nature of sin, Niebuhr said,
17is to elevate relative aspects of life to absolute status".
There are two main points ofNiebuhr's criticisms of pre-Vatican II Catholic
natural moral law theories. First, the doctrines ofjustitia originalis and the natural
law of reason must not be delineated to the degree that either of them stands alone.
Second, neither of these components of natural moral law theories provides insight
into moral nature without a more complete understanding of human sin. Catholicism
errs in its overemphasis on originally lost perfection as does any Protestant
overemphasis on the effects of sin in social contexts. Thus, Christian realism claims
that "[m]an is neither as completely bereft of 'original justice' nor as completely in
possession of 'natural justice' as the Catholic theory assumes", but Protestantism,
because of undue stress on the moral agent's total depravity, "has no sense of an
describe the various gradations of pride in Niebuhr's analysis of sin, including "pride of intellect",
"moral pride", and "spiritual pride". Ibid, p. 105.
14
Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. I, p. 296.
15 "The moral sense does not give content to moral judgments. It is a principle of action which
requires the individual to act according to whatever judgments of good and evil he is able to form".
And again, "[wjhatever its peculiar character, the important fact.. .is that men do seem to possess.. .a
sense of obligation toward the good, however they may define it". See Niebuhr, MoralMan and
Immoral Society, pp. 37-38.
16
Ibid, p. 295.
17 Thomas C. Berg, "John Courtney Murray and Reinhold Niebuhr: Natural Law and Christian
Realism" Journal ofCatholic Social Thought, 3 (2006): 7.
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abiding structure at all". The realist's task is thus to strike a balance between
overemphasis on structure, or on the neglect of structure.
What Niebuhr therefore hopes to repair in the metaphysics of natural law
thinking is an awareness of sin's tragic existence, inbuilt with the notion that moral
agents must act despite sin's presence, but must do so with the knowledge that their
moral judgments may be wrong. "Men do have to make important decisions in
history upon the basis of certain norms, even though they must recognize that all
historic norms are touched with both finiteness and sin.. .",19 A theological
metaphysic need not focus on what was lost at the Fall, but on what has not yet been
gained, and what can only be completed by the fulfilment of the law of love at the
completion ofhistory. It must, that is, focus on creation as a dynamic, not static,
process. Therefore, a complete restructuring of the natural moral law is not needed
in order to assemble a realistic Christian ethic, but reparation of the categories
emphasised by Catholicism is.
The question that arises from the metaphysical considerations has to do with
how the moral agent knows which moral judgments represent the principles of the
natural law. For the natural moral law tradition that Niebuhr criticises, the answer is
that human reason is able to discern the principles of the natural law, a fact that
Niebuhr gives a far greater amount of criticism than he does metaphysics.
3.5. Criticism ofEpistemology
Whatever rapprochement is achieved between the metaphysical principles of
natural moral law theories and Protestant reflections on human nature is not achieved
in Niebuhr's criticisms of the epistemology of the natural moral law tradition. He is
perhaps at his most critical when he addresses epistemologies he regards as overly
self-assured, and the Catholic natural moral law is most culpable in this regard.
Though he spends little time constructing an alternative epistemology, it is from
Niebuhr's negative evaluations of natural moral law theories' epistemologies that we
20
can construct a semblance of order to his thought on the subject.
18
Niebuhr, "Christian Faith and Natural Law", p. 50.
19
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. I, p. 284.
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By contrast, Mark F.W. Lovatt argues that "Niebuhr presents an alternative epistemology as the
means by which ultimate truth may be revealed". These means are "more emotive types of
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Both Christian realism and the natural moral law tradition agree that the
principles of goodness are part of an independent natural order, the knowledge of
which moral agents never entirely possess, but to which they attempt to assent
regardless of any limitations which might prohibit the full disclosure of these
principles, such as the inevitable hindrance of sin. Their paths diverge, however, with
regard to the nature ofknowledge and reason and the justice this knowledge elicits,
rather than on the nature of the moral principles to which reason directs the moral
agent.
Niebuhr criticises the natural moral law tradition for its understanding of
"uncorrupted" reason as a vestige of the pure self left after the first sinful act of
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humans. More specifically, Niebuhr criticises "medieval" (Thomistic) and
"modern" (the construal of the natural law in the eighteenth century by "bourgeois
idealists")22 understandings of reason for this interpretation. The problem, as
Niebuhr sees it, is that an emphasis on uncorrupted reason leads the moral agent to
conclude that the elements of justice achieved in socio-political contexts are likewise
uncorrupted. What Niebuhr does not consider is that Thomistic conceptions of the
natural law distinguish between "speculative" and "practical" reason, a distinction
Niebuhr himself would affirm. As Aquinas himself says,
.. .since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with necessary things,
which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like
the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical
reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about
which human actions are concerned: and consequently...the more we
descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter
defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in
communication such as myth, symbol and paradox [offered] as replacements for rational dogma in
revealing true religion". Mark F.W. Lovatt, Confronting the Will-to-Power: A Reconsideration of the
Theology ofReinholdNiebuhr, (Cumbria: Paternoster Press, 2001), pp. 152-153. What Lovatt is
discussing is in this passage is epistemology as it concerns the doctrine of salvation in Niebuhr's
theology. Nevertheless, the point is still applicable to the argument here because it points to the larger
question of the role epistemology serves in Niebuhr's realism. It is a questionable assertion that
Niebuhr ever adhered to a particular epistemology, or ever constructed an alternative one, and the
implausibility of this suggestion lies within the larger argument that Lovatt attempts to make; namely,
that Niebuhr interprets reason as "inadequate", and as "no match for the will-to-power". Power and
reason in Christian realism are not mutually exclusive entities, even in epistemological considerations,
and, pace Lovatt, it is more accurate to say that Niebuhr understands reason and the will-to-power
(egoism) as two sides of the same coin, though reason is in the service of self-interest. For Niebuhr,
the "will-to-power uses reason, as kings use courtiers and chaplains to add grace to their enterprise".
Niebuhr, MoralMan and Immoral Society, p. 44. Emphasis mine.
21
Niebuhr, "Christian Faith and Natural Law", p. 53.
22 Ibid.
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all men...[b]ut in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not
the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to general
23
principles...
In other words, speculative reason is directed at the objective and
unchangeable nature of truth, while practical reason is concerned with the fluctuating
contexts in which that truth is discerned. According to Niebuhr, though, the
knowledge that results from (practical) reason's direction of the moral agent to the
disclosure of the (speculative) moral principles of the natural law is a perfected
knowledge in natural moral law theories. Niebuhr counters what he perceives as this
emphasis on the perfected nature ofjustice, however limited, in Catholic natural
moral law theories with the declaration that all attempts at justice are infected with
an '"ideological taint' in human knowledge".24 Instead, to Niebuhr, human
9 S
knowledge is "transient" and bound to "cease". This transience is most obvious in
acts of justice, which, though potentially beneficial to the social good, are also
themselves transient and bound to the sinful contexts in which they occur. They are
thus only "approximations" of the higher ideal of love. Human knowledge and acts
ofjustice are bound together by virtue of their perfect natures in natural moral law
theories; in Niebuhrian realism, they are likewise bound by the fact of their sinful
imperfections.
The question of how the moral agent knows the good is never given a
positive answer in Niebuhrian realism. Negative emphasis is instead given to the
good the agent does not know, and the proximate efforts at collective justice
undertaken to countermand social evils. How and where these efforts are carried out,
as well as the implications this has for the theological accounts in natural moral law
theories, are the next areas deserving attention as we consider the Niebuhrian
critiques of Catholicism's natural moral law theory.
23 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica (trans, by Fathers of the English Dominican Province),
Volume Two, la IIae QQ. 1-114, (Notre Dame: Ave Maria Press, Inc., 1948), p. 1011.
24
Niebuhr, "Christian Faith and Natural Law", p. 48.
25
Cf., Niebuhr's 1960 sermon, "Faith, Hope, and Love", disc N665 14-15, available from The
Reinhold Niebuhr Audio Collection, Union-Presbyterian School of Christian Education, Richmond,
Virginia.
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3.6. Criticism ofTheology
Though Niebuhr does not spare criticism of the idea that the epistemic
function of reason and its ensuing knowledge and moral acts are incorruptible, his
sharpest critique of Catholicism's natural moral law theory deals with the area where
these moral acts are discerned and through which they are carried out: the Church. It
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is the "height of spiritual arrogance", in Niebuhr's estimation, to associate any
modicum of the goodness in moral acts ofjustice with the independent properties of
goodness themselves, simply because the acts of justice are carried out in the
Christian Church; and this arrogance is manifest significantly in the Catholic Church.
Whereas in the previous enquiries into metaphysics and epistemology, Niebuhr is
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critical of what he considers both Protestant and Catholic errors, his criticism of the
theological conception of the church as the institutional arbiter of uncorrupted justice
is reserved primarily for the Catholic Church. Despite the fact that Protestantism is
often susceptible to the same self-delusion as Catholicism, especially in regard to
knowledge and reason, "[i]t must be admitted.. .that the Catholic theory of the church
as divine institution lends itselfparticularly to the temptation of confusing relative
with eternal values.. .[which] lacks the proper reservations such as are found in the
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more consistent Protestant views of the church". In a sense, then, Niebuhr's charge
that Catholicism's ecclesiology fails to safeguard itself against the primal urge to
usurp God's place as the ultimate moral authority mirrors the earlier analysis of
liberalism inMoralMan and Immoral Society. That is, the Church, as with society,
is exemplary of the delusional grandeur of the individual writ large. While the
individual moral agent may erroneously believe he or she is capable of understanding
the principles of goodness through reason, the Catholic Church is demonstrative of
the practical outworking of this pride in its emphasis on justice as the social
embodiment of goodness. It should be remembered that Niebuhr's critique of the
Catholic Church's identification of justice with goodness does not disregard the fact
90
that those achievements of justice are still only partial. It is not the degree of justice
26
Niebuhr, "Arrogance in the Name ofChrist" in D. B. Robertson (ed.), Essays in Applied
Christianity, pp. 197-201.
27 The outline ofNiebuhr's critiques of Catholicism is the only one necessary for our immediate
purposess.
~8
Niebuhr, "Arrogance in the Name of Christ", p. 200.
29 Cf. Paul VI's Papal encyclical, Populorum Progressio, (March 26, 1967), which emphasises this
point, http://www.vatican.va/holv father/paul vi/encvclicals/documents/hf p-
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achieved that Niebuhr criticises, but the notion that achievements of justice, however
partial, are still fully good, even in their incompleteness.
This confusion of goodness with the acts ofjustice in the Church is the result
of two errors ofCatholic natural moral law theories, according to Niebuhr. First, the
more heavily emphasised doctrine of original sin in Protestant ethics does not receive
the same treatment in Catholic moral theology. For Niebuhr, original sin was evident
in perennial efforts of humans to assume the place of God as final judge and arbiter
over all moral acts. This leads to the obfuscation ofhuman self-interest as the force
which taints all moral acts, and which prohibits the realisation of goodness in ethical
judgments. When the moral agent abandons self-reflection in favour ofmoral action,
the result is a view ofmoral reality that assumes knowledge of the unknowable God,
TO
and discernment of God's often indiscernible will. "Sometimes the self acts and
sometimes it contemplates its actions. When it acts it falsely claims ultimate value
for its relative necessities and falsely identifies its life with the claims of lifeper
31 rse". Thus, self-interest is the prohibitive agent in realisations of the good, and "[i]t
is because self-interest is not easily overcome in even the life of the 'redeemed' that
most of the harmonies of life are not the perfect harmonies of fully co-ordinated wills
but the tolerable harmonies of balanced interests and mutually recognized claims".
The second error Niebuhr believes a Catholic theological construal of the
natural moral law position makes, as we will see, is in the assimilation of Stoic
natural law properties. The problem, according to Niebuhr, is not that Catholicism
draws on the resources of Stoic thought (for this is inevitable in any system of
Christian thought) but that the delineations between "absolute" and "relative",
between eternal and temporal, in Catholic natural moral law "are too absolute
because it is never possible to define the limits of the force of sin or of the ideal
possibilities which transcend sin". Moreover, Catholicism transmutes the moral
vi enc 26031967 populorum en.html. I am grateful to Dr. Michael Purcell for pointing this out to
me.
30 The "unknowability" ofGod is a thematic element that runs through many ofNiebuhr's works, and
signifies some similarities with Barth's work on this subject. Though it beyond the scope of the
present investigation to consider these occurrences in Niebuhr's work here, it merits notation,
especially in light of the fact that the two are usually identified for the differences in their thought.
31 Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny Man, Vol. I, p. 259.
32 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Spirit of Justice" in, Love and Justice, pp. 25-26; and "Love, Justice and
the Question ofNatural Law" in Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics, pp. 163-164.
33 Niebuhr, "Love, Justice and the Question ofNatural Law", p. 169.
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value of the absolute natural moral law into the theological virtues of faith, hope, and
love as moral characteristics embodied by the individual moral agent and the Church
as an institutional moral agent, despite the sinful contexts in which both exist. We
can see, then, the similarity ofNiebuhr's critique of the theology of natural moral
law theories and their metaphysics and epistemologies in Niebuhr's return to the
conception of sin as the obstruction which prevents the realisation of the good
promised in the natural moral law.
Niebuhr thinks that the Protestant concept ofSchoepfungsordnung ("order of
creation"), which offers something of an alternative to the ecclesiology of the natural
law tradition, encounters similar difficulties as Catholicism's emphasis on the
Church.34 With this Protestant notion of a created order—made up of the family,
church, and government—the church is understood as only part of the larger societal
order, instead of the singular establishment through which moral goodness is
discerned, justice carried out. Niebuhr thinks that the Catholic natural law tradition
and the Protestant concept of the "orders of creation" are essentially at fault for the
same thing: each, in its own way, offers a pre-closed hermeneutic which
■J c
overemphasises the "push of duty" and fails to take seriously the "pull of grace".
That is, Protestant interpretations of the "orders of creation" are, like Catholicism, at
fault for neglecting the aspect ofmystery in human life, grace, at the expense of an
emphasis on the order of life.
What Niebuhr finds more tenable for Christian ethics is a pluralistic emphasis
which incorporates the church and all other areas of social existence as the places in
36which acts ofmoral responsibility are conducted. Such an emphasis takes seriously
the notion of sin in all moral acts that Niebuhr thinks Catholicism flouts, and defrays
responsibility to those areas of life in which these moral acts are carried out.37
34
Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. 1, pp. 281-282.
35
Niebuhr, "Love and Law in Protestantism and Catholicism" in Christian Realism and Political
Problems,-p. 150.
361 am grateful to Robin Lovin for pointing this out. Lovin offers an account of this pluralistic
emphasis in Niebuhrian realism by associating it with Bonhoeffer's account of the mandates. See
Christian Realism and the New Realities, Chapter six.
37 This emphasis on pluralism has led some, most notably Stanley Hauerwas, to accuse Niebuhr of
lacking an ecclesiology. See Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain ofthe Universe: The Church's
Witness and Natural Theology, (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2001), pp. 87-111. It is not my interest
to defend Niebuhr's ecclesiology, but for a helpful analysis, see Kenneth Durkin ReinholdNiebuhr,
(London: Cassell Publishers Ltd, 1989), p. 182. Durkin defines Niebuhr's ecclesiology as
commitment to the idea of "the Church as the Body of Christ, as a community of grace, as the leaven
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3.7. The Just War Tradition
Nowhere is the divide Niebuhr drives between Catholicism's stress on the
importance of the Church as bearer ofmoral goodness and the shared responsibility
of just and unjust acts in the created order more apparent than in his discussions of
the JustWar doctrine. Though it is beyond the scope of the immediate investigation
fully to analyse Niebuhr's understanding of Just War thinking, a brief excursus into
the way he interprets the differences between Catholicism and Christian realism is
worth our while, especially in light of the fact that Niebuhr is one thinker frequently
credited with the revitalisation of Just War analyses in the late twentieth century.38
The divide is apparent because it is precisely at the point of applying the theology of
the natural moral law to political considerations that Niebuhr thinks Catholicism's
theological deficiencies are most perceptibly detected. "The limitations ofCatholic
natural-law theories", Niebuhr says, "are revealed with equal clarity when applied to
the field of international relations. The Catholic theory of a "just war" is a case in
•7Q
point". A word about moral ambiguity merits our brief attention in order to
understand Niebuhr's criticisms ofwar and Catholic natural moral law theories.
Theology for Niebuhr is useless unless it assumes a stance ofpractical
relationship to modern social contexts. The fact that Niebuhr, only in the latter
stages ofhis career, determined that theology was not a relic of "moral idealism" and
could, in fact, be useful in the navigation ofmoral predicaments and the construction
of ethics, explains his late appreciation for some prominent theological thinkers,
particularly Augustine, from whom Niebuhr draws insights regarding the Just War
tradition.40 Mirroring the criticisms noted above, Niebuhr points out that, regarding
the doctrine of Just War, Catholicism fails to offer an adequate theological stance
because of its previously mentioned insistence on the absolute status of the church as
sole possessor ofmoral goodness and bearer of social justice, "the arbiter of culture
and civilization".41 A sufficiently realistic theology for Niebuhr accounts for the
in the social fabric, a concept which was developed by the Catholic Church at the Second Vatican
Council".
38 Cf., Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just War Against Terror, pp. 99-111; Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust
Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 110 n. 4.
39 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan , Vol. I, p. 283.
40 See Niebuhr's "Intellectual Autobiography" in Kegley and Bretall, (eds.) Reinhold Niebuhr: His
Religious, Social, and Political Thought, p. 9.
41 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Selfand the Dramas ofHistory, (London: Faber and Faber Ltd, 1956), p. 68.
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fluid nature of social contexts and subsequently adapts its insights to address the
moral questions of the present day. While relativism poses an even more spurious
alternative to realism than moral absolutism in relation to Just War thinking,
Catholicism's social theology nevertheless fails here because "it assumes that
obvious distinctions between 'justice' and 'injustice', between 'defence' and
'aggression', are possible".42 The evolution and changing face of social contexts
requires that moral agents adjust their moral imaginations in ways Catholicism fails
to capture. Protestantism, too, is blameworthy on this point because of its tendency
toward "Lutheran relativism and moral scepticism which finally leaves the Christian
without any standards by which he might judge the relative justice ofhis nation's
cause".43 Despite the ever-changing nature of social contexts, abject relativism leaves
the moral agent with no particular principles on which to base moral judgments.
Thus, ifCatholicism absolutises the relative, Protestantism relativises the absolute.
The result in either case is a form ofperfectionism untenable for social theology and
ethics.44 Awareness ofmoral ambiguities tempered by attendant adaptations ofmoral
judgments and actions without recourse to despair is what Niebuhr urges, particularly
in the case ofwar. It should be recognised that there is no single, determinative
moral authority, such as the Church, whose pronouncements concerning decisions to
engage in or refrain from war as moral or immoral can be accepted absolutely. On
the other hand, those disagreements about the tightness or wrongness of such
decisions that inevitably do occur should not lead the moral agent to assume that
there is no moral grounding on which to stake her claim, or by which to justify her
moral reasoning. Realistic moral thinking accepts neither absolutism nor relativism,
but seeks to mediate the ways ofmoral judgment through analysis of the social
contexts in which such judgments are made.
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Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. I, p. 283.
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44John C. Bennett, another, more systematic realist than Niebuhr, criticises Niebuhr for an overly-
perfectionist understanding of the love principle. "Professor Niebuhr", says Bennett, "seems to me to
divert attention from the real centre of the difficulty [of social ethics] by his extremely perfectionist
interpretation of love in terms of complete selflessness and complete non-resistance. His conception
of love does not suggest an ideal that has meaning except for the most intimate personal relations".
See John C. Bennett, Christian Realism, (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1941), pp. 114-
115. Bennett's own conception of love sounds much more like the agape-ism of situation ethics
associated with Joseph Fletcher of the 1960s, and is akin to the "idealisms" Niebuhr castigates for
their naive and uncritical adherence to simple theories of morality.
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Thus, the theological issue for which Catholicism is most challenged by
Niebuhr is its understanding of the Church's role in society. Niebuhr emphasises the
Protestant doctrine of the created order, but this does not mean that the nature of the
church as an instrument of social conscience is lost. What is significant about the
theological grounding of Protestant ecclesiology is that it emphasises the fact that
"the church is not unqualifiedly the Kingdom of God but rather that place in human
history where the Kingdom of God is known and where the judgments ofGod are
felt to be pointed at all human actions and institutions, including the church itself'.45
Thus, the church occupies a unique social function in Niebuhr's theology, but
maintains this position only with the awareness of its own culpability in human sin.
Disavowal of that sin is expressive of the pride from which the sin stems.
We have now considered Niebuhr's criticisms of the metaphysical,
epistemological, and theological elements of Catholicism's natural moral law, but we
have not yet considered these criticisms in relation to any of the developments that
occurred in Catholic moral theology post-Vatican II. Are Niebuhr's comminations
of Catholicism fair? Are they representative ofChristian realism today? Moreover,
what do they suggest to the modern reader about the methodology informing
Niebuhr's own realism? What, if any, are the similarities between post-Vatican II
moral theology and Niebuhr's understanding of Christian realism? It is to these
questions that we now turn.
3.8. Post-Vatican II Catholic Moral Theology
Niebuhr's criticisms of Catholic moral theology are often inadequate at best,
uncritical at worst, when considered in light of the documents of Vatican II and many
subsequent documents in the tradition of Catholic moral theology. He exhibits a
strong Protestant bias in his criticisms of Catholicism that is representative ofwhat
he saw as assimilation with Fascism in Europe,46 and one that does not consider the
many ways his understanding of realism coheres with some of the thought of
Catholic moral theology. Still, it seems that some of the critiques Niebuhr offered of
Catholicism would today be repeated, even in light of the revaluations ofmoral
theology post-1965. For example, the documents ofVatican II and some of the papal
encyclicals since that time demonstrate coherences between Niebuhrian realism and
45 Niebuhr, "The Catholic Heresy", p. 209.
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Catholic natural moral law theories, particularly with regard to the metaphysical and
theological concerns. But they also confirm the differences between the two
approaches to moral reasoning, principally on the issue of epistemology. It is worth
our time here to consider some of those documents and their relationship to
Niebuhrian realism.
3.9. Metaphysics post-Vatican II
The metaphysical principle on which Niebuhrian realism and the Catholic
natural moral law assume common ground is with the issue ofmoral anthropology's
conception of original perfection, defined as the natural law in the human.
Catholicism makes the point, noted above as the Niebuhrian emphasis on the "law of
love", that for the human there is the moral sense that "things are not as they should
be", and that the human qua moral agent is the instrument in whom the moral
principles of goodness are recognised, though the true nature of these is held at a
distance in our moral judgments because the complex nature of the human spirit is in
a state of constant tension (sin). Thus, the human is, "a weak and sinful
being.. .[and] often does what he would not, and fails to do what he would".47 As
Fergusson notes, "[although some rudiments of the natural law are present in the
minds of all rational creatures, this does not provide a free-standing basis for an
adequate moral theory. Our grasp of the natural law is clouded by sin and error".
That is, we may affirm that things are not as they should be, but we cannot always
affirm how it is that those things should change. Niebuhr makes this same point
when he states that
[t]he consciousness of original perfection is not in some universal self
in distinction to an empirical self.... [I]n every moment of existence
there is a tension between the self as it looks out upon the world from
the perspective of its values and necessities and the self as it looks at
both the world and itself, and is disquieted by the undue claims of the
self in action. These two perspectives of the self are clearly
revealed.. .in the Pauline process of self-searching. [Paul] declares on
the one hand: "For we know that the law is spiritual; but I am carnal,
sold under sin." Here the sinful self looks at a reality which seems to
be outside the self. It is the law. But in almost the same breath St.
46 See Niebuhr, Essays in Applied Christianity, pp. 22, 207-212.
47 "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World" (Gaudium et Spes) in Walter M. Abbott
(ed.), The Documents of Vatican II: All Sixteen Official Texts Promulgated by the Ecumenical Council
1963-1965. Translated from the Latin, (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1966), p. 208.
48
Fergusson, Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics, p. 46.
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Paul declares: "Now then it is no more I that do it, but sin that
dwelleth in me"....Here the self as ultimate subject looks at the sinful
self and declares it is not itself.49
Of course, the anthropological framework is not unique to post-Vatican II
moral theology, though the stress on these types of concerns is greater in some of
those documents.50 The central basis of natural moral law, even prior to its reception
in Christian theological thinking, has always been some derivation of the claim that
the law is written in the consciousness of the human moral agent so that certain
universal moral norms are discernible to the moral agent. For Christian theology,
then, the proscription against murder, or the right ordering of one's desires are in
concert with God's ordering of human life, and are naturally present in all rationally
moral humans. "All creatures have 'impressed' in their very being inherent
tendencies which reflect the ordering and orientation which God their creator wishes
for them".51 Though this notion of a law inscribed in the moral agent has seen
considerable modification in Catholic moral theology over the centuries, the basic
idea remains.52 Niebuhr draws short of affirming the Catholic conception of a
universal moral law inscribed in human nature, but he does suggest that love, which
is the only basis for a common morality, is the "law" of this nature. This is precisely
the "reorientation" of the natural law tradition for which Niebuhr calls. Such
reorientation argues for the feasibility of the natural moral law in contemporary
ethical reflection, which is constituted by a strong emphasis on the anthropological
character of human nature. Human nature, to Niebuhr, is
a realm of infinite possibilities of good and evil because of the
character of human freedom. The love that is the law of its nature is a
boundless self-giving. The sin that corrupts its life is a boundless
assertion of the self. Between these two forces all kinds of ad hoc
restraints may be elaborated and defined. We may call this natural
law.53
49 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. I, p. 278.
50 Cf. "Declaration on Religious Freedom: On the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social
and Civil Freedom in Matters Religious" {Dignitatis Humanae), in The Documents of Vatican II, pp.
675-694.
51 John Mahoney, TheMaking ofMoral Theology: A Study ofthe Roman Catholic Tradition, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 78.
52 Ibid, pp. 72-83.
53
Niebuhr, "Christian Faith and Natural Law" in Love and Justice, p. 54.
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Niebuhr obviously still seeks to emphasise the doctrine of sin in his
reworking of the natural law, but the common anthropological ground he now
occupies with Catholic moral theology is apparent. Of course, the moral agent's
method of discernment is not rectified for Niebuhrian realism as with post-Vatican II
moral theology as we will see momentarily, but it is worth noting the areas of
agreement the two do share. We will now continue that exploration by considering
the ways in which the theological interpretations of the role of the Church are
amended in the moral theology ofpost-Vatican II contexts in such a manner that
they find much in common with Niebuhrian realism.
3.10. Mystery and Social Ethics: Theology Post-Vatican II
Lumen Gentium and Gaudium et Spes are two statements in the documents of
Vatican II that address the role of the Church in society.54 Lumen Gentium's
importance is signified by its status as the only dogmatic constitution in Vatican II
that addresses ecclesiological concerns.55 It serves as the basis for the revised
understanding of the Church's constitution and has been noted for its "ecumenical
spirit".56 Gaudium et Spes is more practical and pastoral in timbre, builds on the
ideas set forth in Lumen Gentium and seeks to define the methodology by which the
Church, through self-examination, engages its particular socio-political contexts.
While neither document presents a theological conception of the
natural moral law fully assimilated to the Niebuhr's realism, both documents
do signify a shift in thinking about the nature of the moral law and its
relationship to the Church, as well as moral agents' response to that nature,
particularly with regard to two areas of concern, outlined below.
First, Lumen Gentium significantly begins its ecclesiological enquiry by
assessing the "mysterious" nature of the Church. Rather than discussion of the
54 See The Documents ofVatican II, pp. 9-101, 199-308, respectively.
55 Vatican II has one other dogmatic constitution, Dei Verbum, which addresses divine revelation. See
The Documents ofVatican II, pp. 111-128. It should be noted that"Lumen Gentium does not actually
define any new dogmas. It sets forth, with conciliar authority, the Church's present understanding of
her own nature". While this does not differ dramatically for the first Vatican council's ecclesiology,
the significant change is that "Vatican II wished to propose its teaching without anathemas and
condemnations". Seep. 11.
56 Ibid, p. 102.
63
doctrine of papal infallibility, the energy ofVatican II's documents is directed at
the constitution of the Church and the ethics of the Church-in-society. We might
say, in Humean fashion, that the dogmatic constitution of the Church, Lumen
Gentium, seeks to define what the Church is, while the pastoral constitution,
Gaudium et Spes, attempts to answer how the Church ought to be in the world-at-
large. What unites Lumen Gentium is its Christological emphasis which
characterises the Church as, mysteriously, the institution whose existence is defined
by its unique governance under Jesus Christ, yet whose position in socio-political
contexts "indicates that [it], as a divine reality inserted into history, cannot be fully
CO
captured by human thought or language". That is, while the nature of the Church is
bound to the person of Christ, the epistemological function of knowing how this
relationship occurs, or what is required of it is never fully discernible within the
context of history; it is a mystery.
Mahoney argues that the role of Vatican II in shaping the "new direction" of
moral theology is characterised by two features: "a drive towards totality and an
attempt to recognize diversity".59 Totality in Vatican II, according to Mahoney, is
interpreted as a rebuttal to the "neo-scholasticism" of the nineteenth century.
Without disregarding twelfth-century scholasticism which sought to reconcile
theological statements about the nature of reality seemingly at variance with one
another by "packaging] and pigeonholing] reality" into analysable components of
"objective" and "subjective" reality,60 the emphasis on totality recognises the
necessary analytical divisions between moral agent, moral act, and moral reality, but
interprets them holistically, as a part of the same reality; an "intelligible whole".61
Diversity does not, as one might legitimately anticipate, mean dispersion of
moral agent, act, and reality into the analysable components ofobjectivity and
subjectivity. Instead, Mahoney speaks about diversification in modern moral
theology and the second Vatican council in methodological terms. Thus, diversity
"refers to viewing the whole, or the totality [of reality], in a diversity of different
57 Vatican II still adheres to the notion of papal infallibility. However, in contrast to the first Vatican
council, there is not an entire section devoted to the doctrine ofpapal infallibility. See The Documents
ofVatican II, pp. 48-52.
5 The Documents ofVatican II, p. 14 n. 1.
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Mahoney, The Making ofMoral Theology, p. 302.
60 Ibid, p. 309.
61 Ibid, p. 310.
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ways". Consequently, diversity and totality may be understood as two branches of
the same root. What is necessary to supplement any incongruent elements that do
exist between totality and diversity, according to Mahoney, is "a recovery of
mystery".63 That is, appreciation ofmystery in moral theology is recognition of the
fact that the nature of objective reality is never fully knowable in the subjective
context of human existence.
Mahoney's suggestion that much ofmodern moral theology post-Vatican II
is involved in the theological appropriation ofmystery is the point where we see the
strongest similarities between Niebuhrian realism and post-Vatican II moral
theology on the issue of the natural moral law. There are significant elements of
existentialist thought reflective of the nature ofMahoney's above statement and
characteristic of twentieth-century philosophy in Niebuhrian realism, and these
extensively inform Niebuhr's interpretation of the natural moral law. This
existentialism, however, is not a confusion of the distinctions between objectivity
and subjectivity in either modern moral theology or Niebuhrian realism. The
categories of objective and subjective still exist, particularly for Niebuhr.
The second point concerning the shifting dynamics ofmodern moral
theology and the natural moral law tradition that is worth noting is the modification
in Catholic socio-ethical thinking, especially evident in Gaudium et Spes. What
results from the aforementioned emphasis on existentialist thought, marked in the
recovery ofmystery, is a revised understanding of the Church's role in social ethics.
Where Niebuhr had been critical ofCatholicism for its overemphasis on the Church
as institutional arbiter of social goodness, the documents ofVatican II close the
distance between Niebuhr's criticisms and the reality ofmodern Catholic social
ethics. Existential and anthropological considerations are prominent in this
transition, as is the need to modify socio-ethical judgments by addressing current
social injustices through an appeal to the objective nature ofmorality, tempered by
subjective recognition of the often unattainable reality of that objective nature. In
Gaudium et Spes, the reflections on social ethics are similar to Niebuhr's own
considerations on the subject. For example, the statement that "[c]aught up in such
numerous complications, very many.. .contemporaries are kept from accurately
62 Ibid, p. 321.
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identifying [objective] permanent values and [subjectively] adjusting them properly
to fresh discoveries"64 bears resemblance to Niebuhr's early declaration that, "[t]here
is.. .no problem of history and no point in society from which one may not observe
that the same man who touches the fringes of the infinite in his moral life remains
imbedded in fmiteness.. ..Therefore, it is as important to know what is impossible as
what is possible in the moral demands under which all human beings stand".65 In
other words, Niebuhrian realism and Gaudium et Spes agree that moral judgments,
though both aspire to the ideal of objective moral nature, must be moderated by
awareness of the intransigent nature ofmoral reality, as well as the perennial flux of
the social contexts in which such decisions are made.
For Catholicism, the Church is still instrumental in this understanding of
social ethics but it is interesting to note that, in Gaudium et Spes, the introductory
statement following the preface addresses first the human condition and its social
contexts before turning attention to the Church.66 The prominence of this
anthropological emphasis marks an important characteristic of Vatican II's
documents, and further distinguishes some similarities between the renewed moral
theology of the twentieth century and Niebuhrian realism. Indeed the authors of
Gaudium et Spes recognise that, "[a]ccording to the almost unanimous opinion of
believers and unbelievers alike, all things on earth should be related to man as their
center and crown", but that this proclamation must immediately be called into
question by the subsequent existential question, "But what is man? About himselfhe
has expressed and continues to express many divergent and even contradictory
opinions. In these he often exalts himself as the absolute measure of all things or
(\7
debases himself to the point of despair". Here the Church is called to help answer
these questions because, "[e]ndowed with light from God, she can offer solutions to
[the problems the above questions raise] so that man's true situation can be
/• o
portrayed and his defects explained...". Niebuhr affirms this role of the Church
63 Ibid, p. 302.
64 The Documents of Vatican II, p. 203.
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Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, p. 135.
66 Section titles include, "Hope and Anguish", "Profoundly Changed Conditions", "Changes in the
Social Order", "Psychological, Moral, and Religious Changes", "Imbalances in the ModernWorld",
"The Broader Desires ofMankind" and "Man's Deeper Questionings". See The Documents of
Vatican II, pp. 201-209.
67 Ibid, p. 210.
68 Ibid.
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when he declares that the "ultimate religious question" to be asked is "[w]hat does
life mean"? and when he states that the Church's "first business is to raise and
answer religious questions.. ,."69 Thus the Church, properly understood, is the
institution which inaugurates not only the Kingdom ofGod (the ecclesiology for
which Niebuhr reproaches Catholic moral theology), but which is also the point in
which ultimate existential questions are addressed.
Moreover, the characterisation of the human qua moral agent in Vatican II
evokes the same realist sensibilities ofNiebuhrian realism, primarily because of its
attention to the problem of sin's pervasive effect on all moral judgments. For
example, when considering the potential of the moral agent's knowledge of ultimate
reality, Gaudium et Spes states, "[The moral agent's intelligence] is not confined to
observable data alone. It can with genuine certitude attain to reality itself as
knowable, though in consequence of sin that certitude is partly obscured and
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weakened". As noted above, Niebuhr's primary criticism of Catholicism's natural
moral law theory is that it is not mindful enough of the degenerative effects of sin on
all moral acts, a criticism, as we see here, potentially rendered unfair in light of the
documents ofVatican II.
Of course, the publication of Vatican II was only one event in a series
reforms in Catholic moral theology during the twentieth century. Most of the
modifications in moral thought that did occur as a result ofVatican II were subtle.
For instance, the influence of existentialism is probably reflective of the historical
contexts in which Vatican II's documents were composed, and is only discernible as
a result of the critical distance achieved by the historical space between then and
now. What was achieved, however, was a consolidation of documents to which one
can point as the manifestation of a trend in Catholic moral theology begun at least
several decades earlier, as well as a harbinger ofmany of the documents and papal
encyclicals that have been issued in the decades following. Indeed, when one
compares statements from Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical, Rerum Novarum, such as,
"Now a State chiefly prospers and thrives through moral rule, well-regulated family
life, respect for religion and justice, the moderation and fair imposing of public
taxes, the progress of the arts and of trade, [and] the abundant yield of the land-
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through everything, in fact, which makes the citizens better and happier" with the
statement from Gaudium et Spes that
there must be made available to all men everything necessary for
leading a life truly human, such as food, clothing, and shelter; the
right to choose a state of life freely and to found a family, the right to
education, to employment, to a good reputation, to respect, to
appropriate information, to activity in accord with the upright norm of
one's own conscience, to protection ofprivacy and to rightful freedom
71
in matters religious too,
the similarities are apparent. In light of statements such as these which demonstrate
the affinities between Niebuhrian realism and twentieth-century Catholic moral
theology, Niebuhr's charge that Catholicism's theological understanding of the
Church is based on a monolithic self-referential nature is often difficult to
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understand. As suggested above, however, Niebuhr's criticisms are, at least in part,
home out of a distrust ofCatholicism's association with mid-twentieth century
Fascism.73
What Niebuhrian realism attempts to accomplish and Catholic moral theology
seeks to reconcile in its later twentieth century documents are, as we have seen, not
dissimilar, particularly with regard to the issue of the natural moral law. Whereas for
Niebuhrian realism the natural law is redefined as the "law of love" and is
characterised by the ethical ideal made impossible by the pervasiveness of human
sinfulness, Catholic moral theology presents the same idea in terms of the
characteristics of human reason and its relationship to the natural law of the moral
agent. Neither operates in exactly the same framework, though both have similar
objectives. That is, Niebuhrian realism seeks to interpret socio-political realities in
light of the significance of the natural law of love in Christian morality for
contemporary contexts without recourse to archaic conceptions of the natural law.
These realities can only be interpreted by avoiding the extremes of sentimentality
and cynicism. Christian realism is thus the attempt to understand human nature,
which operates under the natural law of love. Catholic moral theology attempts, as
70 The Documents ofVatican II, p. 213.
71 Ibid, p. 225.
72 For a useful discussion of the realism in Rerum Novarum, see Lovin, Christian Realism and the
New Realities, pp. 206-207.
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John Paul II's 1993 encyclical, Veritatis Splendor made clear, "to foster dialogue
with modern culture, emphasizing the rational—and thus universally understandable
and communicable—character ofmoral norms belonging to the sphere of the natural
moral law".74 Though Niebuhrian realism is sympathetic to this kind of dialogue, it is
the appeal to "rational" and "universally understandable" moral language that gives
this realist pause. Niebuhr, as we have seen, shares much in common with post-
Vatican II moral theology, especially as concerns the metaphysical and theological
issues of the natural moral law. The epistemological emphasis, however, is an area
where the similarities cease, which we will now discuss.
3.11. Reason and the Natural Moral Law Theory: Post-Vatican IIEpistemology
Although in the documents ofVatican II there are similarities to be found
between Catholic natural moral law and Niebuhrian realism, there are also still
divisions that remain between the two. Particularly with regard to the epistemology
of the human in relation to the natural law, one sees little modification in the Vatican
II documents and subsequent documents ofCatholic moral theology. Again, the
issue for which Niebuhr repeatedly rebukes the Catholic moral law tradition is its
reliance on human reason in relation to the natural law. As we saw in the previous
section, Niebuhrian realism and the Catholic natural moral law tradition similarly
embrace anthropological emphases in the formulation of their respective ethical
positions. For Niebuhrian realism, though, this means that the moral agent operates
under the natural law of love and possesses infinite freedom for good or evil acts.
Paradoxically, every human act is at once free to operate in love, and at the same
time bound by sin. To be human is thus to be moral.
Insofar as the moral agent is primary in the Catholic natural moral law
tradition, he or she is so with respect to the ability to discern the natural moral law
written by God, inscribed in the moral agent's consciousness. Though encumbered
by the insidious effects of sin, the agent's reason is nevertheless capable of
distinguishing and determining the good of the natural moral law. Thus, to be human
73 Niebuhr does not consider Pius XI's encyclical, "On the Church and the German Reich", (March
14, 1937), in which the Pius XI condemns Nazism. See
http://www.papalencvclicals.net/Piusl 1/P11BRENN.HTM
74 John Wilkins (ed.), Understanding Veritatis Splendor: The Encyclical Letter ofPope John Paul II
on the Church's moral teaching, (London: SPCK, 1994), p. 113.
69
is to be reasonable. In these terms, the natural moral law is, as Franz Bockle defines
it,
not to be found in a natural order from which norms can be deduced,
nor is it contained in a summary of rational rules of behaviour or
universal legal statements. On the contrary, it is an inner law which
claims man as a moral being capable of fashioning himself and the
world, and which makes him aware, by harnessing his powers of
reflection, of the most important aims which, as a responsible being,
he has to accept unconditionally....His fashioning the order of law
and morality is a constant task calling for interpretative and
determinative thought and action.
Reason serves two purposes in this definition, both ofwhich are related to the
epistemology of the natural law. On the one hand, it is the means by which the moral
agent apprehends the good intrinsic to the natural moral law. On the other, reason
facilitates the actual determination of how that good is to be implemented. Hence,
we have Bockle's definition of the natural law as defined by reason. There is an
element ofhuman freedom innate to the moral agent's ability to determine the good's
implementation, but this is not the same kind of infinite freedom ofwhich Niebuhr
speaks when he (re)defines the natural moral law. Additionally, for the natural moral
law tradition, revelation does occupy a significant role in the process of apprehension
and determination of the good. Once apprehended, though, the moral agent's reason
cannot but help assent to the good of the natural moral law.
To assist reason in its effort to understand the mystery [of the nature
of reality] there are the signs which Revelation itself presents. These
serve to lead the search for truth to new depths, enabling the mind in
its autonomous exploration to penetrate within the mystery by use of
reason's own methods, of which it is rightly jealous. Yet these signs
also urge reason to look beyond their status as signs in order to grasp
76the deeper meaning which they bear.
In other words, it is still human reason that makes possible such a process as
the apprehension and determination ofmoral good, but revelation serves to guide
such exploration. Criticisms from a Niebuhrian perspective of epistemological
rationalism in the natural moral law tradition are no different than those outlined
75 Franz Bockle, FundamentalMoral Theology, trans. By N.D. Smith, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan
Ltd., 1980), p. 192.
76 John Paul II, Faith andReason: Encyclical Letter ofPope John Paul II, (London: The Incorporated
Catholic Truth Society, 1998), p. 22
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above, because the documents of twentieth-century moral theology do not radically
alter the dimension of human reason in natural law theory by the same
methodological approach applied to the issues ofmetaphysics and theology
discussed earlier. Indeed the document in Vatican II dealing most with
epistemological and revelatory concerns, Dei Verbum, undertakes its task by
"[Restating almost to the letter the teaching of the First Vatican Council's
Constitution Dei Filius, and taking into account the principles set out by the Council
ofTrent.. .Dei Verbum pursued the age-old journey of understandingfaith, reflecting
on Revelation in the light of the teaching of Scripture and of the entire Patristic
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tradition". That is, the second Vatican council's statements on the issues of human
reason and the natural moral law are essentially reaffirmations of their
epistemological heritage which dates back to the earliest foundations of Christian
thought, and which establish human reason as the vehicle by which the moral agent
assents to knowledge of the natural good.
What was stated in Vatican I and reaffirmed in both Dei Verbum and Fides et
Ratio with regard to the nature of reason and rationality was likewise further
developed and articulated in the decades since Vatican II in what is known as the
New Natural Law Theory (hereafter NNLT). Any exploration of post-Vatican II
moral theology is incomplete without discussion of the NNLT, and it is to this
discussion that we now turn.
3.6. The New Natural Law Theory
no
Germain Grisez and John Finnis are two Catholic moral theologians
responsible for the discernment and description of the principal characteristics
inherent to NNLT. It is beyond the scope of the immediate project here to offer an
exhaustive account of, and response to NNLT but apropos to the continuation of our
considerations of the epistemological elements in Niebuhrian realism and post-
Vatican II moral theology, it is suitable briefly to outline some of the prominent
features ofNNLT and offer comments on their relevance for our enquiry into the
dynamics of the relationship between Niebuhrian realism and Catholicism's natural
moral law tradition.
11 Ibid, p. 15.
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Joseph Boyle has also been a significant participant in the development ofNew Natural Law
Theory, but we will here only consider the contributions of the John Finnis and Germain Grisez.
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In the years immediately following the 1965 completion ofVatican II reforms
in Catholic moral theology, little new work was produced on the issue of natural law
theory. However, John Finnis's Natural Law and Natural Rights and Germain
Grisez's three-volume The Way of the Lord Jesus offered philosophical and
theological considerations both of some of the reforms in Vatican II and of issues
79
concerning natural law theory.
The Finnis-Grisez school principally seeks to affirm the conclusions of
Vatican II, though it is at points critical ofmuch in modern moral theology, which
Grisez, particularly, considers "to be a series of compromises with secular
80
humanism". Moreover, its formulation ofNNLT is an attempt to retrieve many of
the elements in the natural moral law of the Thomistic tradition, though it is not a
o 1
simple recapitulation of that tradition. While Niebuhrian realism is sympathetic to
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many of the criticisms of Catholic moral theology offered by NNLT, the
epistemological issues therein present an insuperable boundary for a realistic
construction of ethics in the tradition ofNiebuhrianism.
Two kinds of reason—theoretical and practical—are constitutive ofNNLT's
epistemology, the sine qua non ofwhich is the absolute free moral choice of the
8T
human agent. For both Finnis and Grisez, freedom in moral choice is the
groundwork in any attempt to discern the nature ofmorality and to make moral
judgments which either cohere with that goodness, or which negate it. Any
79 The philosophical and theological approach ofGrisez and Finnis is an interesting development in
Catholic moral-theological thinking in itself because it signifies a methodological departure from the
way that Catholic moral theology has traditionally undertaken its various enquiries, even in the late
twentieth century. For example, the 1993 papal encyclical Fides et Ratio makes clear that there is a
delineation between philosophy and theology, whereas Grisez's The Way ofthe Lord Jesus is as much
philosophical enquiry as it is theological. Niebuhrian realism is redolent ofNNLT's preference for
methodologies which include both philosophy and theology, though it does not affirm the same
conclusions ofNNLT.
80 Goran Bexell, "Is Grisez's Moral Theology Rationalistic? Free Choice, the Human Condition, and
Christian Ethics" in Nigel Biggar and Rufus Black (eds.), The Revival ofNatural Law: Philosophical,
theological and ethical responses to the Finnis-Grisez School, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.,
2000), p. 131.
81 See Germain Grisez, Joseph Boyle, and John Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and
Ultimate Ends", American Journal ofJurisprudence, 32 (1987): 99-151.
82 These include the notions that l)"By defining human nature in very limited terms, and as possessing
only a limited range ofprinciples to guide action, scholastic natural law theory has little capacity to
offer a positive vision of how to respond to these new possibilities in human life"; and 2) "Because
scholastic natural law theory does not identify the human fulfillment to be gained from living the
moral life, and because of its static character.. .classical moral theology succumbs to the life-denying
strictures of legalism". See The Revival ofthe Natural Law, p. 3.
83 "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends", pp. 100-102.
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epistemological enquiry is directed precisely at the knowledge ofmoral truth, which
not only possesses a real nature, but itself can be possessed (i.e., epistemologically
determined) by the moral agent, as well as demonstrated in the agent's moral
judgments. Thus, "truth is not a mysterious abstract entity; we want the truth when
we want the judgments in which we affirm or deny propositions to be true
judgments, or., .want the propositions affirmed or denied, or to be affirmed or
denied, to be true propositions". In other words, the desire or "want" ofmoral
knowledge cannot be otherwise than for the knowledge ofmoral truth to which any
0<T
moral epistemological enquiry is directed. This, of course, does not mean that the
freedom of the moral agent is freedom to choose only moral good. Moral choice
could not rightly be called free in that case. Instead, "[fjree choice is, properly
oz:
speaking, an existential principle, a source ofboth moral good and moral evil".
That is, apprehension ofmoral goodness does not preclude evil acts from the
freedom ofmoral choice.
Consequently, the foundation of absolute free moral choice in accordance
with the reality of the truth ofnature provides the basis on which NNLT argues for
the epistemology of practical and theoretical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is
thus present assent to, and intellectual apprehension of, a priori moral principles. On
the other hand, practical knowledge is the application of the moral principles
identified by the moral agent; it is the knowledge of the moral good manifested in the
moral act. "The truth of theoretical knowledge is in the conformity of proportions to
prior reality, actual and possible. This truth is signified by 'is': So it is. The truth of
practical knowledge.. .is not signified by 'is' but by 'is to be'—for example, Good is
on
to be done and pursued". Specifically, the difference between theoretical and
practical knowledge lies in the moral act in which the truth ofmoral goodness is
84 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 59-60.
85 We see here strong similarities to John Paul II's statement, though situated in terms of the agent's
knowledge of the reality of God, that, "It is not just that freedom is part of the act of faith: it is
absolutely required. Indeed, it is faith that allows individuals to give consummate expression to their
own freedom. Put differently, freedom is not realized in decisions made against God. For how could
it be an exercise of true freedom to refuse to be open to the very reality which enables our self-
realization? Men and women can accomplish no more important act in their lives than the act of faith;
it is here that freedom reaches the certainty of truth and chooses to live in that truth". Fides et Ratio,
Fa21"Germain Grisez, The Way ofthe Lord Jesus, Vol. One: Christian Moral Principles, (Chicago:
Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), p. 41.
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Grisez, Boyle, Finnis, "Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends", p. 115.
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either exemplified or it is not. The moral act, then, is determinative of the ways in
which the truth ofmoral goodness is interpreted and applied, though it has no
bearing on the actual nature ofmoral goodness itself.
Initially, nothing about this description ofNNLT's epistemology seems
particularly incompatible with Niebuhrian realism as it has been described so far. Of
course, there are more nuances to the notions of freedom of choice, the nature of
good, and the application of theoretical and practical knowledge than we can discuss
here, but some of those nuances are best highlighted by noting the critiques NNLT
offers of elements ofmodern moral theology with which Niebuhrian realism tends to
be aligned, as we are about to see.
3.12. Proportionalism: NNLT's Critiques ofModern Moral Theology
Based on what we have described so far, NNLT understands itself in terms of
oo
existential ethics. That is, for proponents ofNNLT, moral judgments are varied in
their applications because they are relative to the social contexts in which they are
made (e.g., the geographical location of a particular community, its religious
constitution, its historical situation, or any other attendant considerations).
What NNLT is critical of in elements ofmodern moral theology is
"proportionalism", which, similar to consequentialism, is the notion that in moral
judgments the moral agent must choose the option that is "the least evil" from
among the choices available, and that the choice must be proportionate to the
contexts in which the decision is made. While this sounds characteristic of the
existentialism affiliated with NNLT above, the difference (at least to Grisez's mind)
is that while
[pjroportionalism seems to be verified by the experience one
sometimes has in deliberating of finding one possibility definitely
better overall than the others; the others simply drop out of
consideration. In fact, however, this experience does not support the
proportionalist account of moral judgment. For when all options but
one drop out of consideration, there is no need to make a free choice,
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Importantly, Goran Bexell takes exception to this claim of existentiality because, he thinks, the free
will of existentialism differs dramatically from that ofNNLT. For instance, insofar as Grisez is
concerned, "freedom of choice in a general sense plays a fairly limited role in [his] theory, as we see
when we compare it with the place of free will in existentialist ethics. On this latter view, it is in the
last resort the conditional choice which is the correct one, whereas Grisez maintains that there is a
standard of Tightness found in natural law and the deliverances of the consciences, which the
individual must choose in order to be right". See The Revival of the Natural Law, p. 132.
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and none is made....This suggests why proportionalism is
unacceptable as a theory of moral judgment. Its proponents cannot
say how to measure benefits and harms in the options so that their
proportion can be settled. Moreover, it involves two incompatible
conditions: first, that a morally wrong choice be possible; second, that
the alternative which is superior in terms of the proportion of good to
bad be known.89
In other words, the choice between "lesser evils" is a false proposition ifwe
take seriously the terms of the condition that "if the alternative [moral choice] which
is superior in these terms is known, [then] other possibilities fall away, and there can
be no morally wrong choice".90 That is not to say that the moral agent at all times
opts for the morally right choice, but that whatever moral decision is made cannot be
judged as anything other than morally good because there is not another moral
option which serves as a plumb line against which to measure the value of a moral
act. Thus, per Grisez, if the good is intrinsically preferred in moral judgments, the
moral agent cannot say that he or she has chosen anything other than the good when
adhering to proportionalism as framed in the above terms ofGrisez, even when such
a claim is false. Consequently, forNNLT, proportionalism appears as little more
than an extreme version ofmodern relativistic ethics in which any moral judgment is
made good by virtue of the fact that it was chosen by a moral agent who naturally
possesses the desire for moral good in his or her moral enquiries.91 What makes
proportionalism so untenable for NNLT as the preceding criticism by Grisez
illustrates, is that there is no foundation of free choice for the moral agent because he
or she is actually limited by the number of available choices (one) in every moral
enquiry. Proportionalists would of course want to disagree with this
characterisation, as would those who NNLT criticises for being proportionalists,
even if that is an unfair classification. Though I am not interested in defending the
propositions in NNLT's critiques ofproportionalism, the significance of this
discussion is of importance to us because the ethics ofNiebuhrian realism are similar
to those with whom NNLT associates proportionalism. Thus, it is worth our time to
89
Grisez, The Way ofthe Lord Jesus, p. 160.
90 Ibid.
91 Finnis makes an almost identical argument to Grisez, except that he uses the term consequentialism
instead ofproportionalism and differentiates between modern and older ethical theories "precisely by
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consider the account ofproportionalism given above in comparison to Niebuhrian
realism.
As we have seen thus far, though many ofNiebuhr's criticisms of the
Catholic natural moral law tradition stand, even in light ofVatican II's reforms
(especially with regard to epistemological issues), several are also shown to be
attenuated by his inattentiveness to the distinctions ofmoral theology in the mid-
twentieth century. We have observed similarities between Niebuhrian realism and
post-Vatican II moral theology (as well as elements of pre-Vatican II moral
theology) in terms of their ideologies; that is, in terms of their extant metaphysical
and theological considerations. While this conversation has been conducted at the
theoretical level, it is important to turn our attention to the thought of an interlocutor
representative of post-Vatican II Catholic moral theology with whom Niebuhrian
realism shares specific features which are manifestations of the metaphysical and
theological considerations hitherto discussed, so that we can further clarify how
Niebuhrian realism is actually reliant on the natural moral law tradition in a way that
it does not recognise.
3.13. Christian Realism andMoral Theology
In demonstrating the differences between moral theology before and after
Vatican II, and in calling for a metaphor different from that of law to describe the
nature ofmorality in light of the post-Vatican II changes, Norbert J. Rigali draws
attention to the fact that some moral theologians and ethicists suggest the
92
responsibility of the moral agent as a metaphorical replacement for law. The need
for the change in metaphor, according to Rigali, is signalled by the changing
philosophical contexts in which the reforms ofVatican II were conducted. Pre-
Vatican II moral theology of the twentieth century was largely conducted in the
philosophical tradition of essentialism. Much of post-Vatican II moral theology, as
we have seen, related to the philosophical tradition of existentialism. Thus, while
earlier moral theology relied on the metaphor of the law as representative of its
[the former's] adoption of the consequentialist method". See Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights,
op. 111-118.
Norbert J. Rigali, "Reimaging Morality: A Matter ofMetaphors", The Heythrop Journal 31:1
(1994): 1-14. See also Lovin chapter on Niebuhr and Bonhoeffer in Christian Realism and the New
Realities, chapter six; and William Schweiker, Theological Ethics and Global Dynamics: In the Time
ofMany Worlds, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 67-127.
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essentialist tendencies, mid-twentieth century moral theology pointed to such
metaphors as human nature or existence as representative of its existentialist
tendencies.
Rigali ultimately finds the metaphor of responsibility lacking because he
thinks it forsakes teleological ethics and thus cannot be otherwise than mired in
Q1
nihilism. However, he importantly acknowledges H. Richard Niebuhr as the
Protestant theologian accountable for this suggestion. Rigali's article points out that
other Catholic moral theologians, particularly Josef Fuchs in the mid-twentieth
century and Charles Curran more recently, have carried on the suggestion for the
metaphorical replacement of law with responsibility, each drawing significantly on
the thought ofH. R. Niebuhr for their respective understandings of the moral agent's
responsibility.
Reinhold Niebuhr, though he states his understanding of the natural law as
the "law of love" and thus, in terms different from H. Richard Niebuhr, still
demonstrates latent elements in his realism which signal dependence on the moral
agent's responsibility in the development ofNiebuhrian realism. Whether or not this
is directly attributable to H. Richard's influence, the association is an important one
because it suggests another connection between the Catholic natural moral law and
Niebuhrian realism, especially as it pertains to metaphysical concerns.94
Rigali's association ofH. Richard Niebuhr with Protestant Reinhold and
Catholic Josef Fuchs logically suggests that there is a connection between these
latter two thinkers, at least in terms of the particular elements of their thought on
which they placed the most emphasis. Upon closer observation, this is precisely
what we find, particularly with regard to the notions of responsibility and grace.
3.13.1. Fuchs and Niebuhr
When it comes to the moral choices between greater and lesser evils, some
moral theologians—particularly, as we noted above, those who are proponents of
NNLT—find Fuchs's ethic too much integrated with proportionalism to be ofmuch
93 Ibid: 9-11.
94 Richard Fox thinks that not only is H. Richard partially responsible for Reinhold's return to
theological issues—what Reinhold later came to call "orthodox Christianity"—over against
theological liberalism, but also that, "[fjollowing Richard's lead...[f]or the first time [Niebuhr]
introduced the concept of "natural law" into his writing". RichardWightman Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr,
p. 148.
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use to the formation of a tenable Christian ethic. This is chiefly because of the
emphasis on moral responsibility that we find in much of Fuchs's works which
suggests that the moral agent is always to choose between competing evils. Here,
however, we have a theologian writing in the tradition ofpost-Vatican II moral
theology whose thoughts regarding the nature ofmoral goodness in the unique and
fluctuating contexts ofhuman existence mirror much ofNiebuhr's own realism.
With Fuchs, we get an idea of the kind ofCatholic natural moral law ethic with
which Niebuhr would have found a great deal of commensurability because of its
concern to take into account all of the extenuating circumstances affecting the
contexts in which moral judgments are made, as well as any extant factors which
affect the judgments themselves.
For Fuchs, responsible moral action is hastened by the need for such action.
This seems an obvious statement even to the most ambivalent observer who, when
asked why a shelter volunteer offers room and board to a homeless mother, would
likely respond, "Because the mother and her children need a place to sleep and
nourishment in order to live". The point stressed by Fuchs, though, is that morally
responsible acts can only arise out of the need for such acts; thus responsibility
begets response. Following Vatican II's emphasis on vocation, Fuchs makes the
distinction that in the case of Christian morality, the response of the moral agent
originates in the call to all humans to be imitative ofChrist. "In [Christ's call] the
radical character of Christian morality becomes apparent. That is to say that what is
ofprime importance is personal decision and personal responsibility, undertaken in
love, in imitation ofChrist".95 Of course, the suggestion that all that the moral agent
needs in order to be responsible is to "imitate Christ" is redolent of the simplistic
morality of theological liberalism ofwhich Niebuhr was so critical.96
Fuchs is mindful of the dangers associated with such un-nuanced ethical
understandings, and thus warns of the risks involved with any moral reasoning
which fails to account for the constantly changing socio-political contexts in which
moral evaluations and judgments are conducted. This, however, does not mean that
Fuchs assumes the non-existence of objective norms in moral reasoning. On the
95 JosefFuchs, Human Values and Christian Morality, (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1970), pp. 74-75.
96 We might add that this now extends to the character ofmuch ofmodern conservative, evangelical
Christianity in North America, Great Britain and Western Europe.
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contrary, he argues for the absoluteness ofmoral objectivity in scripture, ecclesial
Q7
community, and the natural moral law. Where Fuchs differs with some
interpretations of the objectivity ofmoral norms (especially those of the natural
moral law criticised most by Niebuhr) is in the applicability of those norms to the
social contexts ofhuman existence. According to Fuchs, whereas the nature of
moral norms may remain unalterable, their discernment, definition and application
do not. What results, then, is the notion that simply because a moral norm is
98absolute does not mean that it is universalisable. In other words, the application of
a moral norm in one context may appear radically different when applied in another
context without actually changing the objective status of the norm. As Fuchs states:
Facts—social, technological, economic, etc.—change. Man's
experience, i.e., those of human societies, likewise change, on the
basis of changing data. Evaluations also, the mind's grasp of human
realities, and self-understanding can be altered....All these manifold
possible—and actual—alterations have to be brought into the moral
judgment of human conduct. Such "new" aspects could call for
action which, independent of such aspects, would be out of the
question; or they might exclude a course of action which would be
commanded under other circumstances...[Thus] behavior norms
have, at least theoretically, a provisory character."
According to this definition, the mutability of a moral norm's application is
dependent upon the epistemic contexts in which it is applied and the behaviour of the
moral agent. "If the absoluteness ofmoral norms is constituted primarily by their
objective effectiveness vis-a-vis the given reality and thus not preeminently by their
universality or their universal validity, the question of the applicability ofmoral
norms to reality in the concrete inevitably arises".100 This question is answered by
Fuchs's emphasis on the moral agent's reason and responsibility. Having already
noted Niebuhr's criticisms ofnatural moral law's emphasis on reason, it is sufficient
here to state that the same objections apply to Fuchs's conception of the human's
ability to discern the nature ofmoral goodness.
97 Josef Fuchs, Personal Responsibility and Christian Morality, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 1983), pp. 117-128.
98 Ibid, p. 129.
"ibid, pp. 131-132.
100 Ibid, p. 133.
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Niebuhr's attitude concerning the necessity ofmoral responsibility, as we
see, does not differ dramatically from that of Fuchs's.101 While Fuchs frames his
treatment ofmoral responsibility in terms of a response to the trends ofCatholic
moral theology, Niebuhr's handling of the issue is predictably set in Protestant
frameworks, particularly as a response to the theological liberalism of the early to
mid-twentieth century. "Niebuhr takes it as obvious that the Christian 'critical
attitude' which measures all plans against the demands of the Gospel must be
balanced by a 'responsible attitude' that is still prepared to make the real choices,
109
even though all the options are less than what love requires". The failure of
theological liberalism was precisely that it could neither manage, nor make these
"real" choices because it did not "realize that the whole of economic and political
life is a system of coercion. That does not mean that it is not necessary and
important to make ethical distinctions between types of coercion. But it does make
10T
ethical objections to coercion per se rather hypocritical". In other words,
responsibility in a socio-political context which is perennially confronted with the
realities of coercion means that the moral agent is compelled to make a decision
about which form of coercion is most acceptable in a particular context.
Niebuhr never explicitly identifies the association of responsibility in
Christian realism with Catholic natural moral law theology. He does, however, think
that the characteristic capable of ameliorating some of the theological differences
between the Protestantism and Catholicism is the virtue of charity. Noting that
Protestants are also tempted to the prideful arrogance for which he has criticised the
Catholic natural moral law tradition, Niebuhr writes,
The root of all Christian charity lies in the contrite recognition of the
common need of all men for the divine mercy. Charity, particularly the
charity of forgiveness is not something which can be demanded or
learned. It springs from the heart of those who know themselves to
stand under a more ultimate judgment than any of the judgments by
which they judge their foes and their foes judge them. If there is not
101 Of course, Niebuhr takes exception to the notion that the moral agent's responsibility is an
alignment of one's moral responses to the moral interpretation of the Catholic Church. This
notwithstanding, the responsibility of the moral agent assumes a similar role for both thinkers.
102 Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 93.
103 Reinhold Niebuhr, "A Christian Philosophy of Compromise", The Christian Century, June 7, 1933:
747-748. Charles Clayton Morrison responded critically to Niebuhr's article in the same issue,
arguing that though the law of love is not practicable, the task of Christian ethics is to "set about the
making of such a world" where it would be practicable. See Charles Clayton Morrison, "Is
Christianity Practicable?": 805-807.
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something of this ultimate insight informed by faith, in the Christian
life, it is a salt which has lost its savor. Catholics may boast of the
superiority of their discipline and unity; and Protestants may boast of
their superior liberty. But without charity the virtues of each become
corrupted by an intolerable self-righteousness. The virtues of each
have, indeed, become thus corrupted.104
In other words, though he is often critical of the Catholic natural moral law
tradition specifically, it is a lamentable fact to Niebuhr's mind that Catholics and
Protestants had not reached any kind of accord during the time which he wrote.
Therefore, he reminds his readers that though "[b]oth Catholics and Protestants must
admit the deep pathos of the fears and prejudices which exist between the two
communities of Christendom.. .ifwe have any measure of charity we will remember
that we are in the same position as our competitor or foe".105
Indeed, Catholic moral theologians have also recognised charity as a supreme
virtue, on whose essence other virtues are dependent for their existence. "Charity
surpasses all charisms and other virtues and is the bond ofperfection.. .[it] is new
and unique, a love that surpasses all human sentiments. Its source is God.. .",106 We
might say that charity, both for Protestantism and Catholicism, is the "possible
ideal". Niebuhr speaks of the regulative principles of equality and justice, but
neither of these principles could possibly function in their respective roles were it not
for the fact that, in Niebuhrian realism, charity, borne out of the law of love,
precedes the realisation of these principles. That is, grace goes before justice for
Niebuhrian realism. So, while the burden of Christian realism's account ofmoral
responsibility may seem untenable for a viable Christian ethic (due to the fact that
whatever judgment the moral agent makes, the option is still, in part, evil), it is
important for the realist to temper his or her moral judgments with the kind of
charity Niebuhr wants to extend to Catholicism. This common charitable ground is
an important place to conclude our considerations of the differences and similarities
between Christian realism and the Catholic natural moral law tradition.
3.14. Conclusions
104
Niebuhr, Essays in Applied Christianity, pp. 221-222.
105 Ibid, pp. 233-234.
106 Servais Pinckaers, O.P., The Sources ofChristian Ethics (trans, by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P.),
(Washington D.C.: The Catholic University Press ofAmerica, 1995), p. 122.
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In this chapter I have attempted to contextualise the enquiries begun in the
second chapter by placing Niebuhr's articulation of Christian realism into
conversation with the Catholic natural moral law tradition, particularly with regard
to pre-and post-Vatican II concerns. As discussed, Niebuhr was strongly critical of
Catholicism on metaphysical, epistemological, and theological grounds. As we have
observed, however, many of these criticisms are answered in the developments of
post-Vatican II Catholic moral theology.
Metaphysically, Niebuhrian realism and Catholic natural moral law theology
share in common the notion that there is an objective status to the nature ofmorality.
Epistemologically, Niebuhr is critical ofwhat he perceives as Catholic moral
theology's declaration that the moral law is discernible by human reason.
Additionally, Niebuhr here criticises Catholic ecclesiology for its emphasis on the
function of the Church as the final arbiter in the discernment ofmoral law.
Theologically, we have seen how Christian realism and the Catholic natural moral
law share many of the same ideas about societal orders and the natural law tradition.
Niebuhr is never able fully to divest himself of the kinds of concerns he has
of Catholic natural moral law theology. This may be the result of not being able to
see the "forest for the trees"; for, theological and ethical enquiry in the mid-twentieth
century, and especially in the years following Vatican II's reforms was strongly
107
influenced by Catholic contributions.
Having covered the foundations of Christian realism and its relationship to
other traditions of Christian ethics, we will now turn our attention to the
hermeneutical methodology ofNiebuhr's realism. The enquiries carried out in
chapters two and three beg the question about how Niebuhr's realism goes about the
task of interpreting its social contexts. This question ofNiebuhr's social
hermeneutic will be the question we explore in the next chapter, which will be
necessary for the following chapter's evaluation of John Milbank's criticism of
Niebuhr.
107 See Mahoney, pp. 302-347.
82
Chapter Four
MEANING AND METHOD
4.1 Abstract
This chapter undertakes a discussion of the methodology of Christian
realism's social hermeneutic. Niebuhr presumed the meaningfulness
of human existence and he likewise presumed a meaningful
framework by which to interpret that existence. The first part of this
chapter is devoted to a description of meaningfulness for the realist,
as well as a discussion of the process of moral justification. This is
followed by an enquiry into William Schweiker's notion of
"hermeneutical realism" and its association with a realist conception
of ethics. Important descriptions of the moral meaning of history and
the forms and validations involved in discerning meaning bring the
first part of the chapter to a close. In the second part of the chapter
we discuss the relationship of Niebuhrian realism to Christian
existentialism, incorporating a helpful essay on the subject by Paul
Ramsey. The chapter ends with a consideration of the role of the
conscience in Niebuhr's interpretation ofmoral meaning.
4.2 Introduction
Christian realism is about the Christian's understanding of the nature of
things. The parameters ofmoral discourse are set within a metaphysic which
understands the realities of the things being discussed as existent, yet separate from
the socio-political contexts in which they are examined. In a sense, all moral
observations and judgments refer to representations of reality; even, perhaps, false
representations of true reality. In moral enquiry, this means that where terms such as
"good", "right" or "just" are concerned, they can only offer descriptions of what the
moral agent believes to be the case about the nature of goodness, rightness, or
justness. In Christian realism, when realistic moral agents speak of the good, right,
or just, they do so with the understanding that these terms relate to the ultimate
reality of God's goodness, rightness, and justness. Realism, then, offers a
hermeneutic for understanding the nature of objectivity in relation to human
existence.
Moral interpretation is inextricable from the previous experiences of the
moral agent and the present contexts in which the agent now lives. To understand
the relationship between moral realism, the judgments the moral agent makes (which
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is the hermeneutical task of ethics) and human existence, is to make a commitment to
a particular system ofmeaning. Sue Patterson makes this point well when she notes
that "[ijnevitably.. .hermeneutics will be done from some position of commitment to
certain beliefs (however 'interpreted' those beliefs are), so that to employ a so-called
general hermeneutic will be simply to operate from some faith position other than the
one upon which the hermeneutic is being brought to bear".1 In other words, moral
commitments are dependent upon the beliefs the moral agent claims to be true, and
are inevitably conditioned by the particular perspectives of the agent. Moral
interpretation, then, is as much determined by the contexts in which such
interpretation occurs, as by the meaning accorded the objects of interpretation.
In chapter two elements that inform the framework of this metaphysic for
Christian realism were observed. There, important associations between moral
philosophy and theological ethics were considered in relation to Niebuhr's realism.
Chapter three then contextualised the previous chapter's enquiries by placing them in
relation to Niebuhr's critiques ofpre-Vatican II conceptions of the natural moral law
tradition. In that chapter we saw many of the similarities between Niebuhr's realism
and post-Vatican II moral theology. This is a useful investiture because it helps to
place Niebuhr's ethic historically, and it emphasises some of the predominant themes
with which he deals continuously throughout his career.
In this chapter we are going to build on the themes developed in the previous
chapters, paying special attention to the social hermeneutic of Christian realism. Here
we will explore the dimensions ofmethod and meaning in Niebuhr's understanding
of Christian realism. There are two areas that will be useful to explore in this chapter.
First, what William Schweiker has called "hermeneutical realism" is a helpful way of
appropriating what a realistic social hermeneutic looks like. Most important for our
purposes is the fact that Schweiker defends hermeneutical realism as a method of
moral deliberation which "stands in some continuity with traditional Christian
natural law ethics" and which provides the modern moral agent a resource with
which to engage pluralistic societies. Because we have seen how Niebuhr's realism
is similarly aligned with a particular version of the natural law tradition, Schweiker's
categories for hermeneutical realism will be helpful for our understanding of
' Sue Patterson, Realist Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age, p. 55.
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Niebuhrian realism. Additionally, we will note that many of the characteristics of
Schweiker's hermeneutical realism are similar to those of the pragmatic tradition
with which Niebuhr has frequently been identified. Because of this, it will be
necessary to consider the role of pragmatic thought in Niebuhrian realism, though we
will not offer the kind of comprehensive treatment of it that others have.3
The second point of focus will be the influence of existentialism on Niebuhr's
realism. Paul Ramsey's helpful essay on this topic will be considered in this portion
of the chapter, as will Langdon Gilkey's reading ofNiebuhr's interpretation of
meaningful history. After considering these contributions, it will be argued at the
end of the chapter that the individual conscience contributes to Niebuhr's
understanding of a realistic hermeneutic.
The enquiries carried out in this chapter thus continue the task undertaken so
far: to understand the framework of Christian realism as interpreted by one of its
chiefproponents as foundational for what we will soon see to be a realistic
theological hope. Let us resume that task now.
Part I—Meaning: The "How" of the Method
4.3 On Use andMeaning
The subject of theological realism is God and the realist's discourse is related
to the existence of God. This, however, does not mean that discourse about the
reality ofGod is separated from moral discourse that relates to God's nature. There
is an inherent danger in positing such a divide between theologically and morally
realistic discourse which is, as Peter Byrne has noted, that if the moral agent
"reject[s] the underlying assertion of a moral providence in [every version of
realism]", he or she is "then at liberty to make use of theistic symbols for other ends
than to refer to a transcendent theos".4 What results is moral and theological
2 William Schweiker, Theological Ethics and Global Dynamics, pp. 28-29.
3 For some of the sources on pragmatism and Niebuhrian realism, see Charles C. Brown, Niebuhr and
His Age: Reinhold Niebuhr's Prophetic Role and Legacy, New Edition, (Harrisburg: Trinity Press
International, 2002), pp. 17-18; Cornel West, The American Evasion ofPhilosophy: A Genealogy of
Pragmatism, (Madison: The University ofWisconsin Press, 1989), pp. 150-164; Martin Halliwell, The
Constant Dialogue: Reinhold Niebuhr & American Intellectual Culture, (Oxford: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), pp. 29-78.; Ronald H. Stone, Professor Reinhold Niebuhr: A
Mentor to the Twentieth Century, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992), pp. 205-228;
Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, pp. 46-54; Mark L. Haas, "Reinhold Niebuhr's
"Christian Pragmatism": A Principled Alternative to Consequentialism", The Review ofPolitics 61:4
(Autumn, 1999): 605-636.
4 Peter Byrne, God and Realism, p. 155.
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relativism. For if the ultimate symbol, the end of all theological and moral
discourse—God—is reserved for use as a means to some other end rather than the
source ofmeaning, the moral agent could rightly claim that the subject, in all
actuality, is not God, but is instead a useful linguistic device by which particular
moral judgments are justified.5 We might even say that the linguistic device is not
actually use-full because its use is annihilated; or rather, where meaning does not
precede it, the use never existed. The device cannot be used to any end because there
is no meaning-full subject from which to derive its use. Thus, it is without use; it is
use-less. We might also say that moral justification itself is no thing at all if this is
the case, because justification is unnecessary in the absence ofmeaning. That is, if a
moral principle's use could somehow exist independently of its meaningfulness
(which it cannot), justifying moral judgments would quite literally become a task
without meaning. Here we arrive at an aporia: without meaning inherent to our
moral justifications, what would be the necessity for such justifications? Moreover,
could they have any use?
The Christian realist answers No.6 This realist claims that the meaning
inherent to moral justification is inseparable from God, and that all such justifications
are made in light of the declaration that it is from God's existence that meaning is
derived. Reality is thus meaningful in the first place. Moral justification is indeed
important, but moral justification cannot be established unless the meaning of the
interpreted symbol is discerned. That is, meaningfulness precedes usefulness. This
is not to say that the agent imparts moral meaningfulness to the hermeneutical
subject in the sense that such meaning is derived from the agent by the interpreted
subject, or that the agent provides the moral meaning of that which is interpreted, as
if that were possible. The paradox, though, is that there is no need for moral
5 For a helpful discussion along these lines, "The Brokenness ofDivine Language" in Christopher J.
Insole, The Realist Hope: A Critique ofAnti-Realist Approaches in Contemporary Philosophical
Theology, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006), pp. 172-186.
6 So would others who do not make the same claims of the Christian realist, but the Christian realist is
the subject most relevant to our present investigations.
7
Clearly the agent cannot understand meaning of the object interpreted except that he or she knows,
or is conscious of the fact that there is an object whose meaning is to be interpreted. It is only in light
of such consciousness that we paradoxically know that we cannot posit moral meaning. Sartre makes
a similar point when he notes that "All consciousness.. .is consciousness of something. This means
that there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that
consciousness has no 'content'". We are saying the same thing about the usefulness ofmoral
justification: without the content ofmeaning, moral justification has no use. See Jean-Paul Sartre,
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meaningfulness without the existence of the human subject. Moral justification
would certainly not exist without the human, and neither would moral meaning. Just
as meaningfulness precedes usefulness, existence precedes essence; or, at least
nothingness precedes somethingness. Nevertheless, as a constituent of the
hermeneutical subject, meaningfulness exists independently of human interpretations
of it. The task of justification, then, is to interpret moral meaning and its relationship
to our moral and historical contexts. This is not to suggest that when we engage the
hermeneutical task we understand fully the meaning of the object interpreted.
Nevertheless, limited understanding ofmoral meaning does not obviate the need for
such a task. The point of looking "through a glass darkly" is that we still look.
Niebuhr puts this point in a slightly more negative tone when he says that "[t]he
proper combination ofhumility and trust is precisely defined when we affirm that we
o
see, but admit that we see through a glass darkly".
4.3.1 The Goal ofJustification
As we have seen throughout our chapters so far, Niebuhr had little use for
what he considered "pre-closed" systems ofmeaning. The social and political
contexts of the world are constantly changing, requiring new interpretations and
applications ofmoral meaning, which is their "use". All such interpretations seek to
establish justice in an unjust world. Thus, new situations of injustice may require
new interpretations ofmoral meaning as part of the process of defining moral terms
and their usefulness.
For the Christian realist, however, this provisional character ofmoral
meaning and use does not abrogate the source of that meaning. Suppose, for
example, that a particular island plant has nutritional value which provides those who
eat it with a full daily complement of three essential vitamins. Then suppose that one
day a boy who suffers from scoliosis begins eating the plant. Slowly the curvature in
his spine begins to straighten. Soon the plant is made widely available to scoliosis
sufferers. When they eat the plant, the patients experience the alleviation of pain and
the straightening of the curvature in their spines, but they also still receive their full
Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, translated by Hazel E. Barnes,
(London: Routledge Classics, 2003), p. 7. For more on the relationship between Niebuhr and Sartre,
see Ramsey's "Love and Law" in Reinhold Niebuhr:His Social, Religious, and Political Thought, pp.
80-89.
8 See especially Niebuhr, "Mystery and Meaning" in Discerning the Signs ofthe Times, p. 147.
87
complement of three essential vitamins. Our understanding of the use of the plant is
modified, but the plant as a source ofusefulness is not. In this case, the first use of
the plant is still valid, but we now have an interpretation of its use that is much
broader than the one with which we began. We might, however, imagine a similar
scenario in which we find out that though the plant provides essential nutrients and is
beneficial to those who suffer from scoliosis, it also contains carcinogens ofwhich
those who first ate the plant were unaware, making it dangerous to consume in large
quantities. In this instance, where the use or meaning of the plant is discussed, the
source of that meaning still does not change. Moreover, the plant will continue to be
what it is regardless of how we understand it.
But is what we know of the plant all that can be known of it? Are there more
uses for it other than those ofwhich we are currently aware? If so, how would we
know that, or how, we should continue to investigate the uses of the plant? The
answer seems to be an appeal to experience. Considering that we have so far
discovered more uses for the plant than the initial one, it is at least reasonable to
suggest that there are potential uses for the plant ofwhich we are currently unaware.
The moral realist that we met in chapter two would suggest that the plant could
indeed have additional uses ofwhich we are unaware. We may eventually discover
those uses and thus must live with the knowledge that our knowledge of the plant is
potentially incomplete. Additionally, when we speak of the plant's "nutritional"
value, we are using a term that appeals to the previous experiences we have had with
those values, so that those involved in our conversation would understand what we
meant when we used that term. The natural moral law theorist from chapter three
would agree with the moral realist of chapter two, at least in part, but would further
suggest that because the uses of the plant are universally applicable to all humans, all
reasonable moral agents will use the plant where its value is good, and avoid it where
the value is harmful. This, of course, does not take into consideration the fact that
some moral agents may use the plant for what the natural moral law theorist would
consider corrupt purposes, such as the suicidal person who devours enormous
quantities of the plant in the hopes of developing cancer to end his or her life. So it
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is with moral meaning and justification. The existence ofmoral meaning does not
change,9 but the use of that meaning probably will.
Though the above illustration is perhaps too simplistic to suit the
complexities ofmoral argument, it is nevertheless helpful for our present
considerations because it highlights the kinds of issues with which realistic moral
thought generally, and Christian realism specifically, is concerned.
Further, the above illustration begs the question ofwhat, exactly, the purpose
of discerning moral meaning is. Discernment ofmoral meaning is ultimately a
justificatory process. That is, the question ofmoral discernment asks what the moral
agent is justified in believing, and whether or not such beliefs may be asserted in the
broader scope ofmoral discourse. In the above example, we can say that the moral
agent is "justified in believing" that the consumption of the plant is a remedy and is
"warranted in asserting" these beliefs in broader moral discourse based on the
experiences reported from consuming the plant.10 What may result, however, is the
realisation that in spite of these declarations, what the moral agent is justified in
believing or warranted in asserting is not actually representative of the truth of the
moral principle after all. As Stout notes,
[i]t is...misleading at best to express doubt about certain traditional
theories of truth by saying that truth is merely warranted
assertability....When I am speaking of a proposition that I, here and
now, take myself to be warranted in asserting or justified in believing,
it will normally be a proposition that I, here and now, will accept and
assert as a truth. If not, my rationality will be suspect....[Wjhen I,
here and now, face the problem of what propositions to deem true and
seek criteria for determining this, the propositions I accept as
true.. .will be the ones I am justified in believing. The propositions I
assert to be true, if I am being reasonable and candid, will be the ones
I am warranted in asserting. And the criteria I use for judging truth
will be the ones I use for determining which propositions I am
justified in holding true.11
In other words, those things that we moral judgments we assert can only be
asserted if they are first reasonably believed. What is significant is the realistic tone
9
Neither, for the Christian realist, does the source ofmeaning: God.
10 I take the phrases "justified in believing" and "warranted in asserting" from Jeffrey Stout, Ethics
After Babel: The Languages ofMorals and Their Discontents, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2001), p. 25.
11
Ibid, pp. 25-26.
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Stout's statement strikes. It may seem, prima facie, morally myopic to say that
justified beliefs are ultimately related to my perspective "here and now", but to what
else could they be related? If it is true that to be human is to be moral, all processes
ofmoral justification must take into consideration the limited perspectives of the
human agents involved. In Christian realist terms, this means that "[(justification.. .is
relative to our place in history and society and the particular sets ofbeliefs that place
offers us".12 Thus, returning to our above example, ifwe argue that the plant's
properties are universally true for all people and at the same time argue that not only
do we not know all that is knowable about the plant, but that the beliefs that we do
hold to be true about it may, in fact, not be true at all, how do we avoid logical
incoherence on the one hand and relativism on the other? For belief that the plant
does possess an objective nature, but that its moral meaning or usage is subject to
change may seem either to be self-referentially incoherent on the one hand, or it may
render our statements about the plant relativistic on the other. The tension created by
this dualism is what a realistic ethic seeks to understand. Forced rapprochement of
the two statements is not the goal of such an ethic; understanding how both
statements can be true for our moral and historical contexts is.
If the answer to the question ofwhy the discernment ofmoral meaning is
important is that it is ultimately a process intended to justify the moral beliefs we
hold and to validate our assertion of those beliefs in wider moral discourse, the
question of how the process of discernment is carried out still remains to be
answered. It is sensible to suggest that, as with all moral enquiries, Christian realism
wants its moral beliefs and assertions to be justified. What may be much less clear,
however, is how the hermeneutical process of that justification is carried out.
Because of this, it is to the discussion of hermeneutics in the Christian realism
articulated by Niebuhr that we now turn.
4.3.2 Hermeneutical Realism
"Hermeneutical thinking", Schweiker tells us, "is irreducibly tied to the
problems of life. Such reflection does not necessarily attempt to escape or control
our finitude; nor must it attempt to reduce all texts and traditions to existentialist
12
Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 52.
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questions about the meaning of authentic human life as an act of freedom".13 At the
same time, the dialectical and equally accurate statement here is that hermeneutical
thinking does provide a foundation from which we attempt control over our finitude.
This Niebuhr recognises as moral imagination expressed in human self-
transcendence. The hermeneutical process likewise must at some point interpret texts
and traditions existentially as part of the justificatory process for deriving meaning
from the "problems of life". Without such interpretation, the effort to understand
those problems denigrates into abject anxiety over the fact that those problems may
actually be meaningless.14 The point of Schweiker's statement is that some attempts
to control our finitude and to offer existential interpretations of life's problems are
inevitably elements of the hermeneutical process; they just cannot be the sum ofwhat
is involved in that process. Niebuhr's version ofChristian realism is an attempt to
negotiate the balance between unrealistic escapism and existential reductionism that
Schweiker highlights.
The problems of life occur in the incidents of history. For this reason, the
hermeneutical process of Christian realism is an attempt to interpret the meaning of
history so that we can subsequently understand the meaning of the problems of
history. Niebuhr suggests that
[a] basic distinction may be made between various interpretations of
the meaning of life by noting their attitude towards history. Those
which include history in the realm of meaning see it as a process
which points and moves towards a fuller disclosure and realization of
life's essential meaning. Those which exclude it, do so because they
regard history as no more than natural finiteness, from which the
human spirit must be freed. They consider man's involvement in
nature as the very cause of evil, and define the ultimate redemption of
life as emancipation from finiteness. In the one case history is
regarded as potentially meaningful, waiting for the ultimate
disclosure and realization of its meaning. In the other case it is
believed to be essentially meaningless. It may be regarded as a realm
of order; but the order is only the subordinate one of natural necessity
which affects the meaning of life negatively.15
13 William Schweiker, Mimetic Reflections: A Study in Hermeneutics, Theology, and Ethics, (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1990), p. xi.
14
"Anxiety" has dual connotations for Niebuhr. As June Bingham notes it is "used theologically for
the feeling all men have because of their combination of finiteness and freedom, and psychiatrically
for the feeling the individual may have because of his unconscious conflicts and repressions".
Bingham, Courage to Change, p. 195, n. 1.
15 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 2.
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Niebuhr is himself a part of the former camp, and he considers the thought of
Christian realism to be among those who understand history as moving towards
something which is more meaningful than the ways in which history seems in light
of its problems. Moreover, the natural principles ofmoral realism and the abiding
structure of the natural moral law, both ofwhich we observed in the previous
chapters, provide the basis for Niebuhr's moral interpretation ofhistory and God,
who transcends history.
4.4. The MoralMeaning ofHistory
In an article written shortly after Niebuhr's death, Langdon Gilkey identifies
seven categories by which to understand Niebuhr's theological interpretation of
history. These include first, a "vertical dialectic" between "transcendence and
creatureliness"; second, the "ontological structure" of the human as "constant
throughout history"; third, human sinfulness as "a permanent characteristic of
history"; fourth, the future as "a part of history as history has manifested itself in past
and present experience"; fifth, the notion that "[t]he resolution of history's problems
[occurs] not in terms of the manifestation of divine power over evil but in terms of
the manifestation of the divine love and mercy to evil..."; sixth, the declaration that
the structures which constitute history, that is, "all civilizations, social orders, and
groups in history are by no means equal in virtue or in worth"; and seventh, "that
eschatological symbols" occupy a more unique role in Niebuhr's theology than for
most others who were concerned with eschatology during his time.16 These provide
important categorical classifications for better interpreting the theological elements
ofNiebuhr's thought, and we will return to some of them in our last chapters on
theological hope. For now, though, we are concerned primarily with the fourth
category: the future as "a part of history as history has manifested itself in past and
present experience", and from that statement we are really only concerned with the
emphasis on experience. Drawing on what has been said in previous chapters and in
similar fashion to Gilkey's outline ofNiebuhr's theology of history, we are now in
position to offer an outline ofNiebuhr's moral interpretation of history. This can be
divided into three categories, expressed existentially and pragmatically. First,
Niebuhr believes that there is a transcendent source ofmoral meaning to life, which
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is beyond the moral agent's comprehension of it, and separate from the agent's
existence. In spite of the distance between the source ofmoral meaning and human
existence, the source nevertheless impacts on human existence, as noted in chapter
two. Second, moral and historical contexts change; so, too, does moral meaning.
The source ofmoral meaning, however, does not. Of the three features ofNiebuhr's
moral interpretation of history, this one is most closely related to the concept of a
natural moral law such as the one explored in chapter three. The difference is that in
the version of the natural moral law that Niebuhr associates with Catholicism there is
little room for the notion that moral meanings can change. Hence, Catholicism, like
early Christianity, is bound to the primitive interpretations ofChristian myths. Third,
we can understand and interpret this meaning through appeals to previous
experiences, either modifying our understanding ofwhat we once interpreted to be
the truth about goodness, or changing our interpretations of that truth altogether in
light ofnew social and historical circumstances. This is what Lovin identifies as the
"limited affirmation" of pragmatism by the mid-twentieth century theological
realists, including Reinhold Niebuhr, who were seeking
a way to state their conviction that coherences tested by pragmatic
methods may not exhaust the meaning of 'truth'....[For example,]
[gjiven the beliefs and purposes I now share with others in my
society, I may be entirely justified in believing that a certain pattern
of behavior indicates a morally culpable moral weakness of character.
People once believed this about certain forms of mental illness.
Today, we are justified in believing that these episodes are the result
of chemical events in the brain that are not subject to voluntary
control by the individual who suffers from them. We do not,
however, deal with this change in beliefs by saying that people are
free to choose whichever explanation works best for them. Neither
do we say that it used to be true that mental illness was a moral
1 7
problem, but it isn't true anymore.
The corollary between Gilkey's outline ofNiebuhr's theological and
historical vision and our framework for interpreting Niebuhr's moral understanding
of history is in the fourth and third points, respectively: his point about history being
manifest in "past and present experience" and our point concerning morally
16
Langdon Gilkey, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Theology ofHistory", The Journal ofReligion 54 (1974):
364-382.
17 Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, pp. 51-52.
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interpretive appeals to previous experiences. Both outlines, though, are attempts to
shed light on Niebuhr's emphases for interpreting history, and while Gilkey is
certainly correct that Niebuhr interpreted history in theological terms, the goal of this
interpretation was to understand the meaning of history, which is derived from moral
contexts. Thus, what our outline provides is a conceptual framework by which to
understand how Niebuhr both understands the past and imagines new moral
possibilities for the future. Remembering, imagining and interpreting past, future
and present moral contexts are all part of the larger hermeneutical project, as we will
now see.
4.5. Forms: Impertinent Predication
i o
"For Christian faith the world is neither perfect nor meaningless".
Characteristically, Niebuhr phrases the intent of this statement in negative terms: if
the world is not meaningless, it must be meaningful. The hermeneutical task of
Christian realism, then, is to seek ways of understanding and interpreting the
meaning of the world through its use ofChristian symbols.
The concerns of hermeneutics are also epistemological concerns. It would be
erroneous to offer moral interpretations of social contexts if the one who attempts
such an interpretation does not first claim knowledge about the truths to be
interpreted or the contexts under which they are to be considered. Of course, the
knowledge to which the moral agent makes claims is relative, so the link between
hermeneutics and epistemology is not absolute because, as Stout pointed out above,
we can only assert those things that we are justified to believe. While the
hermeneutical process is one that is bound to the epistemological process, it also
stands independently of epistemology. Schweiker provides the foundations for
understanding his hermeneutical realism which he defends as an attempt, similar to
the one constructed in this chapter, "aimed at providing an interpretation of the moral
meaning of Christian faith" by outlining three "forms" of epistemology which are
unique to the hermeneutical process. These are empirical, logical and
hermeneutical.19 The variations of knowledge to which hermeneutical realism is
linked—what we are warranted in asserting (hermeneutics) based on justified
18 Reinhold Niebuhr, "As Deceivers, Yet True" in Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian
Interpretation ofHistory, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 15.
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statements ofwhat we know to be the case (epistemology)—are expressed in their
methods of validations. Empirical knowledge is validated through sensible
experience. For example, we can claim empirical knowledge about something, say,
the plant in our above example, based on the experiential wisdom we have gained
through engaging the plant with our senses. Logical knowledge is attested to through
analytical validation, which is closely related to empirical knowledge. That is,
knowledge gained through sensible experience becomes logical knowledge when it is
empirically analysed. Logical and empirical claims to knowledge face the similarly
difficult, but necessary task ofnot reducing their respective interpretations of reality
to universally determinative meanings of reality based on the unique perspectives of
the moral agent involved in the process. This error ironically results in the charge of
moral relativism with which methods of realistic interpretations are frequently
charged. The obverse of such a reduction is what Schweiker identifies as part of the
hermeneutical process in which "there can be the creation ofmeaning through the
juxtaposition of logically and empirically distinct and even contradictory claims
("the kingdom of God is like a mustard seed") where meaning arises from the virtual
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destruction of literal sense by impertinent predication". Schweiker is quick to
emphasise that "[t]he non-reducibility of understanding to empirical and/or logical
knowledge claims is crucial to sustain. I may "know," for instance, that the sun is
shining through my window, but that does not in itself determine its meaning for me
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or anyone else, or that I understand its possible range ofmeanings". Logical and
empirical knowledge claims make necessary demands on the hermeneutical process,
but they are only part of that process, and cannot be the apogee ofmeaning for any
given statement about reality. For the Christian realist dependent on the structure of
henneneutical realism so far constructed, then, "these experiential and logical
demands do not determine the meaning of Christian discourse [which is engaged in
determining the meaning of history], because.. .the creation ofmeaning is often
through impertinent predication, and in all cases understanding exceeds logical and
19 William Schweiker, "Comment", The Journal ofReligious Ethics 34.4 (2006): 712, 715,
respectively.
20 Ibid, 713.
21 Ibid.
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empirical conditions".22 In other words, for the Christian realist, the symbols of the
Christian faith which constitute its discourse are interpreted as nothing more than
symbols: meaningful, descriptive images that point to an objective truth about history
which is otherwise indescribable.
Finally, hermeneutical knowledge is bound to the interpretation given to that
knowledge. Perhaps it seems redundant to claim that our stated knowledge of reality
is the result of our interpretation of that reality, but the point Schweiker is making is
that when we claim knowledge of reality based on our interpretations of that reality,
what we are really doing is claiming that our interpretations of reality are
"disclosive" ofmeanings associated with the reality to which we cannot give full
expression precisely because we do not possess full knowledge of those meanings or
that reality in the first place. Thus, we see through a glass "darkly". For methods of
thinking such as Christian realism, this means that "[t]he disclosive power of
Christian symbols, metaphors, parables, and narratives ground the properly public
nature of Christian claims.. .",23 For Niebuhr's understanding of Christian realism,
then, the meaning of history is both disclosed and fulfilled in Jesus Christ.24 So,
when we see through a glass darkly, the person of Christ establishes the meaning of
history (for Niebuhr, God's sovereignty over history) and promises to illuminate
our faulty vision. "From the perspective ofhuman history, which cannot be fully
comprehended from its own perspective or fulfilled by its own power, the wisdom
and thepower in Christ is what gives life its meaning and guarantees the fulfilment
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of that meaning".
22
Ibid, 715. Note the difference Schweiker strikes between "determining" meaning and "creating"
meaning.
23 Ibid, 718.
24
Niebuhr, in fact, devotes quite a bit of energy to explaining Christ's role for determining the
meaning of history. He notes that, "the disclosure of the character ofGod and the meaning of history
in Christ has a threefold relation to the conceptions of the meaningfulness of history as established in
historic cultures and their Messianic hopes. It (a) completes what is incomplete in their apprehensions
ofmeaning; (b) it clarifies obscurities which threaten the sense ofmeaning; and (c) it finally corrects
falsifications ofmeaning which human egoism introduces into the sense ofmeaning by reason of its
effort to comprehend the whole of life from an inadequate centre of comprehension". Niebuhr accepts
this threefold pattern and also uses it to explain the role of the cross for determining the "ethical norm
of history". See The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. II, pp. 81 -90. Additionally, see the second
chapter of Vol. I, pp. 26-53, for the fuller discussion ofChrist's role in determining the meaning of
history.
25 "The sovereignty ofGod establishes the general frame ofmeaning for life and history, according to
Biblical faith". Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 136. See also Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of
Man, Vol. II, pp. 35-38.
26
Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 55.
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Of these three forms outlined above, Schweiker champions hermeneutical
knowledge for his hermeneutical realism though, because of its interrelationship with
the other two forms of knowledge, it is not as if hermeneutical knowledge can
function independently of the others. That is, "[hjermeneutics is linked but not
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reducible to empirical and logical knowledge". Here is a methodological
disposition similar to that ofNiebuhrian realism.
4.6. Mimesis andMemory: A Caution
Granting that Schweiker is not a Niebuhrian realist of the sort so far described
and that Niebuhr himself never offered hermeneutical and epistemological categories
in his articulation of Christian realism, we can nevertheless benefit from
appropriating Schweiker's categories for our present enquiries into Niebuhrian
realism. To that end, the hermeneutical task of Christian realism is best described,
like Schweiker's hermeneutical realism, as an amalgamation of the three forms of
knowing mentioned above. Before considering the implications of this
hermeneutical realism for Christian realism, however, a potential source of error
needs to be highlighted.
The assumption in Schweiker's discussion of forms and validations is that the
hermeneutical task of interpreting our present social contexts is accomplished
through the recollection of past definitions ofmoral meaning. Thus, in Lovin's
example, one of the reasons we no longer assert that a person with mental disabilities
is someone who exhibits a "moral weakness of character" is because we make
appeals to consequences ofpast beliefs as corrective for present moral judgments.
That is, we now realise that our past beliefs were false and led to the mistreatment of
those who are mentally disabled. When what we once believed true proves to be
false, or even pernicious, we can then say that we were wrong in our beliefs and set
about correcting injustices resulting from our misjudgements. This is important
because the past—particularly as it is interpreted in the forms of empirical and
logical knowledge—serves as a plumb line against which to measure current moral
judgments. Thus, we look to our past history to understand our present. So, any
present interpretation ofmoral meaning that we may claim to possess is derivative of
the experiences (sensibly and analytically validated) that we have had previously.
27 William Schweiker, "Comment", Journal ofReligious Ethics 34 (2006): 715.
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The problem with this is that remembering the past can never simply be a
mimetic exercise for determining present moral meaning. That is, the past as we
once knew it only now exists in imagination and cannot be re-created in such a way
that it can fully represent the reality it once did, the absolute and uninhibited nature
ofmoral imagination notwithstanding. Attempts at such reconstructions are
ultimately guilty of naive sentimentality, one of the reasons for which Niebuhr was
so critical of liberalism. Moral imagination, of course, works both regressively and
progressively, which is to say that the imagination enables us to remember the past
and envision the future; thus, its uninhibited nature. However, what happens when
we emphasise the past as the foundation for present moral enquiry is that we get a
sense ofwhat it means for the Christian realist to "create" history. Gilkey seems to
associate the creation of history in Niebuhrian realism with an atavism of the sort not
9R
easily identified with the Niebuhrian realist's conception ofhistory. The task of
creating history for the realist does not mean that the moral agent or society is
capable freely to devise new socio-political contexts ex nihilo, dissociated from the
contexts of the past. Nor, however, does it mean that the moral agent or society is
bound indeterminately to those contexts. Instead, the task of creating history lies
somewhere in between these two poles. Whether or not this is his intent, the
implication ofGilkey's categories is that the moral agent or society is indeed capable
of the ex nihilo creation of history. The point ofNiebuhr's emphasis on human
transcendence, particularly in The Nature and Destiny ofMan, though, is that we are
never so far from our past mistakes as we would like to imagine, and so we cannot
create utterly new forms of socio-political existence. Sin remains with us in all times
of history.
The way that Niebuhr defines the creation of history is paradoxical. On the
one hand, the moral agent—the creator of history—is powerful and free enough to
imagine limitlessly into history's uncreated future and thus to "create" new
28
Gilkey's later work on this same topic seems to me a more plausible interpretation ofNiebuhr's
conception of history. For example, Gilkey notes that in Niebuhr's thought there are "layers" of
Niebuhr's understanding of history's meaningfulness and that though "[mjeanings...exist in history,
and there are renewals of these that avoid catastrophe and build further on the past.. .none of this is as
final as its enthusiastic agents believe; none is ultimate, though it will claim to be so". Gilkey, On
Niebuhr, pp. 210-211.
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scenarios. On the other hand, however, this creative ability is never far from the
capacity for destructiveness that haunts it. Thus, "the creative and destructive
possibilities of human history are inextricably intermingled. The very power which
organizes human society and establishes justice, also generates injustice by its
or\
preponderance of power". And elsewhere, "[t]he two-fold possibility of creativity
and destruction in human freedom, accounts for the growth of both good and evil
"3 1
through the extension of human powers". Moreover, what incapacitates the human
and leads to the negative potential for the "uncreation" (destruction) ofmeaning in
history is anxiety over death. Just as preoccupation with the need to create a history
which is meaningful, preoccupation (anxiety) with death is likewise concerned with
meaning which could either be fulfilled or negated upon death. Thus,
[hjowever inexorable death may be as law of nature, the fear of death
is just as inevitable an expression of that in man, which transcends
nature. It proves that he does have "preeminence above a beast";
because the fear of death springs from the capacity not only to
anticipate death but to imagine and to be anxious about some
dimension of reality on the other side of death....The fear of death is
thus the clearest embryonic expression ofman's capacity as a creator
ofhistory.
The important thing to remember about Niebuhr's understanding of the
creation ofhistory is that in it, the human stands atop a fulcrum between the past and
future. Any attempts to create history—that is, to establish a meaningful history—
must be related to such past attempts. This is precisely the point at which Niebuhrian
realism is so tied to the pragmatic tradition.
4.7. Validations: Coherence and Niebuhrian Realism
We have so far in this chapter discussed the methodology involved in
interpreting the moral meaning ofhistory. Schweiker's presentation of
hermeneutical realism offers empirical, logical and hermeneutical categories which
we have used better to understand Niebuhr's articulation of Christian realism for this
29 Power and freedom, for Niebuhr, are always related to the imagination, which is also the locus of
destructive evil when the human tries to imagine beyond the natural bonds of human limitation. "Sin
is, in short, the consequence ofman's inclination to usurp the prerogatives ofGod, to think more
highly of himself than he ought to think, thus making destructive use of his freedom by not observing
the limits to which a creaturely freedom is bound". Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 137.
30
Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. II., p. 21.
31 Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 139.
32
Ibid, p. 8.
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interpretation. Nevertheless, enquiry into, and interpretation of, moral meaning does
not end with these categories. "That is to say, asserting that something is logically or
empirically or hermeneutically true does not in itself show that the claim is actually
•3-3
true no matter who makes the assertion". In other words, what is important in
hermeneutical realism is related to the question, mentioned above, about what we are
warranted in asserting. As Lovin's example highlights, it once seemed sufficient to
claim that people suffered from mental disabilities because ofmoral weakness or
culpability. One might even be able to imagine a scenario in which support for this
claim is offered logically, empirically or hermeneutically. That does not, however,
establish the truth of the claim. In fact, one can argue logically, empirically or
hermeneutically precisely for the opposite, for the untruth of the claim. Here we
have an example of the nature of knowledge's incompleteness and its contingency on
historical contexts. "Knowledge of the truth is thus invariably tainted with an
"ideological" taint of interest, which makes our apprehension of truth something less
than knowledge of the truth and reduces it to our truth".34 That is, all knowledge or
attempts to derive knowledge are forever conditioned by certain attendant features
that are beyond our control. This taint, in a nutshell, is precisely what Niebuhr
constantly emphasises as the singular reason for why the meaning ofhistory or
claims to truth should not be handed over to a monolithic tradition. Given this, the
question of any hermeneutical interpretation naturally shifts from one concerning
what is involved in the process (i.e., "What are we doing when we interpret moral
meaning"?) to one concerning the contexts involved in that interpretation (i.e., "Who
is warranted in asserting interpretations ofmoral meaning?" And: "What are the
conditions necessary for those interpretations to take place?"). Ultimately, questions
about methodology, context and conditions all contribute to the larger question-at-
hand: What gives an interpretation ofmoral meaning its validity? Here we have the
link between Niebuhrian realism and pragmatism.
Niebuhr is not entirely clear about who is involved in his understanding of the
process ofmoral interpretation and justification; or, at least he is not always specific
about who is involved, or who validates the public search for a meaningful history.
As we noted in the previous chapter, this has led several critics, particularly Stanley
33
Schweiker, "Comment", p. 715.
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Hauerwas, to criticise him for lacking a robust ecclesiology. It is precisely on this
point where they think Niebuhr fails, because he does not offer an ecclesiological
ethic in which the Christian Church speaks to the truth of God as revealed in the
person ofChrist to society-at-large. This, the critics say, results in Niebuhr's
inability to offer a specific account of a Christian ethic, which is proven by "the fact
that many ofNiebuhr's contemporaries were attracted to his account of the human
•5 c
condition without sharing his theological convictions". Of course, part of
Niebuhr's hesitancy to point to the Church as the harbinger ofmoral goodness was
stressed in the criticisms of Catholicism that we outlined in the last chapter. As we
noted in that chapter, Niebuhr argues that the Church as a human institution is
susceptible to the kinds ofmoral failure that any other human institution is.
However, as I think Kenneth Durkin has rightly pointed out, this does not account for
or
a failure on Niebuhr's part to provide an ecclesiology.
These criticisms notwithstanding, we are not here offering an apologetic for
Niebuhr's ecclesiology, and so are more concerned with the above question about
what conditions are necessary in Niebuhr's articulation of Christian realism in order
that interpretations ofmoral meaning may take place. For the sake of consistency,
we will focus here only on the primary condition for these interpretations which, as
those who have discussed Niebuhrian realism's relationship to pragmatism have
pointed out, is coherence.
Whatever his dependence on the pragmatic tradition is, "Niebuhr was not
altogether consistent in his statement ofwhat the "pragmatism" in [his] "Christian
pragmatism" means".37 He defines it as "the application of Christian freedom and a
sense of responsibility to the complex issues of economics and politics, with the firm
resolve that inherited dogmas and generalizations will not be accepted no matter how
revered or venerable, if they do not contribute to the establishment of justice in a
34
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 214.
35 Kenneth Durkin, Reinhold Niebuhr, p. 182. This criticism (which is highlighted by Durkin, not
offered by him) does seem to gloss the fact that Niebuhr still possesses theological convictions from
which his understanding of Christian realism is derived, regardless of whether or not they were
convincing to his contemporaries.
36 See chapter three, n. 37.
37
Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 48, n. 39.
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given situation". What is consistent, though, is that, particularly when he speaks of
the moral interpretation of history, Niebuhr is quick to emphasise the importance of
coherence as a validation for any truthful interpretation.
Coherentist epistemological theories stress the importance of consistency in
order for beliefs to be considered "true". Similarly, coherence in Niebuhr's
articulation of Christian realism means "that religious beliefs and traditional dogmas
lose their claim to validity and become literally meaningless if they are not coherent
with our other ideas about the context in which we seek important human goods",39 a
statement which is exemplary of the distinctions between warranted assertability and
epistemic justification.40 This does not, however, portend nihilism or relativism, as
some might fear. Instead,
[t]o require that doctrinal truths be coherent with the other beliefs by
which we guide our choices and actions does not mean that theology
cannot question scientific theories, political principles, or social
scientific accounts of human action. To suggest that would be to give
these other systems of belief the same unquestioned status that some
theologians have mistakenly given to religious dogma....The point is
rather that the beliefs which guide action are those by which we can
coordinate all of our knowledge and experience...in pursuit of those
larger aims that give direction to our life as a whole and link us in
shared purposes with others.41
So, Niebuhr writes that "[w]e instinctively assume that there is only one
world and that it is a cosmos, however veiled and unknown its ultimate coherences,
38 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Theology and Political Thought in the WesternWorld" in Faith andPolitics ed.
by Ronald Stone, (New York: George Braziller, 1968), p. 55. Cited in Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and
Christian Realism, p. 48, n. 39.
39 Ibid, p. 49.
40 There is a tricky nuance here, however, which Niebuhr's version of Christian realism (perhaps
unknowingly) treads carefully. As Diggins points out, the original pragmatists were dubious about
accounts of truth which held "the view that a law or principle exists independently of the knowing
mind" (realism). Instead, "[t]o the pragmatist truth is never actual but potential, never total but partial
and tentative. Whether a potentially true idea be regarded as whatever moves one from a state of
doubt (Peirce) or as a volitional belief precipitating action (James) or as 'a plan of operation" that
equips us to control the environment (Dewey), truth is not a property inherent in an idea but
something that happens to an idea in the process of experiencing it. Ideas become true to the extent
that they either "work efficiently and satisfactorily" (James), enable us to measure their practical
consequences and "sensible effects" through scientific inquiry (Peirce), or provides us with
"warranted assertability" with which we can act upon hypotheses and solve problems (Dewey). To be
sure, there are distinctions in these definitions; yet they all share one premise: truth is not discovered
but produced; it does not exist but comes into being, so to speak, in the act of knowing". See Diggins,
p. 233. Obviously, Niebuhrian realism as it has so far been outlined does rely on this notion of truth
that the pragmatists reject and believes that the truth of an idea, or the determination ofmoral meaning
is validated through the testing of its premises, carried out in sensible experience.
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incongruities, and contradictions in life, in history, and even nature..." and that "[i]n
the one world there are many worlds, realms ofmeaning and coherence; and these
are not easily brought into a single system..." but "[t]here must be a final congruity
between these realms..." 42 The point is that coherence cannot be coerced, but that it
is also unavoidable, which is to suggest that any of our interpretations concerning the
moral meaningfulness of history, if they are true, will not be replaced by other ideas
which are not true. Sensible experience simply does not validate false interpretations
ofhistory's moral meaning. However, just as he believes Catholicism obliterates
moral meaning with its predetermined and closed system of natural law thinking,
Niebuhr warns that though "[tjhings and events may be too unique to fit into any
system ofmeaning.. .their uniqueness is destroyed by a premature coordination to a
system ofmeaning, particularly a system which identifies meaning with
rationality".43 It is Christology, I will argue in the penultimate chapter, which finally
reconciles this incompleteness—transcendentally and immanently—for Niebuhr.
The consistent criticism ofpragmatism is that because of its emphasis on the
necessary consideration of the contexts in which moral judgements occur, the moral
agent is too easily empowered with the ability to formulate any solution to moral
problems that suits the prejudices of that agent. For example, if I want to assert that
it is morally justifiable for me to bomb an abortion clinic, I may conceivably validate
my assertion pragmatically by constructing a coherent appeal to the experiences of
my fellow sensible citizens. I could argue publicly about the priority of unborn
"rights" based on the experiences we all share (i.e., we have all been born, and thus
were granted the "right" to be so); or, I might appeal to the emotions of others by
attempting to evoke a sense of revulsion through media depicting aborted foetuses;
or, I could characterise those who support abortion as ones who offend God's ideal
purpose for our lives. I may then suggest that the most effective means to end
41
Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 49.
42 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith" in Christian Realism and
Political Problems, p. 176. Incoherence proves a foil to coherence, which results in the inexplicable
phenomenon of evil. Niebuhr found radical evil—the idea that moral evil can actually be willed
instead ofbeing a privation of good—problematic. "Biblical faith has always insisted upon the
embarrassing truth that the corruption of evil is at the heart of the human personality. It is not the
inertia of its natural impulses in opposition to the purer impulses of the mind. The fact that it is a
corruption which has a universal dominion over all men, though it is not by nature but in freedom that
men sin, is the "mystery" of "original sin", which will always be an offence to rationalists". See Faith
and History, p. 138.
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abortion is to eliminate it at the source. In so doing, I justifymy actions with a
coherent argument based on appeals to shared experiences which some might even
find morally unobjectionable. The problem, of course, is that I have bypassed the
root issue ofwhat I might find morally unacceptable about abortion; namely, that I
have not named the moral meaning, or significance of the act of aborting a foetus.
Instead, I have dealt only with adventitious concerns. Consequently, I have offered a
too-simplistic account ofmoral reasoning, and I have sought to justify my means
(the destruction of an abortion clinic) by appeals to my ends (the destruction of
abortion as a practice). As we see, then, the moral judgement may too simply seek
the answer most convenient to the moral agent involved. The justification of a
particular interpretation ofmoral meaning can be offered less on the basis ofwhat is
logically, empirically and hermeneutically validated, and more on the basis of what
suits the purposes of the agent formulating the justification so that the "ends justify
the means" of the decision. This, of course, is a crude interpretation, reductively
constructed and consequentially applied, but it is also consistent with the kinds of
criticisms offered ofNiebuhr's Christian pragmatism.44
Russ Shafer-Landau notes that, "for non-reductive realists [a group in which
we would want to include Niebuhr].. .there is a standing presumption against any
view that is irreducibly pluralistic. In every area of enquiry, philosophical or not,
there is a powerful theoretical drive for simplicity. Faced with disparate phenomena,
we seek to identify the smallest possible set of ultimate causes or explanations of the
matters in question".45 Seeking out and articulating the simplest choice in moral
judgement, however, is not the only alternative to an ethic which identifies and
defines the respective multitudinous claims on our lives, though understandably, it is
one of great appeal. As Lovin notes, "[t]he appeal of these non-naturalist
alternatives [illustrated in the above example] is that they provide a simple single
criterion by which to determine whether an act is right.. ..No further investigation is
required".46 The problem is that the straightforwardness involved in only having one
43 Ibid.
44 Cf. Haas, p. 607, n. 5 where he lists David Little, James Childress, John Patrick Diggins, Colm
McKeogh and Michael Joseph Smith as some of those who present this interpretation ofNiebuhr's
realism.
45 Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, p. 97.
46
Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 109.
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option from which to choose does not, by that virtue alone, mean that the simplest
(or singular) moral choice is always the right one. Life is not that tidy. Niebuhr's
articulation ofChristian realism, though, was neither "irreducibly pluralistic" nor
naively simplistic. The kind of coherence involved in Niebuhr's version of Christian
realism offers a vision ofmoral hermeneutics that attempts to navigate the myriad
facets of our moral existence. "The appeal" of what Lovin identifies as "coherentist
ethical naturalism" which he attaches to Christian realism, "is not that it eliminates
moral disagreements, but that it suggests a way to resolve them".47
This is an important point, particularly as it pertains to the kinds ofpluralistic
contexts more prevalent today than during Niebuhr's life. In some sense, because of
his insistence on the need to consider all relevant perspectives and still to resolve
moral disagreements, Niebuhr anticipated twenty-first centuryWestern pluralism in
liberal societies in a way that today lends credence to the appellation "prophetic"
before Niebuhrian realism.
4.8.Pragmatism with Foundations
It is beyond the extent of the present project to outline the particular
distinctions which make up the trajectory of pragmatism. However, it is worth
acknowledging that many pragmatists do not maintain the same kind of conceptual
framework about the nature of reality that we have to this point associated with
Niebuhrian realism, nor would they be likely to be persuaded by Schweiker's
hermeneutical realism. Richard Rorty, most notably, dashes the realist metaphysic
against the rocks of linguistic meaning. He offers a tripartite definition of
pragmatism which, roughly summarised goes: first "pragmatism...is simply anti-
essentialism applied to notions like 'truth,' 'knowledge,' 'language,' 'morality,' and
similar objects ofphilosophical theorizing". The second defining characteristic is
that pragmatism holds "no epistemological difference between truth about what
ought to be and truth about what is, nor any metaphysical difference between facts
and values, nor any methodological difference between morality and science".
Finally, pragmatism "is the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save
conversational ones—no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the
objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by
47 Ibid.
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the remarks of our fellow-inquirers". More to the point, the pragmatist "wants us to
give up the notion that God, or evolution, or some other underwriter of our present
world-picture, has programmed us as machines for accurate verbal picturing.. ,".48 It
is this third point which Rorty finds most compatible with an accurate philosophical
construal of pragmatism. Thus, he finds realism philosophically incapable of
offering a viable contribution to the conversation that pragmatists are having because
of its reliance on conceptual frameworks which support the objectivity ofmoral
truth.
We could say, though, that Niebuhr also wants us to give up that same notion
that there is a universal "underwriter" who programmes us for moral response.
Especially as we have tried here to reinforce the ideas from the last chapter, Niebuhr
is disinterested in an ethic in which moral agents are "programmed" for anything, as
he thinks is articulated by pre-Vatican II Catholic natural moral law theology. This,
however, does not require that such an ethic relinquishes the idea that God is the
underwriter of the moral meaning of history. Instead, it enforces Niebuhr's aversion
to the singularity in systems of ethics whose meaning is predetermined and, thus,
pre-closed.
David Fergusson, who has offered a helpful interpretation ofmoral realism,
has addressed Rorty's characterisation ofmoral pragmatism and found it lacking for
reasons of a similar nature than those mentioned above. Fergusson offers three
criticisms: First, based on Rorty's depiction ofpragmatists, there is no room for the
"moral dissident" to challenge the status quo ofmoral hermeneutics. "Ifmoral truth
is to be defined pragmatically in terms ofwhat the community finds useful or
convenient, how can we make sense of those who confront society with a moral
alternative"?49 By offering pragmatism as a moral alternative, but constructing it in
terms which do not allow other moral alternatives to be offered, Rorty's depiction of
pragmatism runs into the problem of self-referential coherence, which, as Fergusson
notes in his second point, ".. .attends Rorty's reading of the history of philosophy. If
48 Richard Rorty, Consequences ofPragmatism (Essays: 1972-1980), (Brighton: The Harvester Press
Limited, 1982), pp. 162-165.
49 David Fergusson, Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics, p. 104. Fergusson does note
Rorty's insistence that "the moral dissident is one who confronts society with the ideal of liberalism
over against the shortcomings of the status quo. [Therefore] [i]t is essential to a liberal society that it
provide its poets and revolutionaries with the space in which to challenge conventional wisdom and
practice".
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[Rorty's analysis ofpragmatism] is presented as a true and objective account ofwhat
has happened, it is hard to see how Rorty is not commending his position in a
manner that it judges impossible".50 In other words, pragmatism, defined by Rorty,
cannot be presented objectively without first ridding itself of its chief component:
commitment to the non-objectivity ofmoral enquiry and truth. Fergusson's third
criticism is similar:
To describe our predicament in terms of being trapped inside our
conceptual scheme with no access to the independent world is to
misrepresent our true position.. ..[AJlthough there is no pure language
of morals which infallibly represents ethical truths independently of
historical context, this does not undermine the realist's case....[T]he
fact that we can only talk about ethics in terms of a particular,
culturally bound vocabulary, does not imply that we are not talking
about something beyond our own culturally conditioned
preferences.51
What Fergusson believes Rorty's position necessarily leads to is relativism of
the sort that realism attempts to avoid. Nevertheless, Fergusson sees positive
elements in moral pragmatism, and wants to endorse a pragmatism which does not
abandon moral realism.
What, then, is required to answer these problems presented by Rorty's
characterisation of pragmatism? It seems that both realists and pragmatists are
searching for an interpretive ethic which can negotiate the impulse toward an
ideology in which the moral meaning ofhistory is closed to enquiry that has not been
programmed on the one hand, and one which relativises ethics in such a way that no
50 Ibid, p. 105.
51
Ibid, pp. 106-7.
52
Pragmatism also attempts to avoid relativism, and it should be noted that Rorty is quick to argue
against relativism and the notion that just because one does not accept a framework in which moral
meaning is held objectively apart from human conceptions about it that such a person can legitimately
be called a "relativist". "The philosophers who get called 'relativists' are those who say that the
grounds for choosing between such opinions are less algorithmic than had been thought. Thus one
may be attacked as a relativist for holding that familiarity of terminology is a criterion of theory-
choice in physical science, or that coherence with the institutions of the surviving parliamentary
democracies is a criterion in social philosophy. When such criteria are invoked, critics say that the
resulting philosophical position assumes an unjustified primacy for 'our conceptual framework,' or
our purposes, or our institutions. The position in question is criticized for not having done what
philosophers are employed to do: explain why our framework, or culture, or interests, or language, or
whatever, is at last on the right track—in touch with physical reality, or the moral law, or the real
numbers, or some other sort of object patiently waiting about to be copied. So the real issue is not
between people who think one view as good as another and people who do not. It is between those
who think our culture, or purpose, or institutions cannot be supported except conversationally, and
people who still hope for other sorts of support". See Rorty, pp. 166-167.
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system or moral meaning of history exists from the beginning on the other. In other
words, pragmatism and realism are tenably and mutually sustainable conceptions of
moral meaning when one utilises the insights of the other without recourse to
caricature in consideration of either one of them.
Niebuhr provides this sort of interpretive ethic in his articulation of Christian
realism with its incorporation of both realistic and pragmatic elements. That is,
Niebuhrian realism offers a realistic reading of the moral meaning ofhistory which
transcends human existence, and provides a pragmatic appraisal ofmoral
interpretation which appreciates the significance of language (particularly as it
pertains to impertinent predication and the symbols of the Christian tradition) as
determinative of our interpretations ofmoral meaning. In this sense, Niebuhr's
Christian realism points to pragmatism with foundations. Regarding this kind of
pragmatism, Joseph Margolis offers a definition of realism and relativism (used non-
pejoratively) that seems useful for the Niebuhrian realist. Says Margolis:
Relativism is an empirically motivated thesis to the effect that, in
particular sectors of inquiry, it is methodologically advisable to
retreat from insisting on a strong bipolar model of truth and falsity,
while not denying that the affected propositions or claims are
genuinely such and, as such, are to be ascribed suitable truth-like
values....[RJelativism is not only not opposed to realism, but its
advocates are positively committed to realism.. ,.54
Nevertheless, Niebuhr is also mindful of the mysterious nature of human and
divine existence, and finds parts of existential thinking useful for understanding our
53 Richard Fox argues that though John Dewey is frequently thought of as the pragmatist with whom
Niebuhr has the least in common, there are actually significant links between the two thinkers. He
points especially to how "[w]hat Niebuhr's analysis [ofDewey] actually revealed, was how close his
own prophetic faith was to Dewey... .His starting point, like Dewey's, was man's drive for meaning
and his quest to realize ideals in history". See Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr, p. 165. Bruce Kuklick accepts
this idea, but also points out that he "would add that Niebuhr was able to be a formidable enemy of
Dewey because he couched his 'similar' ideas' in language that reflected a more complex view ofman
and of the potential of science". See Bruce Kuklick, "Dewey, American Theology, and Scientific
Politics" Religion and Twentieth-Century American Intellectual Life ed. by Michael J. Lacey, p. 92.
Kuklick has an interesting point here and, though it exceeds the boundaries of what I am attempting to
accomplish in this chapter, it is worth noting because it points to the use of language as another link
between Niebuhr's version of Christian realism and philosophical pragmatism. At the very least, this
could be the basis for a future avenue of research, locating the two thinkers in pluralistic contexts. To
that end, Jerome Paul Soneson's work on Dewey and theology could prove a useful conversation
partner. See Jerome Paul Soneson, Pragmatism and Pluralism: John Dewey's Significancefor
Theology, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993).
54
Joseph Margolis, Pragmatism Without Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism, (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986), p. 111.
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contexts of existence. Using our understandings of hermeneutical realism and
pragmatism up to this point will help us as we now move on to explore the concept
of existentiality, which will occupy the remainder of this chapter.
Part II—Meaning: The "What" of the Method
4.9. Christian Realism and Existentialism
IfNiebuhr's interpretation of the moral meaning ofhistory is similar to
hermeneutical realism and influenced by pragmatism, it may seem natural to tie this
conception to existentialist thought, because of shared emphases on the discernment
ofmoral meaning and reluctance to derive meaning from any system of pre-closed
thinking applied to human existence. It may, however, seem disadvantageous to
associate Niebuhr's articulation of Christian realism with pragmatism or
existentialism because neither of these requires the same theological metaphysic that
Niebuhr's realism does in order for their interpretations of the moral meaning of
history to be sustainable. Nevertheless, it is apropos to the current of our discussion
so far next to discuss the existential elements in Niebuhrian realism because it was
after the foundations ofChristian pragmatism were established that Niebuhr's
theological thinking, existential in conception, began to become more apparent.
"From now on [after Christian pragmatism]", notes Cornel West, "[Niebuhr] would
focus first and foremost on the development of a Christian mythology that engaged
the social but proceeded from the aspirations, responsibility, and anxieties of the self.
In short, he decided to take Christian theology seriously—or at least as seriously as a
Christian pragmatist can".55 The doubtful nature of this last sentence
notwithstanding,56 the point still stands: Niebuhr's most profound theological
55
West, The American Evasion ofPhilosophy, p. 159.
56 It seems fairly clear that Niebuhr always took theology seriously, though he was never entirely
comfortable with the label "theologian". He admits as much when he says, "I have never been very
competent in the nice points of pure theology; and I must confess that I have not been sufficiently
interested heretofore to acquire the competence". See Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and
Political Thought, Kegley and Bretall (eds.), p. 3. Some critics point to this as empirical evidence not
of a statement of humility, but for the insufficient and "un-Christian" nature ofNiebuhr's theology.
See, for example, Hauerwas, p. 114, n. 2, in which he notes that "Niebuhr's self-assessment is correct,
but also misleading. His declaration that he is not competent in the 'nice points ofpure theology' is
but an indication that he assumes the 'nice points ofpure theology' are Jamesian over-beliefs that
cannot be true or false".
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analyses come at a time in his life when the influence of existentialism is
en
proportionately evident.
We have discussed already the distinctions and similarities between
pragmatism and Christian realism. The task at hand is now to demonstrate a similar
alliance between this realism and existentialism. We will begin that undertaking by
looking a piece addressing existentialism in Niebuhrian realism to date, to which we
now turn.
4.9.1. Ramsey on Niebuhr's Existentialism
The most important and sustained account which relates existentialism and
CO
Niebuhrian realism is Paul Ramsey's essay, "Love and Law". There Ramsey draws
on the tradition of natural law thinking to structure his argument, and it will be worth
our while to identify five key points in each of these parts in order better to
understand the overall argument. Consideration ofRamsey's arguments is important
because his analysis ofNiebuhr's thought appropriately situates Niebuhr as an
existentialist and as someone who is reliant on natural law thinking.
First, Ramsey identifies Sartre with the natural moral law tradition and then
Niebuhr with Sartre (and, consequently, with the natural moral law tradition). Sartre,
says Ramsey, intends to split from the natural moral law tradition, but is never
finally able to complete the schism precisely because his existentialism is dependent
upon an essentialist metaphysical conception similar to that of the natural moral law
tradition. Sartre argues that individuals draw on no predetermined nature for their
existences qua individuals, and so determine their own existences through the
exercise of choice (opto ergo sum), which is part and parcel to human self-
understanding. "[TJhere is no explaining things away (or, dropping out that last
pejorative word, there is no explaining things) by reference to a fixed and given
human nature".59 Ramsey summarises this by stating that "[cjhoice creates value and
571 would locate Niebuhr's most important theological and existential works from the late 1940s
onward. Obviously The Nature and Destiny ofMan (1939) still serves as the magnum opus, but many
other important works came after this time which develop and elucidate the themes begun in these two
volumes (including the moral meaning of history, the self and its place in history and the idea of a
nature intrinsic to humans). This list includes, but is not limited to Faith and History (1949), The Self
and the Dramas ofHistory (1956) and Man's Nature and His Communities (1966).
58 Paul Ramsey, "Love and Law", in Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought,
pp. 80-123. This essay also appears in Ramsey's later Nine Modern Moralists (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 111-147.
59
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essence. There is no pre-existent value or essence or structure of reality of God
which justifies choice; and it would be fruitless to try to justify by a value the action
which alone creates value. Man is a free, selfmanufacturing being.. ,".60 History, or
at least the moral meaning of individual histories, is the product ofwhat each
individual creates of it based on the choices he or she makes; a truly atavistic
conception of "creating" history. The problem, as Ramsey points out, is that Sartre
cannot escape the essentialist conception of human nature he intends to escape,
because that essentialism is necessary for him to make such a statement. "To think
at all about the nature ofman Sartre must think with essences, even if that be only
the thought that man essentially consists of an entirely dynamic and limitless
freedom. However radically reshaped, here surely there is a modicum of the natural
law".61
This is the point at which Ramsey links Niebuhr to Sartre and the natural
moral law. In fact, Ramsey claims that the link with the natural moral law tradition
is even stronger for Niebuhr than it is for Sartre. Highlighting Niebuhr's emphasis
on the law of love as a kind of "natural law", Ramsey notes that
love is the moral law for man.. .[Niebuhr's] way of pointing us to this
conclusion is by showing that the natural moral law elaborated in the
philosophies of naturalism, rationalism, and so on, fails and must fail
to captivate and fulfil the special dimension of freedom in man's
essential nature....[W]hat can be more grounded in "Nature" than
[Niebuhr's] assertion that man is made for life-in-community whose
fO
quality is love?
Second, Ramsey attempts to establish more clearly the issues involved with
linking Niebuhr's realism to the natural moral law tradition, thus locating him farther
from an existential conception ofhuman nature than Niebuhr believes himself to be.
However, Ramsey turns on this point and suggests instead that Niebuhr might
actually provide a version of existentialism, but that Niebuhr does not realise this
because ofhis attempt to modify the natural law tradition. Ramsey draws primarily
on Niebuhr's redefinition of the natural law as the law of love, and suggests that
what we have in Niebuhr's Christian realism is not, in the end, the natural law,
60 Ibid.
61
Ibid, p. 82.
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because the law of love for Niebuhr is inextricable from the notion that there are
variable norms of human nature. "One step in the direction of properly grasping
Niebuhr's thought is to understand love as the natural law for freedom. Another is to
understand that what he often calls natural law, or its equivalent in his thought, is not
that at all, but an application of the fundamental law of love".63 That is, to Ramsey's
mind, Niebuhr confuses traditional conceptions of the natural law for the law of love
to which Niebuhr appeals.
Third, Ramsey revisits the division between the jus Gentium and jus Civilis
in Niebuhr's thought that is outlined most extensively in An Interpretation of
Christian Ethics,64 Ramsey offers criticisms ofNiebuhr that are similar to those of
John Milbank particularly as they relate Niebuhrian realism to Stoic conceptions of
the natural law. Because these criticisms are addressed at length in the following
chapter, it is sufficient simply to note Ramsey's use of them here.
Ramsey's fourth and fifth points are his most important, and therefore
importantly linked to one another. He first discusses the notion of sacrificial,
agapeic love in Niebuhr's conception of Christian realism and relates it to the natural
moral law tradition. In fact, Ramsey highlights that agape is the natural moral law,
the "ought" to which the moral agent is drawn, and the chief component for
understanding the moral meaning of history. This naturally leads to the question of
how the moral agent knows "that love is the norm for human life in freedom".65
Ramsey poses three possibilities for answering this question: First, "[i]t may be that
man has an "inchoate" knowledge of the requirement ofself-sacrificial love, or that
he dimly knows that he should heed not his own but his neighbor's good". Second,
"[i]t may be that in his free spiritual self-awareness man has a sense ofmutual love,
and that only by faith in Christ does he know himself to be judged in terms of the
self-giving love which seeks to save him at such cost". Third, "[i]t is simply love
that is known as the norm for human existence in the moment of self-transcendence
and self-understanding".66
Ramsey's essay is important because it draws attention to the influence of
existentialism on Niebuhr's realism. At the same time, however, it points out that
63
Ramsey, "Love and Law", p. 93.
64
Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, pp. 103-135.
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because Niebuhr is so concerned to distance himself from the tradition of the natural
moral law (pre-Vatican II), he never realises just how close to that tradition he
actually is. Consequently, the essay signifies the fact that there are essentialist and
existentialist ways of thinking at work in Niebuhr's realism. As we will see in our
final chapters, this is crucial to understanding how the framework ofNiebuhr's
realism provides a foundation for theological hope.
Putting the point on his argument, Ramsey thus suggests that from the above
list, the second possibility for interpreting Niebuhr's conception of love is most
appropriate. Interestingly, he never ties this conceptual possibility to the part of
human nature responsible for its possibility in the first place, though one could
plausibly suggest that it is implicit in his argument. This, I suggest, is the place of
the conscience in moral agency, an area largely unexplored in Niebuhrian studies.
Before closing this chapter, let us focus for a moment on the role the conscience
plays in Niebuhr's realism for the determination of the moral meaning ofhistory.
4.10. Conscience andMoral Hermeneutics
Moral agents are compelled to act for justice when they sense that "things are
not as they ought to be". This sense, which may rightly be called the conscience, is
intrinsic to the discernment ofhistory's moral meaning. Throughout his writings,
Niebuhr attends to the notion that the role of conscience is significant for the
discernment ofhistory's moral meaning, but he is careful not to ascribe too crude an
appraisal to what the conscience is, or what kind of roles it plays. For Niebuhr the
conscience is not merely an "intuition" or "feeling" aroused by some sense ofmoral
dissatisfaction with our social contexts as we understand them. Human existence is
not so formulaic that moral hermeneutics may always identify one good, two evils or
three injustices in any given social context. For Niebuhr this means that "the content
of conscience is much more relative than the proponents of the idea of 'moral
f\1
intuitions' realize". Part of the problem with intuitionism, as Niebuhr understands
it, is that it too easily champions the significance of the moral agent's reason, as in
the natural moral law tradition. As Lovin notes, "[f]or the intuitionist, the fact that
so often we "just know" that an act is wrong suggests that these moral aspects of
66 Ibid, pp. 140-146.
67 "Rational, Moral and Religious Norms" in ReinholdNiebuhr on Politics, p. 125. See also Brink, p.
109.
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experience are unique properties of actions and situations, not [as in Niebuhrian
realism] discerned by examining and drawing conclusions about natural
68
properties". The problem, in other words, is that the intuition that something is
wrong may be nothing more than a feeling of unease, and moral discernment cannot
be made on the basis of feeling at the expense of examination of the facts at hand.
While the conscience is not merely a feeling, neither is it some uncorrupted
element of human life which exists independently ofhuman existence. The ideal
function of the conscience is to serve the individual in her transcendence and provide
for her a sense of compunction concerning things which are not as they ought to be.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the individual's sense of compunction
necessarily conforms rightly to moral goodness discerned by reason. Instead, as
reason is corruptible, so is the conscience, and so the guilt often associated with the
conscience can be false guilt.
In sum, Niebuhr thinks of the conscience not simply as intuition, nor as a part
of human nature that, when discerned, will help the moral agent rightly order his or
her desires. Instead, for Niebuhr, the conscience is
any aspect of the self s judging its actions and attitudes in which a
sense of obligation in contrast to inclination is expressed. Many
efforts have been made to deny the reality of such a sense of 'ought'.
Most of these efforts are clearly derived from one-dimensional views
of selfhood, usually elaborated within a naturalistic ontology. They
try to eliminate the distinction between the desired and the desirable
in the view of the self. But they fail to explain why the self is under
the necessity of seeking what it desires by proving that the desired is
really desirable; or that what the self wants is in accord with some
wider system of values than the selfs own interests....This sense of
obligation is powerful enough to allow the self freedom to achieve
what it desires only when it is able to persuade itself that what it
desires is consonant with this more general system of values.69
Having sketched Niebuhr's basic conception ofwhat the conscience is not, I will
now suggest two ways in which Niebuhr understands the conscience as central to the
process ofmoral hermeneutics: the easy and uneasy conscience; and, the individual
conscience.
4.10.1. The Easy and Uneasy Conscience
68
Lovin, ReinholdNiebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 108.
69
Niebuhr, The Selfand the Dramas ofHistory, pp. 25-26.
114
The first category to consider for Niebuhr's understanding of the conscience
is the distinction he draws between "easy" and "uneasy" conscience. The easy
conscience is not a conscience which glosses the problem of sin, or denies the reality
of sin; it is the ideal conscience. One with an easy conscience possesses a moral
disposition which believes the self to conform to the moral order of the universe
instituted by God. This disposition asks whether or not ".. .man's historical
existence is such that he can ever, by any discipline of reason or by anymerit of
grace, confront a divine judgment upon his life with an easy conscience. If he can it
means that it is possible for a will centred in an individual ego to be brought into
no
essential conformity with the will and power which governs all things". The easy
conscience is the conscience of legalism that does not acknowledge the relativities of
human existence.71
On the other hand, the uneasy conscience is the conscience that instils in the
moral agent the sense that things are not as they should be. Niebuhr thinks of the
uneasy conscience as the most suitable description of a realistic understanding of the
conscience because it neither shirks engagement with the complexities of existence,
nor does it seek to pre-close the mysteries of this existence into one system of
meaning. Moreover, it points to the collective nature ofhuman existence because
the conscience is made uneasy at the point when it considers the injustices afflicting
others to whom the individual is socially related. "The need of this neighbour, the
demands of that social situation, the claims of this life upon me, unrecognized today
may be recognized and stir the conscience to uneasiness tomorrow".72 In a sense, the
uneasy conscience is more socially conscious than that of the easy conscience.
However, the uneasy conscience always points back to the individual moral agent.
Though certain systems of injustice or oppression may inspire in me a desire to act
on behalf of those who suffer, and though this act may be related to the final law of
agapeic suffering, it is still I who acts. This brings us to the second important
conception of the conscience for Niebuhr.
4.10.2. The Individual Conscience
70 Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 141. It should be noted that Niebuhr is here
criticising the idea of an easy conscience and associates it with Catholic conceptions of the moral law.
11 Ibid, p. 190, n. 11.
12 Ibid.
115
The second way to interpret Niebuhr's understanding of the conscience is
individualistically. Though Niebuhr addresses the idea of a "collective" conscience
in his earlier writings, later writings tend more often to deal with the subject of
conscience of the individual who stands in judgment before God for not being the
person God has called him or her to be. For example, Niebuhr notes that "[i]t is the
highest function of religion to create a sense of guilt, to make man conscious of the
fact that his inadequacies are more than excusable limitations—that they are treasons
against his better self. It accomplishes this task by revealing sin as a treason against
God".74
Interest in the individual conscience in his postwar writings is, I suggest,
related to three separate influences. First, interest in the individual conscience is
linked to his interest in existentialism which is more apparent in his later writings.
As previously noted, Niebuhr devotes a significant amount of time in these later
writings to the concept of the individual person. It is not coincidental, then, that
those writings which deal most explicitly with the themes of existentialism are the
n c
same ones which deal with the theme of the individual conscience.
Second, it should also be noted that during this second half of his
professional life, Niebuhr's writings show increasing interest in contemporary
psychoanalysis. He engaged on a fairly regular basis with the leading proponents of
psychoanalysis (e.g. Fromm, Erickson, Jung, Freud), interactions which certainly
contributed to his interest in the subject of the individual conscience.76
Third, and perhaps most significantly, the interplay and influence ofH.
Richard Niebuhr's ideas on Reinhold's thought plays a considerable role in the older
Niebuhr's later writings on the individual conscience. Each brother has conceptual
elements of the individual self in his respective interpretations of the conscience
which are akin to the other. There are, however, subtle and comparable differences
73
Cf., Niebuhr, MoralMan and Immoral Society, pp. 257-277.
74
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75 Cf. Niebuhr, The Selfand the Dramas ofHistory, pp. 15-84.
76 For more on this interest in psychoanalysis, see Halliwell's chapter, "Digging About in the Slime:
Niebuhr and American Psychoanalysis", in The Constant Dialogue, pp. 131-159. Halliwell does not
explicitly link Niebuhr's growing interest in psychoanalysis to his writings on the individual
conscience, but he does note that Niebuhr's concept of the self is developed largely in conversation
with Freudian psychoanalysis, and that his subsequent understanding of the conscience is borne out of
his understanding of the conceptual "self'. "Rather than being entirely self-centered on Freud's
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between the two thinkers, especially with respect to their responses on the issue of
what it is that the moral agent is responding to when he or she is prompted by what
the conscience.
Both H. Richard and Reinhold conceive of the self first as an individual, but
ultimately as an individual related to other individuals at the level of community.
For example, in Man's Nature andHis Communities, the work in which Reinhold
seeks to correct previous defects he perceives from his thought during the previous
decades, he suggests that a realist understanding of the individual's nature is that the
self first thinks of itself. When it does so, the freedom of the individual is
emphasised to the detriment of the community in which the individual lives. As
Reinhold Niebuhr notes, "Realists emphasise the disruptive effect of human freedom
on the community". Later he notes that "the Christian faith holds that human nature
contains both self-regarding and social impulses and that the former is stronger than
the latter. This assumption is the basis of Christian realism".77 The significance of
this last statement cannot be overstressed because it encapsulates a central idea of
Niebuhr's realism which I have so far attempted to demonstrate the importance of
throughout our chapters: the human individual is the starting point for moral and
theological discourse. Moreover, this understanding of the individual self points to
the paradox that because the self regards both itself and the community, it must
therefore seek "the establishment of a tolerable harmony between self-regarding
individuals within the civil community, and the relations of integral political
no
communities each other". Niebuhr understands the proclivity for the self to regard
itself over others as sinful, a sinfulness to which the conscience points when the
individual senses that things are not as they ought to be. The conscience is central to
human freedom. We might even say that just as justice and equality serve as
regulative principles for the law of love in Niebuhr's articulation of Christian
realism, so also the conscience serves as the regulative principle of freedom. That is,
the conscience reminds individuals that they are never as free as they imagine
themselves to be, but it paradoxically frees individuals better to discern the moral
meaning ofhistory.
model of the superego.. .Niebuhr believed that the conscience had the capacity to take the self beyond
itself...". See Ibid, p. 140.
77
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H. Richard Niebuhr agrees that the individual self is related to other selves
whose existence naturally constitutes community. "To be a self in the presence of
other selves", he says, "is not a derivative experience but primordial. To be able to
say that I am I is not an inference from the statement that I think thoughts nor from
the statement that I have a law-acknowledging conscience. It is, rather, the
7Q
acknowledgement ofmy existence as the counterpart of another self'. Drawing on
this, he suggests that when the self responds to the conscience, it is responding to an
external moral law which compels it to understand that things are not as they ought
to be. But the failure to live by this moral law is made evident because of the
presence of others. Like Reinhold, H. Richard holds to a version of the natural
moral law for understanding how we discern the moral meaning ofhistory. "We
must agree with the prophets who always presupposed that Israel knew what was
good, and with St. Paul who believed that the Gentiles who knew not God had
OA
knowledge of his law in their conscience". In other words, H. Richards agrees with
the point of the examples, contained in both the Old and New Testaments, which
says that the conscience is adjudicated by a law of the "good". The discernment of
this law, he thinks, is given over in the act ofGod's revelation. That is, "[t]he moral
law is changed.. .by the revelation of God's self in that its evermore extensive and
o 1
intensive application becomes necessary".
Granting that H. Richard gives a more robust interpretation than Reinhold
does of the doctrine of revelation as that which completes the knowledge of the
moral law "written" in the conscience, the comparison still stands: both thinkers
identify the self s conscience as that which responds to an external moral authority
which exists independently of human conceptions about it, and they agree that while
the conscience responds to this authority, it is discerned in the exigencies of
historical contexts. As such, moral hermeneutics can never be merely
individualistic. For Reinhold, then, "[m]an lives in nature, yet transcends nature,
and builds history in his communities, and then he transcends these communities of
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history and has his own conscience, whereby he can judge the historical situation.
Finally, looking higher to a more transcendent level, he feels himself subject to an
82ultimate judgment". However, . .notions of conscience as purely individual do
not do justice to the fact that the individual is best able to defy a community when
his conscience is informed and reinforced by another community which directly
oi
impinges upon his life and threatens his liberty by its coercions...". In other words,
the individual is never as free as she believes herself to be because as an individual,
she stands under a more ultimate judgment of the external community in which she
resides. Moreover, all communities stand under the final judgment of God who
transcends history. Here is the paradox of history's meaning: because we sense that
things are not as they ought to be, we say that there must be something which can set
aright our current injustices. But the Christian realist acknowledges that we are
incapable of completing the incompleteness ofhistory's meaning. This leads to the
existential dilemma: history's meaning is only made complete by the law of love in
Christ, which transcends history. However, the fulfilment ofmeaning in history
does not remain elusive in historical contexts; it is related to the two-fold nature of
the law of love embodied in Christ. This is a complicated point in Niebuhr's
interpretation of historical meaning, related to his Christology, and we will turn to a
fuller exposition of Christ as the symbol of the moral meaning of history in chapter
six. For now, though, it is sufficient to mention that Niebuhr's interpretation of the
moral meaning of history is indivisible from his Christology, apprehended by the
individual conscience.
4.11. Conclusions
History's meaning, hidden and paradoxical to the perennial unrest of human
existence, stands beyond our comprehension of it. Sin proves a foil to our efforts to
interpret the meaningfulness of human existence and uncertainty about our futures
provides the basis of anxiety inbuilt to human nature.
We have seen in this chapter that Schweiker's hermeneutical realism
provides an interpretive tool for attempts to interpret the meaning ofhistory that
cannot be fully known in the particularity of our social existences. Moreover,
82 "The Burden ofConscience" in Justice andMercy, edited by Ursula M. Niebuhr, (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1974), p. 106.
83 Niebuhr, The Selfand the Dramas ofHistory, p. 27.
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Schweiker's presentation ofhermeneutical realism offers a helpful interlocutor for
comprehending the hermeneutics ofNiebuhr's realism. Hermeneutical realism seeks
primarily to understand what beliefs we are justified in believing and are thus
warranted in asserting. We have also observed here that existentialist thought is
important to hermeneutical strategies such as realism which seek to interpret
history's meaning from the social contexts in which we live. More specifically,
existentialism is important for understanding the individual's conscience which
instils the sense that things are not as they ought to be.
In the next chapter we will consider John Milbank's assessment ofNiebuhr's
realism and the problems he finds in it. Milbank's criticism deals with several of the
metaphysical and hermeneutical concerns that we have covered to this point, and it
presents the foundations ofNiebuhr's realism as those which essentially offer a
hopeless ethic. It is therefore helpful to consider Milbank's interpretation of
Niebuhr before moving on to our chapters on theological hope.
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Chapter Five
MORAL LAW, PRIVATIVE EVIL AND CHRISTIAN REALISM
5.1 Abstract
This chapter responds to John Milbank's essay, "The Poverty of
Niebuhrianism" in The Word Made Strange. There Milbank offers a
critique ofNiebuhr's Christian realism for offering an attenuated Stoic
naturalism, and a theologically inadequate conception of original sin,
rather than a genuine Christian realism. Drawing on the previous
enquiries of previous chapters into the framework of Christian
realism, its relationship to the natural moral law and the hermeneutics
of Christian realism, I will here argue that while Milbank rightly
perceives a kind of naturalism in Niebuhrian realism, he inaccurately
identifies it as Stoic. Moreover, I will argue that Milbank and Niebuhr
are more aligned on the concept of original sin than Milbank allows,
particularly when the reader considers Milbank's later work, Being
Reconciled, and Niebuhr's The Nature and Destiny ofMan and Faith
andHistory.
5.2. Introduction
It has been a decade since John Milbank published the second instalment of
his project of theological engagement with the social sciences. This work, The Word
Made Strange, seeks to expand and clarify themes originally outlined in Milbank's
first installation, Theology and Social Theory. In The WordMade Strange,
Milbank's clarifications of his original themes are delivered in essays devoted to
such topics as ethics, politics, theology, and linguistics. Though I will not here seek
to comment on all of the topics or essays Milbank covers, it is helpful for the
purposes of the overall thesis to discuss an essay that has thus far gone without
intensive response, "The Poverty ofNiebuhrianism". There Milbank elaborates his
criticism of the Christian realism associated with the thought ofReinhold Niebuhr.
Niebuhrian realism, according to Milbank, generates the realities in order that it
might criticise positions to which it is ironically enslaved. Thus, while Niebuhr's
approach to realism—"the disposition to take all factors in a social and political
situation, which offer resistance to established norms, into account, particularly the
factors of self-interest and power,"1—believes itself to be critical of certain social
and political ideological impulses, Milbank thinks that, in actuality, it creates those
realities based on assumptions it mistakenly believes to be true. The effect is that
1
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"its pessimism turns into over-optimism, its pragmatism into idealism, its anti-
liberalism into liberalism, its confidence in God into confidence into humanity". Put
succinctly, Milbank thinks that Niebuhr's realism is everything it claims not to be.
Milbank does not suppose that Niebuhr's realism intentionally creates false
realities, but that despite its claims to be theological realism, its theology is grounded
in a false myth adopted from the narrative of secular liberalism. This narrative,
claims Milbank, states that there is a sovereign sphere—the secular—which operates
independently of theological discourse, relegating theological belief to a role of
irrelevance. The problem, to Milbank's mind, is that the perceived secular order was
not created ex nihilo, but instead has its roots in the theological, and therefore cannot
truly be secular if secularism is understood to be a sphere which operates
autonomously and independently of God. Instead of theology being an entity
separate from other social scientific methods, it actually provides the basis for all
social sciences.
In chapter four we investigated the hermeneutics of Christian realism as it
seeks to understand a meaningful existence. That enquiry, along with the ones
carried out in the previous chapters, helped to provide a framework by which to
understand Christian realism. Here, that framework will be used to respond to
Milbank's criticisms ofNiebuhr's realism. In response, I will address two points
Milbank makes regarding Niebuhrian realism: the notion of limited human ethical
possibilities and the invocation of the doctrine of original sin. It will be my
argument that while Niebuhr does conceive of the human as limited in ethical
possibilities, he does so differently than Milbank interprets. Moreover, the method
by which Niebuhr understands limited human ethical possibilities does not associate
him with the liberalism he was attempting to criticise, but clarifies further the
problems inherent with that liberalism. Secondly, I will argue that Milbank has
misinterpreted Niebuhr on the problem of original sin, and that Niebuhr's conception
of evil is similar to that ofMilbank's (i.e., evil as ontologically privative contra
"post-Kantian" evil positivists),4 though with different conclusions.
2
Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture, p. 233.
3 See John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 9 ("Once, there was no 'secular'..."); and "An
Essay Against Secular Order." The Journal ofReligious Ethics 15.2 (1987): 199-224.
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Milbank's work on Niebuhr is useful for our purposes because the picture
Milbank draws ofNiebuhr's realism is finally a hopeless one. He finds Niebuhr's
articulation of Christian realism ultimately unable to transcend existential concerns
and offer an imaginative alternative to the problems encountered in human existence.
This is primarily because he thinks that Niebuhr's framework for interpreting these
social contexts does little to provide the realist with the necessary imaginative tools
by which he or she can imaginatively transcend the problems of human life.
Interaction with Milbank's work will offer a helpful segue in to the second part of
this thesis, where the ways in which the framework of Christian realism offers a way
to understand theological hope are to be considered. Before that, though, let us turn
to Milbank.
5.3. InterpretingMilbank's Interpretation
One leitmotif of The Word Made Strange is "the retrieval in Christianity of
certain themes from Stoicism".5 Milbank believes that Stoic naturalism is prominent
in Niebuhrian realism and accounts for Niebuhr's mid-career break with certain
Marxist elements that influenced his early thought. This form of naturalism is also
indicative of an emphasis on the limits to human ethical possibilities Milbank finds
pervasive in Niebuhr's later thought. These limits, which are constituted by "the
notion that human finitude is an impassable barrier to the actualizing of the good life
in the human world",6 are of the reasons Milbank thinks Niebuhr finally to be allied
with the liberalism he sought to criticise. Niebuhr, according to Milbank, arrives at
the conclusion that there are such limits to ethical possibilities through a variety of
ways: philosophically, ontologically, and ethically.
Philosophically, what Milbank detects as present in Niebuhr's early thought,
though absent in his later considerations, is a "genuine realism in the philosophic
sense: he [Niebuhr] claimed that certain objective and regular causal processes were
at work in the human world, even if these were ultimately the contingent upshot of
n
certain human historical choices." Milbank considers this realism characteristic of
the early Niebuhr's Marxist thought, and though he (Milbank) is unconcerned with
the veracity of these processes, he highlights them because they ground Niebuhr's
5 Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, "The Word Made Speculative? John Milbank's Christological
Poetics." Modern Theology 15.4 (1999): 417-432.
6 Milbank, The WordMade Strange, p. 235.
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thought in a particular tradition ofmorally realistic/ethically naturalistic mode of
thinking, such as the one discussed in chapter two. This view states that moral facts
and principles exist and are therefore objective, insofar as they have a "nature" to
which moral agents can appeal when describing the "good", "right" or "just".
Nevertheless, the appeal moral agents assert when calling a particular moral act
"wrong" leaves unaffected the natural status of the principle to which they appeal.
As suggested in chapter two, "[mjoral realism is roughly the view that there are
moral facts and true moral claims whose existence and nature are independent of our
o
beliefs about what is right and wrong."
Milbank identifies early Niebuhrian realism with Marxist social analyses,9
and he suggests that the loss of realistic thinking is coincidental with the
abandonment ofMarxist analysis in Niebuhr's later work.10 While this link is made
between loss of realism and Marxist analyses at the empirical level in Milbank's
critique, it is a more tenuous link at the metaphysical level.
According to Milbank, Niebuhr's break with Marxist analyses and subsequent
adoption of falsely created realities is most evident in Niebuhr's claims about human
nature. Niebuhr, claims Milbank, forsook realistically pessimistic claims (i.e., "that
the nature of our present historical condition is such that we are faced with tragic
dilemmas in which it is impossible to avoid some complicity in evil")11 in exchange
for a pessimism (which Milbank identifies as actually optimism) loosely affiliated
with contrived notions about human nature and group behaviour.12 This is a chiefly
Stoic, and therefore pagan, way of conceiving the world which, Milbank thinks,
consigns Niebuhrian realism to something other than theological realism.
5.3.1. Ontological Criticism
Ontologically, this Stoic naturalism, which assumes an "encounter between
an absolute spiritual ideal and a 'chaotic' finite world which it does its best to
7
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regulate", functions in both human and communal groups, and is marked by a
Niebuhrian emphasis on limited imaginations and understandings. Milbank criticises
Niebuhr for understanding humans as imaginatively limited because he believes
Niebuhr ascribes the characteristics of Stoic ethics (i.e. "natural barriers" between the
real and ideal) to his own realism. I disagree with this assessment, as will be made
clear in the below section on imagination, because I think that imagination and
understanding serve roles greater than mere empathetic instruments for Niebuhr,
though Milbank does not.14 Milbank thinks that because imagination for Niebuhr can
do little more than evoke empathy, moral agents are thus unable to deal in a
genuinely realistic manner with the contexts in which they live. The result for the
Niebuhrian realist is conscription into a liberal narrative rooted in ontological
violence, precisely because the moral agent is unable to imagine an alternative
ontology of peace identified with true theological realism. That is, Milbank thinks
that Niebuhr's putative dispossession of imagination results in Niebuhr's inability to
do other than align his ethic with the ethic of the status quo, which is liberalism
founded on violence. For Milbank, this is a key failure ofNiebuhr's realism because
it does not consider that "the transcending capacity of the human mind can be
conceived as the very impetus that makes social transformation possible".15 Thus, for
Milbank, the Niebuhrian realist's only repudiation of violence is to strive for less
violence rather than an overcoming of violence through peace.16
13
Ibid, p. 236.
14
Ibid, p. 238.
15
Milbank, "An Essay Against Secular Order": 200. This argument is not altogether dissimilar from
some ofMilbank's other arguments about violence in modern contexts. See, for example,
"Ontological Violence or the Postmodern Problematic" in Theology and Social Theory, pp. 278-326.
Though not directly related to his remonstration ofNiebuhr, the reader can discern certain key
elements (especially with regard to understandings of genealogies and narrative histories) in
Milbank's interpretation of secular liberalism as grounded in violence, and how these elements
influence his critique ofNiebuhrian realism.
16 It is difficult to say how this understanding is explicitly Niebuhrian, or where Milbank gets his
conclusions. For example, Niebuhr begins the second volume of The Nature andDestiny ofMan by
saying, "[T]he conflicts of history need not be accepted as normative, but man looks towards a reality
where these conflicts are overcome in a reign of universal order and peace. All human actions are
conditioned on the one hand by nature's necessities and limitations, and determined on the other hand
by an explicit or implicit loyalty to man's conception of the changeless principles which underlie the
change. His loyalty to these principles prompts him to seek the elimination of contingent, irrelevant
and contradictory elements in the flux, for the sake of realizing the real essence of his life, as defined
by the unchanging and eternal power which governs it." The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 2.
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5.3.2. Criticisms ofEthics
Ethically, the Stoic naturalism Milbank perceives in Niebuhrian realism is
most discernible when applied to practical considerations of dilemmas such as those
pertaining to nuclear armament and deterrence. To Milbank, Niebuhrians such as
Richard Harries and John Hick are exemplary of the negative effects limited
imagination and understanding have on the practical outworking ofNiebuhrian
realism. Instead of decrying the ontological violence of secular liberalism by
appealing to expanded understanding and creative imagination, the Niebuhrian realist
presupposes a limited human capacity to imagine or comprehend realities at hand,
and so deals with simulacra of realities. Consequently, "Niebuhrian 'realism' is
unable to envisage the long-term tendency in human affairs not to the gradual
1 7
containment of conflict, but to its final and catastrophic extension". Put simply,
Niebuhrian realism's limited imagination leads only to limited solutions in human
conflict. Of course, Milbank's reading ofNiebuhr begs the question ofwhy there are
supposed natural barriers between the ideal and the real, which begets his discussion
of original sin in Niebuhr's thought.
5.4. Criticism ofOriginal Sin
IfMilbank's account of the perceived limits on human possibilities in
Niebuhrian realism can be divided philosophically, ontologically and ethically, then
his account ofNiebuhrian original sin can be understood ontologically,
epistemologically and ethically.
Ontologically, Milbank thinks Niebuhr's initial investigation of original sin is
sufficiently theologically grounded because Niebuhr appropriately grasps that
original sin cannot be positioned in historically unconditioned human nature, but that
1 R
human sin is still a fact. Because facts warrant explanation, Milbank rightly sees
Niebuhr's location of original sin in the paradox ofhuman will, which "is inherently
paradoxical, because while we recognize it as true that we are never going to will all
that we ought, nonetheless we are always able to say in retrospect, with reference to
any particular act or omission, 'well, I could have done better'".19 Nevertheless,
though Milbank thinks Niebuhr initially correct on sin's locale, he believes Niebuhr
17 Milbank, The WordMade Strange, p. 243.
18 Ibid.
19 TU;A
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returns to Stoic presuppositions, evidenced by two problematic ends to which such a
reading of original sin point.
First, Niebuhr's analysis is, according to Milbank, not extracted from the
individual level and applied to communal contexts. As Milbank notes, "despite his
excellent analysis ofhow the will works, Niebuhr ends up offering original sin as an
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alternative to historical explanations of the deep-rootedness of human evil".
Second, by positing this alternative, Milbank claims that Niebuhr is unable to answer
the form original sin first took in the human will—the ontological question—and so
locates it instead in an ambiguous historical drama. While he avoided an ahistorical
appropriation ofhuman nature, he could not avoid it with regard to the problem of
human history. Therefore, Milbank thinks Niebuhr's interpretation of original sin
must be regarded as a problem mythically and immediately related to all historical
contingencies, rather than the "once-and-for-all fall from grace which is the absolute
sine qua non of Christian ethics and which alone permits a recognition ofhow
21
history seems driven in the direction of catastrophe". The notion that original sin
can be universally related to all historical circumstances obliges the epistemological
consideration ofhow the moral agent understands this relationship.
5.4.1. Epistemological Criticism
Epistemologically, what Milbank finds problematic in Niebuhrian realism is
the method by which the realist interprets the realities in which she lives, and the
conclusions drawn from that method. "For the Christian", says Milbank "a realistic
apprehension of the world does not consist in factual survey and surmise, but in an
evaluative reading of its signs as clues to ultimate meanings and causes. Thus the
world is construed as gift and promise, and we construct the narrative picture of a
99
Creator God". It is important to note here Milbank's earlier criticism of the limited
imaginative capacity ofNiebuhrian realism. The notion that imaginative powers are
limited for the Niebuhrian realist is once again at play here; for how else can the
moral agent evaluate and interpret clues that point beyond themselves to something
ofultimate ends and origins, except through the power of imagination? Imagination
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid, p. 244.
22 Ibid.
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is, in other words, the foundation of evaluation. Also, the emphasis on gift
foreshadows much ofMilbank's later work on gift, especially in Being Reconciled,23
5.4.2. Criticism ofEthics
Ethically, the component ofNiebuhrian realism (substantiated most clearly
by Harries, according to Milbank) which causes the greatest amount of concern for
Milbank is the notion that because ofmoral immaturity or ignorance, the moral agent
finds defence for his or her sinful actions. This recourse to the previous discussion
about ignorance and immaturity results in Milbank's questioning the nature of evil
action in Niebuhrian realism. Elsewhere, Milbank has devoted considerably more
energy to this discussion.24 There he criticises philosophers of radical evil, whom he
9 S
terms "post-Kantians", and defends the idea that evil is always finally an act of
privation, rather than a something which can be willed. This, I believe, is a position
with which Niebuhr himself would agree, narrowing the gap Milbank perceives
between his understanding of evil and original sin and that of a Niebuhrian realist.
Milbank's criticism ofNiebuhr is thus summarised in two central points.
First, Milbank thinks that Niebuhr places unnecessary limits on human ethical
possibilities, and he criticises Niebuhr on philosophical, ontological and ethical
grounds on this point. Secondly, he thinks that Niebuhr's account of original sin
though initially helpful, is ultimately guilty of the same kind of presuppositions that
Niebuhr has regarding the limits of ethical possibilities.
Having offered a synopsis of the two central points of concern in Milbank's
"The Poverty ofNiebuhrianism", we will now offer a response to these criticisms in
the following sections. As noted already, my central argument is that Milbank
misinterprets Niebuhr on the problem of limits to human ethical possibilities because
of a misappropriation of a particular type ofnaturalism in Niebuhr's thought; and that
Milbank and Niebuhr, while disagreeing on the nature of original sin, are more
closely aligned on the problem of the nature of evil and human will than Milbank
allows.
23 Cf. Milbank, "Grace: The Midwinter Sacrifice", pp. 138-161.
24
Milbank, Being Reconciled, pp. 1-25.
25 It is useful to note that Milbank also refers to "post-Kantian Christian ethics.. .very well exemplified
in the thought ofReinhold Niebuhr" later in "The Poverty ofNiebuhrianism". See The Word Made
Strange, 246.
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5.5. Toward an Accurate Interpretation ofChristian Realism
Milbank rightly speaks of the framework ofNiebuhr's realism as one reliant
on naturalistic thinking. We saw in chapters two and three that Niebuhr's realism
shares many similarities with both ethical naturalism and the Catholic natural moral
law tradition, post-Vatican II. Thus, if it were simple enough to declare that the
recognition of an unattainable moral ideal is commensurate with a realistic ethic,
there would be little with which to disagree in Milbank's reading ofNiebuhr. That,
however, is not what Milbank argues. He identifies Niebuhrian realism with a very
9 ft
specific kind of naturalism—Stoic naturalism—and thus as a pagan ethic. Of
course, this association with Stoicism is the result ofMilbank's suggestion that
Niebuhr's realism is committed to interpretations of limited moral possibilities for
humans. This, I suggest, is where the problems with Milbank's interpretation of
Niebuhrian realism begin. The rest ofMilbank's conclusions regarding Niebuhrian
realism are accordingly questionable; for, if an initial diagnosis is inaccurate, how
likely is it that subsequent interpretations will be correspondingly afflicted?
There must be a source of similarity between the Stoicism Milbank ascribes
to Niebuhr and Niebuhr's realism if the charge of Stoic naturalism is accurate. This
similarity is identified by Milbank as the notion that there are insuperable and
permanently chaotic conflicts between the essentiality and existentiality of human
life, which are characterised by "natural barriers" that prevent human existence from
realising its essential (ideal) nature. Milbank is right to point to Niebuhr's allusion to
Stoicism in An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics as instructive to understanding
Niebuhr's construal of realism. However, where Milbank deviates from accuracy in
his analysis ofNiebuhr's ethic is with his charge that Niebuhr's criticism of Stoic
natural law is finally colluded with the structures of Stoic thought.
There are two issues at play here. First, what Niebuhr intends when he
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speaks of Stoic natural law in the chapter Milbank references is not a vindication of
Stoic thought, but precisely a criticism of the sort Milbank himself offers when
90
considering Stoic natural law in relation to Augustine's critique of it; for Niebuhr is
criticising orthodox Christianity because of its failure to recognise the law of love as
26 Ibid, pp. 236-237.
27 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Law of Love in Politics and Economics (Criticism ofChristian
Orthodoxy)" in An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, pp. 139-166.
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an active agent in all human social interaction. Niebuhr introduces the discussion
of Stoic natural law in order to criticise not its co-option by orthodox Christianity,
but the application that resulted from the co-option. Historically, he sees the
adoption of Stoic natural law by orthodox Christianity as collaborative with "the
Pauline conception of the divine ordinance of government (Rom. 13)". The point
Niebuhr is stressing here is that early orthodox Christianity, in developing its
political ethic, was deeply influenced by Greek philosophical elements and portions
of the biblical narrative, because these "philosophical traditions attracted Christian
thinkers precisely for their apparent capacity to express elements of the biblical
tradition. The doctrine that political rule is not a gift of created nature but a
providential preservation against evil does not depend on Stoicism alone\ it is
arguably implicit in the Yahwist history of Genesis itself.. ,".31 What Niebuhr then
criticises is orthodox Christianity's "strategy of compromise", which "was so well
aware of the fact of sin that it saw in the ideal of love only an ultimate criterion by
which all human social achievements are revealed in their imperfections". While
presenting the law of love in such an arbitrating position is suitable to Niebuhr's
realism, the problem Niebuhr finds is that "Christian orthodoxy failed to derive any
significant politico-moral principles from the law of love. It did not realize that the
law of love is not only in position of ultimate transcendence over all moral
achievements, but that it suggests possibilities which immediately transcend any
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achievements of justice by which society has integrated its life". This sounds
rather far removed from the charge that though Niebuhr allows for the law of love in
his political ethic, "he does so only in the crassest possible manner", for what
Niebuhr is arguing is that the law of love occupies a place of both ultimate
transcendence and immediate immanence such that it always stands directly and
intimately related to human existence, yet paradoxically exists regardless of human
conceptions about what constitutes this law. That is, love can be recognised in say, a
28
Milbank, The WordMade Strange, pp. 236-237.
29
Cf., An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, p. 144.
30 Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, p. 144.
31 Oliver and Joan Lockwood O'Donovan (eds.), From Irenaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in
Christian Political Thought 100-1625, (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company,
1999), p. 4. Italics mine.
32 Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian ofEthics, p. 144. Italics mine.
33 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, p. 236.
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human act, but its existence is not dependent on that act. What results, then, is much
less a Stoic conception of natural law than it is an assimilation of the ethically
naturalistic, ormorally realistic ideals of twentieth century moral philosophy, as we
will see more fully in a moment.
The second issue to consider is the notion of chaotic conflict Milbank
addresses in Niebuhr's thought. As before, Milbank accurately notes that Niebuhr's
realism was developed with the assumption that there are constant and pervasive
conflicts between both individuals and nations, and that these conflicts demand our
attention as moral agents who attempt to mediate the conflicts so that "tentative
harmonies" may be established. Again, though, Milbank slightly misreads what
Niebuhr says about the agents involved in these conflicts, and the misreading results
in significant problems for the remainder ofMilbank's critique ofNiebuhrian
realism. Continuing his criticism ofNiebuhr's apparent desire to push love to the
margins because of its ineffectiveness at the very level of sociality, Milbank notes
that for Niebuhr, "Love has to be mediated to the social realm by the intervention of
a purely instrumental reasoning which is able to deduce that freedom can only
become real in society as a result of our adopting an abstract principle of equality".34
What Milbank understands this to reveal is that the law of love is powerless in the
practicalities of existential conflict, and must be considered secondary to the
principle of equality which is the only true principle capable of controlling the chaos
ofhuman existence. Moreover, the principle of equality can only be managed by
human reason.
What is important to note here is that Milbank criticises Niebuhr for an
adherence to the notion that conflicts take place between levels of essentiality (the
ideal) and existentiality (the level of human existence) to the degree that Niebuhr is
"fully assimilated" to Stoic natural law. That is, Milbank thinks that because
Niebuhr conceives of the moral good as objective and essentially transcendent over
human existence, Niebuhr leaves no room for this moral good to become immanent
in human existence. If this were true, declarations that Niebuhr's ethic allows
equality and human reason to usurp the place of agape and the rule of love would be
just. However, this is not what Niebuhr is arguing when he speaks of conflicts that
34 Ibid.
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mark human existence. Instead of conflicts between the essential and the
existential—the ideal and the real—Niebuhr's attention is drawn much more
decidedly to conflicts that happen on the level of existentiality only; that is, conflicts
taking place between the real and the real, between human life and human life. The
role the ideal of love assumes is not one of ancillary importance, but of chief
significance for a full understanding ofwhat it means to be a moral agent. While
Milbank is right to highlight the passages from An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics
that illustrate Niebuhr's concern with conflict, he does so at the expense of accurately
interpreting what those passages are actually about. So, for instance, when Milbank
quotes Niebuhr's declaration that "the forces of nature are in conflict with the
35necessities ofman as spirit", the point Niebuhr is stressing is not that humans are in
constant competition with an ideal, but that there are certain constraints with which
humans must contend when engaging one another (and engagement is always a
moral act), and it is only through attempts to embody the essentiality of human life—
the ideal—that those constraints are appropriately addressed. Thus, the ideal is fully
subsumed into human life as the basis for human existence. This is illustrated most
succinctly in Niebuhr's frequently repeated aphorism that securing justice in a sinful
world was ultimately about securing "tentative harmonies of life with life which are
less than the best".37
35 Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, (London: SCM, 1963), p. 164; cited in The
Word Made Strange, p. 236.
36 Milbank's inclusion of this particular quote strikes the reader as odd, for the discussion from which
it is drawn is about the biological differences between the sexes, and the ways in which "nature" has
prepared each sex for a role in child-rearing. Thus, the "forces of nature" are more to do with the
biological differences between the sexes and the inherent limitations therein, than with conceptions of
Stoic ethics leading to Enlightenment liberalism. What Niebuhr does say is that "An adequate social
morality will.. .be guided.. .both by the principles of equality and by the organic facts of existence"
when dealing with differences between the sexes. It seems implausible, then, to assume that this
distinguishes Niebuhr as a Stoic or Enlightenment liberal when that is not the subject of his address.
See Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, pp. 151-152. Milbank's two other citations ("in
every human situation and relationship there is an ideal possibility, and there are given facts of human
nature, historic and fortuitous inequalities, geographic and other natural divisive forces, contingent
and accidental circumstances"; "[inequalities] may be, and usually are, caused by forces of nature and
history which an intelligent control of social life can greatly restrict and sometimes completely
overcome", The WordMade Strange, p. 236) support what he is attempting to argue, but they are still
misunderstood, as discussed more above.
37 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (Hamden: Archon Books, 1940), p. 9. Italics
mine. See also Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy, p. 192; and his An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, pp.
60-61, both of which contain discussions regarding the notion of life being in a state of conflict with
life.
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Furthermore, Milbank thinks a liberal conception of equality based on the
premise of rationalist thought to be a replacement of love as the primary instrument
•3 O
for social interaction in Niebuhrian realism. In his reading ofNiebuhr, humans are
incapable of realising love socially and are thus confined to Promethean efforts at
only modicums of justice, which is simply the next best thing to love and is defined
as "equality before the law". This is precisely the point at which Niebuhr is,
according to Milbank, drawn irrevocably into the ontological violence of
Enlightenment liberalism, and is destined to forsake any likeness of an ethic
generously predicated on the gift of Christian tradition, a gift which, because of its
naissance in peace, is ontologically counter to Enlightenment liberalism's violence
and is received only through sanctification mediated by the Church. If the essential
is only to hover as an ineffective spirit over all human interaction and moral
engagement, the consequence is that the existential is rooted in nothing more than
violence which seeks to maintain the distance between the ideal and the real.
Again, this interpretation ofNiebuhrian realism depends upon a belief that
Niebuhr construes love as the primary agent in social composition in terms of
Utopian ineffectuality, and that all life is in permanent conflict with the summum
bonum of love. As noted above, such an interpretation inaccurately portrays
Niebuhrian realism as uncritically pessimistic (which leads Niebuhr obliviously to
optimism, in Milbank's opinion).
5.6. Niebuhr and Liberalism
Milbank rightly classifies Niebuhr as a liberal. However, what is achieved
with this classification is a fairly opaque presentation of the otherwise ambiguous
term, "liberalism". That is, Milbank fails to discuss the fact that political liberalism
has never existed in a vacuum, but has been variously expressed and diversely
manifested over its relatively brief history. However, based on what we know of
Milbank's previous work, particularly the association of liberalism and ontological
violence in Theology and Social Theory, the reader is aware that when Milbank
speaks of liberalism, he does so with the implication that violence is the necessary
concomitant of liberalism. Based on this, were one to accept without criticism the
representation ofNiebuhr as a liberal according to Milbank's definition, he or she
38 Milbank, The WordMade Strange, p. 236.
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could follow the logical progression ofMilbank's thought from violence to
liberalism, and be left with a vision that ultimately identifies Niebuhr as the
paterfamilias of a liberalism which revels in violent expressions of individual and
corporate wills-to-power.
The problem with this identification of liberalism is one of ambiguity. It is
unclear to the reader why liberalism—or secularism, as the consequence of
liberalism suggested by Milbank40—must inherently be identified with violence to
the degree that Milbank suggests. This is not to say that Milbank has never
attempted to make the association between liberalism and ontological violence, for
certainly Theology and Social Theory was dedicated precisely to this project.
However, the same criticism that Milbank speaks too generically of liberalism has
been made in response even to this work.41 What this observation does suggest, then,
is that the tenuousness of the link between a loosely conceived liberalism and its
concurrent ontological violence is most perceptively laid bare in Milbank's criticism
ofNiebuhr, for nowhere in this criticism does Milbank define specifically how, or if
Niebuhr's liberalism makes his realism successively violent, which is the originating
point for Milbank's discussion of liberalism. What is suggested is that Niebuhr's
ethic is so thoroughly mired in individualism that it cannot help but be associated
with Enlightenment liberalism which sees individualism writ large—the individual
seeking boundless self-expression over all historical contingencies and over other
individuals through violent coercion—as the inaugurating point for the liberalism
Milbank addresses. The implication is that this individualism logically results in
violence, for if the human is boundlessly expressive, he or she must be so through the
use of violent force. Therefore, Niebuhrian realism must be irretrievably entrenched
in violence.42 Readers will recognise the status of individual boundlessness as the
antecedent and secularised virtue of a politically liberal society grounded in
ontological violence as one of the distinctive critiques ofRadical Orthodoxy,
39 Cf. Milbank, "Grace: The Midwinter Sacrifice" in Being Reconciled, pp. 138-161.
40 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, Chapter one.
41
Cf., Christopher J. Insole, "Against Radical Orthodoxy: The Dangers ofOvercoming Political
Liberalism" in The Politics ofHuman Frailty: A Theological Defence ofPolitical Liberalism,
(London: SCM Press, 2004), pp. 125-157.
42 This is made most clear in Milbank's identification of John Hick and Richard Harries as Niebuhrian
realists who were also apologists for state nuclear armament. See Milbank, The Word Made Strange,
p. 237.
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Milbank's theological project. The liberal effort of the state as secular agent to
replace what was once sacrosanct "proceeds logically from the anthropology of
individual dominium on which the liberal state is based".43 That is, if the state is a
grossly outworked expression of individuals seeking power, and this individual
ambition is originated in violence, then the state is logically established on those
same violent underpinnings.
When Niebuhr speaks of the individual, he does so both critically and
approvingly. Pervasive individualism, defined above as a result in the belief that the
human is boundless in terms of self-expression, is demonstrative to Niebuhr of
human anxiety over the cognisance of looming death and human response to that
anxiety, which exhibited itself as pride, or a desire to usurp God's place who is at
once the ultimate source of transcendence and arbiter over all that is finite and
infinite. Positively, the human is indeed free for self-expression, but this freedom is
paradoxically mitigated by human finiteness. "Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant
of the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is involved. Anxiety is the
internal precondition of sin. It is the inevitable spiritual state ofman, standing in the
paradoxical situation of freedom and finiteness".44 For Niebuhr, then, if sinful
violence is the attempt to overcome the finiteness of the historical condition, then
anxiety is the necessary antecedent to sin.
Niebuhr, in contrast to Milbank, tends toward specificity when he speaks of
liberalism, despite the fact that he can be ffustratingly woolly when addressing a
spate of other topics (naturalism, for instance). Liberalism is interpreted as a
predicament ofparadox. On the one hand, Niebuhr identifies liberalism "in the
broadest sense" with "[i]ts strategy to free the individual from the traditional
restraints of a society, to endow the "governed" with the power of the franchise, to
establish the principle of the "consent of the governed" as the basis ofpolitical
society.. ."45 On the other hand, though, Niebuhr finds this broad definition of
liberalism problematic because it does not take into consideration the "distinct
43 William T. Cavanaugh, "The City: Beyond Secular Parodies" in John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock
and Graham Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 192,
cited in Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.
101.
.
44 Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Desitny o/Man, Vol. I, p. 182.
45 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Liberalism: Illusions and Realities", New Republic 133 (July 4, 1955): 11.
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connotations" of liberalism in modern contexts. Specifically, Niebuhr is referring to
liberalism in "technical societies.. .which insisted that economic life was to be free of
any restraint.. .and also used to describe the political strategy of those classes which
preferred security to absolute liberty and which sought to bring economic enterprise
under political control for the sake of establishing minimal standards of security and
welfare".46
What distinguishes Niebuhr from the kind ofEnlightenment liberalism with
which Milbank associates him is that, despite Milbank's critique, and perhaps even
in alignment with Milbank, Niebuhr is actually critical of the rationalism behind such
ideological liberalism. He (Niebuhr) finds illusory the idea that societies are
perfectible (i.e., more "free") through a vague progressive rationalism inherent in
human nature and instead points to the failure, endemic to Enlightenment liberalism,
to "take the factors of interest and power seriously, which expected all parochial
loyalties to be dissolved in more universal loyalties".47 Such a statement seems frilly
to support Milbank's declaration that "the nature of our present historical condition is
such that we are faced with tragic dilemmas in which it is impossible to avoid some
complicity in evil". Nevertheless, because Milbank thinks Niebuhr conceives of the
nature of love as secondary to the liberal principle of rational thought, he sees a
subsequent division with Niebuhr.
5.7. Liberty and Equality
The reason Milbank's interpretation ofNiebuhr is so implausible, especially
as concerns critiques of liberalism, is because of the sharp distinction Milbank draws
between Christian realism as founded in certain features of human nature as opposed
to the absolute love ethic of the Christian gospel. It is decidedly more
hermeneutically accurate to acknowledge, as has been argued in the previous
chapters, that love provides the ethical underpinnings, indeed the sole foundation of
Niebuhr's thought, and differentiates Niebuhrian realism from other forms of
humanistic ethics of the mid-twentieth century that sought to ground their
conceptions ofjustice in alternatives to theological conceptions of love. Lovin
makes this point when illustrating what distinguishes Niebuhr's elucidation ofjustice
46 Ibid.
47
Niebuhr, "Liberalism: Illusions and Realities", p. 12.
48 Milbank, The WordMade Strange, pp. 234-235.
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over against Rawls (a figure who seems much more suited to Milbank's critiques of
Enlightenment liberalism than does Niebuhr). Drawing on the suggestion that
Niebuhrian realism is a form ofmoral realism and ethical naturalism, Lovin argues
that the prima facie characteristic of this realism is "benevolence".49 Lovin rightly
notes that for Rawlsian liberalism, "mutual disinterest begins with a respect for the
fact that the other person [in a politically liberal society] has aims and goals,
although you need not care at all whether these particular goals are realized".50
Niebuhr, on the other hand, begins his enquiry in social ethics by asking whether
justice, however approximate, can realistically be realised. The conclusion at which
he arrives is that even to begin "the pursuit ofjustice requires that we understand
what it would mean for real persons to live well",51 which is precisely to care about
the neighbour's aims and goals. However, we can only do that through assimilating
ourselves to an ethic which looks to love the neighbour as ourselves (Mark 12:31).
What this requires, according to Lovin, is that we must first recognise that as with
ourselves, our neighbours desire certain things in order for them to live "well". More
than just a transitory nod at our neighbour's particular desires for good lives, justice
requires that we act reasonably in order that those desires may come to fruition. The
basis here is not some loosely defined "equality before the law" inbuilt with the
notion of "rationally autonomous representatives of citizens in a society", but love,
which is defined as "the disposition to seek the well-being of persons generally that
theologians and moral philosophers have called "benevolence"".54
Equality is certainly a desired demonstration of the particular outworking of
love in Niebuhrian realism, and it, alongside liberty, serves as a regulative principle
in Niebuhr's conception of justice.55 However, it is inaccurate to claim that equality
does not belong to the absolute demand of love.56 For as we have seen, with love as
the basis for social ethics in Niebuhrian realism, all regulative principles are only
responses to and informed by the law of love. "Equality, taken by itself, is not
49
Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, pp. 198-202.
50 Ibid, p. 196.
51 Ibid.
52
Milbank, The WordMade Strange, p. 236.
53 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 305.
54
Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, p. 199.
55 Ibid, pp. 217-230.
56
Milbank, The Word Made Strange, p. 236.
137
realistic. Persons are not equal. They are different. But when we must deal with
persons in large groups and in whole societies, equality becomes an instrument of
love by opposing all the inequalities that do not result from love, but from the
cn
exercise ofpower over those in need".
The final issue to address in Milbank's critique ofNiebuhrian realism being
founded on certain assumptions about human nature is the notion of self-
transcendence, to which I now turn my attention.
5.8. Transcendence andMoral Imagination
As noted above, one of the key features Milbank thinks distinguishes
Niebuhrian realism as an ethic embedded in liberalism is the perceived incapacity of
the imagination to envisage anything other than tragic necessities for the world in
such a way that violence becomes not something to imagine against, or overcome,
but something in which the human imagination is imbued. Of all of Milbank's
criticisms, this is probably the most difficult one to understand for those who have
spent a considerable amount of time reading Niebuhr. As suggested throughout,
Milbank rightly identifies Niebuhr's ethic with certain features of human nature, but
wrongly identifies exactly what those features are. The misinterpretation of limited
human imagination is the most inaccurate of the criticisms so far.
The main problem with Milbank's critique at this point is, as considered
above, that Milbank suggests Niebuhr is unduly reliant on human reason and
Enlightenment rationalism from which Niebuhr purportedly abstracts his realism. He
then criticises Niebuhr for lacking the necessary imaginative capabilities
commensurate with a Christian ethic which seeks to avoid tragic conflations with sin,
and is also impotent in the regulative functions of power and judgment. What is
implied, then, is that Niebuhr's imagination is restricted because of the kind of reason
by which it is informed. Rather than the discursive reasoning ofAristotle and later,
Augustine (whose thought Radical Orthodoxy seeks to recapture and reengage),
Niebuhr's ethic cannot imagine past the ontological violence in which it is mired.
If realism is defined as "the disposition to take all factors in a social and
political situation, which offer resistance to established norms, into account,
particularly the factors of self-interest and power", it is understandable that one
57
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might conceivably identify imagination as necessarily non-evaluative and impotent,
for it would seem that the capacity of the imagination is fundamentally related to the
determination of exactly what those established norms are, and a potentially
uncritical adherence to them. When the established norms of the political situation
are determined ontologically violent, as Milbank argues, then someone who claims
the definition of realism offered here seems incapable of "encouraging the
imaginative exploration of social experience, geared to discovering novel moral
aspects of situation and thus achieving a more adequate grasp ofmoral reality",
because such a person "is sowing the seeds of a critical tendency which he cannot
take to control: the tendency towards a state of affairs in which the 'moral fabric' of
CO
the community is perpetually being demolished and rebuilt". But is this necessarily
the case for the Niebuhrian realist insofar as Niebuhrian realism is identified with a
particular kind of ethical naturalism and moral realism? Sabina Lovibond, who has
argued for a similar form of realism to Niebuhr's (though she does not consider
Niebuhr), does not think so:
Suppose we do undertake to substitute a different way of life for our
familiar one. In this situation, the different way of life envisaged by
us may be one which has never actually existed. It may simply be
something which we represent to ourselves in thought—a product of
our (moral or political) 'imagination'. Yet as long as the extant
criteria of moral and political rationality are not so rigid that any
innovation in the relevant discursive practices is automatically
condemned to be perceived as an error, the language in which we
express the thought of that different way of life can be the one made
available to us by the way of life in which we have been brought up to
participate...In other words, our experiential grasp of the moral
institutions of our community is enough to equip us with a moral
imagination which transcends the range of concrete experience that
can be had within our community dominated by institutions such as
those. Our acquisition of the concepts we shall use as participants in
Sittlichkeit, or customary ethics, also provides us with all the
intellectual resources we need for the purposes ofMoralitat—that part
of ethics which concerns our obligation to bring about, not what
already exists, but what ought to exist.59
In other words, our moral imagination is related to the experiences we have
had in the past, but it is not incapable of transcending those experiences. As such,
58 Sabina Lovibond, Realism and Imagination in Ethics, p. 192.
59 Ibid, pp. 195-196.
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moral imagination for the realist is about taking into account past experiences and
imagining new ways of correcting past injustices. Obviously, imagination is here
connected primarily to an epistemic function. That is, the moral agent's imagination
only embarks on the moral quest to interpret, evaluate, and judge the brokenness of
human life when she seeks to know present circumstances, and is thus capable of
envisaging circumstances that could be new, but not altogether dissimilar from the
circumstances with which she currently lives (otherwise, it could not be said to be
morally realistic, but would instead be delusional, or fanciful). Knowledge, as
Lovibond suggests, is borne out of experiential wisdom. Niebuhr makes the same
point, but appeals to coherence as the prerequisite from which wisdom is gained.
"The whole of reality is characterized by a basic coherence. Things and events are in
a vast web of relationships and are known through their relations. Perceptual
knowledge is possible only within a framework of conceptual images, which in some
sense conform to the structures in which reality is organized".60 Notice, again, the
element of human existence here described as a "vast web of relationships", which
plays such a significant role in Niebuhr's thought. Still, Niebuhr is not unmindful of
the fact that giving coherence impunity as the plumb line against which all truthful
moral enquiries and judgments are measured is problematic for an ethic which seeks
to deal with the existential and conflicting elements of human life.61 Nevertheless,
moral inquisition begins with the question ofwhat is good, and the moral realist
attempts to answer that question not by stating what the properties of goodness are,
but by seeking ways in which previous experiences have cohered with what the
moral agent thinks to be good, with full knowledge that the properties of goodness
obtain separately from any agent's conception of them. As such, the application of
60 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith" in Christian Realism and
Political Problems, (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1953), p. 175.
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any system ofmeaning; and their uniqueness is destroyed by a premature coordination to a system of
meaning, particularly a system which identifies meaning with rationality.. .2. Realms of coherence
and meaning may stand in rational contradiction to each other; and they are not fully understood if the
rational contradiction is prematurely resolved as, for instance, being and becoming, eternity and
time.. .3. There are configurations and structures which stand athwart every rationally conceived
system ofmeaning and cannot be appreciated in terms of the alternative efforts to bring the structure
completely into one system or the other.. .4. Genuine freedom, with the implied possibility of
violating the natural and rational structures of the world, cannot be conceived in any natural or
rational scheme of coherence." Niebuhr, "Coherence, Incoherence, and Christian Faith", pp. 176-178.
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coherence is, for Niebuhr, the best method for determining and interpreting a "basic
test of truth".62
This emphasis on coherent imaginative power leads Niebuhr to place an equal
amount of importance on the concept of human self-transcendence. Realities assume
a regulative function within the notion of imaginative self-transcendence. As noted,
humans can freely imagine the kinds of new possibilities Lovibond mentions when
they accurately apprehend the kinds of realities with which they contend. Yet, the
human moral agent is not bound by those realities. "There is no point in human
history in which the human spirit is freed of natural necessity. But there is also no
point at which the mind cannot transcend the given circumstances to imagine a more
zr-3
ultimate possibility". Imagination is the vehicle through which self-transcendence
is possible, and that transcendence assumes a dual nature. On the one hand,
imagination appears to be an instrument of infinite regress.64 "The human mind is
such that not only can it create innumerable schemes of coherence.. .but it can also
itself transcend each one of its own creations. That is, the mind can question,
criticize, doubt everything that the mind produces; and it can, because of that infinite
critical ability, refashion all its achieved forms of order into alternative forms".65 On
the other hand, though, "[h]owever universal, objective, and timeless rationality [to
which the imagination is related] may appear to be, reason is, nonetheless, itself
creaturely, finite, and limited".66 These parallels are illustrative of the kind of
polarity prevalent in Niebuhr's thinking on the ethical imagination. He gives an
instructive word on how we imagine the "not yet" ofhuman existence when he notes
that:
[t]he capacity for rational self-transcendence opens up constantly new
and higher points of vantage for judging our finite perspectives in the
light of a more inclusive truth. On the other hand our involvement in
natural and historical flux sets final limits upon our quest for the truth
and insures the partial and particular character of even the highest
cultural vantage point. Thus human culture is under the tension of
finiteness and freedom, of the limited and the unlimited.67
62 Ibid, p. 176.
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That is, humans can imagine virtuous alternatives to present immoral
circumstances, but they are still finite creatures, and attempts to assay the social,
political, or moral climates of existence in search of virtuous alternatives are at risk
of producing even more immoral circumstances than those which currently exist,
precisely as a result of the existential conflict of life with life mentioned above. It is
true that Niebuhr's pessimism leads him at times almost blithely to dismiss the
possibilities of a more virtuous existence, but the point is that such possibilities are
never excluded from Niebuhrian realism, regardless of how improbable they
occasionally seem to be.68
If it is accurate to say that Niebuhr's realism relies on a sense of coherence
and the power of self-transcendence to form an ethical response to imagination, it is
unclear exactly how this puts Niebuhr at odds with discursive reason in the
Aristotelian sense. Milbank suggests otherwise when he states that with Niebuhr,
"imagination is outside the realm of ethical intuition, and.. .[Niebuhr] has, therefore,
no idea of a discursive 'practical reason' in the Aristotelian sense, and no idea of
ethical action as linked to 'expanding vision', a process in which one's apprehension
of the world is inherently evaluative.. ,".69 Unfortunately for the reader, Milbank
does not elaborate on exactly how Niebuhr's imaginative ethic is initially flawed,
though he does call attention to the consequence of limited imaginative power, which
is basically an inability to supplant a primitive conception of culpability that is
intrinsic to the notion of original sin with the evaluative power of Christian ethics.
But if the imagination (phantasia) for Aristotle is related, yet distinct from discursive
reasoning (phronesis), even minimally, this means that, "rational deliberation will
70
involve comparing alternatives in terms of the more and the less"; a statement fully
defensible by the notion that realism seeks "to take all factors in a social and political
situation, which offer resistance to established norms, into account...". Moreover, if
the process by which the virtues of imagination and discursive practical thinking are
inculcated involves first basic sensory perception, then "practical thinking", and
68 See Niebuhr's essay, "A Critique of Pacifism" in Love and Justice, p. 242 in which he states,
"Imagination is a virtue and achievement that is rare at best and that only occasionally rises to such a
potency that it is able to create as well as to discover hidden virtue in other men".
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finally imagining (self-transcendence), then it would seem that an ethic such as
Niebuhr's, which attempts to make coherent sense of the realities with which it is
faced before imagining new possibilities for those realities, would comport with what
Milbank suggests is necessary for a constructive Christian ethic, but that is lacking
71
from Niebuhr's realism, according to Milbank.
This is not to say that the kind of ethic Milbank advocates and Niebuhr's
realism are the same; for, that is certainly not the case. What I am suggesting,
however, is that the kinds of difficulties Milbank finds in Niebuhr are exacerbated by
the fact that Milbank's interpretation ofNiebuhr is off, if only slightly, and that
certain features ofNiebuhr's interpretation of ethics (naturalism, liberalism, and
limited imagination) are then inaccurately represented. Now, however, as we move
onto the final section of response to Milbank on Niebuhr, I will make a different type
of argument: primarily I will argue that Milbank and Niebuhr are allied on original
sin, at least insofar as the interpretation of evil as privative goes, but that what
occludes Milbank's conclusions on this point is his mishandling ofNiebuhr's work
on the topic.
5.9. Niebuhr as Post-Kantian?
Milbank thinks that Niebuhr's work on original sin makes his ethical thought
much more appeasing to Milbank's own work because it is at this point that Milbank
believes Niebuhr to grasp a fuller picture ofwhat an appropriate Christian ethic is,
since Niebuhr keys on the notion that original sin is not an "inherited taint" of human
finiteness, but a "faulty response" to that finiteness which resides in an imperfect
79
will. Nevertheless, though Niebuhr appears to have an accurate understanding of
the transmission of sin through the human will, he "ends up offering original sin as
an alternative to historical explanations of the deep-rootedness of human evil";
historical explanations which are described as "the once-and-for-all fall from grace
which is the absolute sine qua non ofChristian ethics and which alone permits a
79
recognition of how history seems driven in the direction of catastrophe". Thus,
Milbank thinks Niebuhr's ahistorical location of original sin causes problems for the
71 See Aristotle, On the Soul, Parva Naturalia, On Breath, Book III, Chapter I, Trans, by W. S. Hett,
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later implications about how that sin is realised and what kinds of conclusions it
substantiates with regard to certain ideas concerning human nature.
I want primarily to contest two issues here: first, that Niebuhr embodies a
post-Kantian structure in his ethics which understands evil as something that can be
positively willed; and second, that this association with post-Kantian "radical evil"
leads Niebuhr to a position of irresponsibility with regard to the notion of ignorance
and culpability in human sin. Aside from a few brief remarks, I am unconcerned
with the question ofhistoricity and original sin in Niebuhrian realism, for Milbank
rightly perceives that he and Niebuhr are at odds on the idea of an "ontological
reality of a lost paradise".74 For Niebuhr, "[t]he fall is not historical. It does not take
place in any concrete historical act. It is the presupposition of such acts. It deals
with an area ofhuman freedom which, when once expressed in terms of an act, is
always historically related to a previous act or predisposition". What Milbank
appears to find problematic is Niebuhr's refusal of an ontologically and historically
lost paradise which can posit a "first sin". This leads Milbank to conclude that
Niebuhr's location of the fall—not in a particular historical act, but instead in a "pre¬
human fall which directly affects the life of every human being"76—causes Niebuhr
to develop an unjustifiably individualistic ethic because the fall is considered in
relation to humans individually, rather than collectively. This, according to Milbank,
only leads to the bigger problem that an ethic so conceived relies on the false
confidences of immaturity and ignorance as scapegoats for the culpability of human
evil because individuals are wont to deny responsibility for their unjust decisions.
Milbank's rebuttal ofNiebuhr for pardoning human evil by emphasising
ignorance and immaturity is strongest in his discussion about the possession of
nuclear weapons. There Milbank considers a collection of essays, The Cross and the
Bomb, to which Niebuhrian Richard Harries contributes. Making the claim that
Niebuhrian realism is dependent upon a Stoic conception of ignorance that vitiates
the tragic from culpability in, and responsibility for, evil, Milbank writes, "[s]o
Niebuhr declares: 'That we have only a limited capacity to take into account the
interests of others is not the sign of some dramatic fall from grace, but an indication
74
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of our immaturity' and again, 'we are infants struggling through to maturity rather
77
than perfect beings thrown out of paradise'". At the outset, this appears fully
supportive of the kind of criticisms Milbank has thus far brought against Niebuhrian
realism. However, Niebuhr never offered either of the quotes Milbank attributes to
him. Though he correctly identifies their source (without pagination), the quotes
belong to Richard Harries and are given in his essay "Power, Coercion and
Morality".78
Despite this oversight, ifwe note Milbank's and Niebuhr's similar starting
points concerning the notion of original sin (in the moral agent's will), and also
consider the similarities between Milbank's later response to "radical evil" and
Niebuhr's own response to particular theories of evil, we see that Milbank's concerns
about the seeming lack of responsibility and individualistic emphasis in Niebuhrian
realism are misplaced, and act as barriers to a fuller appreciation ofNiebuhr's ethic.
As mentioned before, Milbank suggests that Niebuhr's realism is
"characteristic of post-Kantian Christian ethics" inasmuch as Niebuhr "constructs a
certain notion of the practical through a series of dualisms between individual and
public, fact and value, ideal and consequence, which are baseless except as
transcriptions of the working values ofmodern Western society".79 Milbank's work
on "post-Kantianism" is greatest in Being Reconciled, where he offers a helpful
response to the philosophers of radical evil (Jacob Rogozinski, Slavoj Zizek, and
Jean-Luc Nancy), in favour of a theory of evil which is "not seen as a real force or
on
quality, but as the absence of force and quality, and as the privation ofbeing itself'.
Philosophers of radical evil argue instead that evil, particularly as manifested in the
horrors of twentieth century genocides and mass killings
cannot be regarded as privative, because this view claims that evil
arises only from the deliberate pursuit of a lesser good. Power
directed towards extermination suggests rather destruction and
annihilation pursued perversely for its own sake, as an alternative end
in itself. Such an impulse towards the pure negation of being, as
towards the cold infliction of suffering—that may not even be enjoyed
by its perpetrators—suggests that the will to destroy is a positive and
11 Ibid, p. 237.
78 Richard Harries, "Power, Coercion and Morality" in The Cross and the Bomb: Christian Ethics and
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surd attribute of being itself and no mere inhibition of being in its
o 1
plenitude.
In other words, against arguments that suggest that evil is the privation of
good, radical evil suggest that evil is something that can be willed by the moral
agent, as if it is one thing among many to be chosen. Milbank rightly identifies the
problem with this claim as one which avoids the responsibility for evil. Evil cannot
have a positive quality, or being, in the sense that the philosophers of radical evil
declare that possibility, if evil is truly evil. That is,
[f]or evil to be at all, it must still deploy and invoke some good, yet it
would like to forget this: evil as positive is evil's own fondest illusion.
Insisting in this way upon the pathos of evil and upon its creeping and
incremental character by no means, as many fear, involves a taking
away from the responsibility of individual wills. On the contrary, this
insistence points to the gravity of even the smallest responsibilities
and the dangers of apparently good intentions (which it does not quite
deem as tragically unavoidable); also it does not excuse or regard as
inevitable the long-encouraged emergence of 'monstrous' wills. Nor
does this insistence tend to deny the unprecedented character of the
Holocaust: all that it denies is the notion of a metaphysical revelation
of an unexpected ontological status for evil. By contrast, it points to
the Holocaust's real disclosure of the terrible capacities of an ancient
depravity whose character, nonetheless, retains all too tediously its
R9
perennial nature.
That is, we only know that evil is evil when we compare it to what we know
to be good. As such, all evil acts must in some sense still possess qualities we would
recognise as good.
Despite Milbank's helpful reply to the problems of radical evil, his work on
Niebuhr is dissatisfying because of the association of radical evil with Niebuhrian
realism. In The WordMade Strange, Milbank intends to associate Niebuhr with the
characterisation of post-Kantianism offered above, especially as it pertains to a lack
of responsibility and culpability in human evil. Concerning this putative deficiency,
Milbank notes that "the evils of finitude and immaturity, often strangely and
inconsistently co-exists [sic], within 'Christian realism'", an existence which leads
to a denial of responsibility, and eventually, optimism. If the moral agent cannot be
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid, p. 22.
83 Milbank, The WordMade Strange, p. 244.
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held responsible for the sin her evil action effects because of certain native
incapacities, she may breathe a sigh of relief that, in all actuality, she could not have
done better in whatever moral judgment or act went awry. If categorising Niebuhr
as post-Kantian means that he adopts these definitions of evil and responsibility, such
an association is shown inaccurate when considering Niebuhr's own remarks on the
subject of evil, remarks that anticipate and reflect a strong sympathy with the kind of
response Milbank offers to the philosophers of radical evil. Niebuhr agrees that evil
cannot be positively willed by the moral agent, and that the moral agent's
responsibility and culpability cannot be avoided even in privative theories of evil,
specifically with regard to the twentieth century evils manifested in German National
Socialism:
Modern religious nationalism is obviously a highly explicit expression
of the collective pride in which all human behaviour is involved and
which Christian faith regards as the quintessence of sin. Inasfar as
this pride issues in specific acts of cruelty, such as the persecution of
the Jews, these acts obviously cannot be defined as proceeding from a
deliberate and malicious preference for evil in defiance of the good.
Yet it would be fallacious to assume that a Nazi gives unqualified
devotion to the qualified and conditioned value of his race and nation
by a consciously perverse choice of the lesser against the higher good.
But it would be equally erroneous to absolve the religious nationalist
of responsibility merely because his choice is not consciously
84
perverse.
And again: "Even particular acts of cruelty are probably not the consequence
of a conscious love of evil, nor do they find an obvious satisfaction in inflicting pain
o c
upon others". That is, evil, for Niebuhr is not exclusive from good, but instead
intrinsically tied to it as its necessary concomitant, and is expressed as the privation
o/-
of good. So, "the possibilities of evil grow with the possibilities of good", but not
in the sense that evil grows in ontological status, a positive state ofbeing, such as the
one who thinks evil can be positively willed declares. Instead, as the historic
substance of good possibilities grows (and the possibilities for good are unlimited
even, with Milbank, in the presence of evil as the countermand to evil's negation),
the shadow of good's privation perforce grows in response, so that the substance
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exists positively (i.e., ontologically) distinct from the shadow's want. And even
while good and evil grow as inverses, the culpable are not absolved of responsibility,
but are necessarily bound by the consequences of their moral action in such a way
that the only truly human response to a moral act is one of responsibility;
acknowledgement of guilt where it applies (and humility where the agent thinks a
good has been done), and a declaration to make just that which is not. Where this is
not achieved, the Niebuhrian realist claims that the failure is not the result of some
loosely conceived and inevitable characteristic of immaturity or limited imagination
embedded and prescribed in human nature, but is instead precisely the moral agent's
desire that those false characterisations were true. Niebuhr, in fact, finds holding
ignorance responsible for immorality as implausible as Milbank does:
The self sees the larger structure of value from its own standpoint.
Yet this provisional disavowal of moral culpability is never finally
convincing. The self s ignorance is never invincible ignorance. It
sees beyond itself sufficiently to know that its own interests are not
identical with the wider good. If it claims such identity, nevertheless
there is an element of moral perversity, and not mere ignorance in the
elaim....Common sense at least touches the periphera of the mystery
87
of original sin which uncommon sense so easily dismisses.
Note how Niebuhr's refusal to give ignorance the status of scapegoat is
linked to a positive appropriation of human imagination as expansive, a feature
Milbank finds lacking in Niebuhrian realism, as mentioned earlier.
The failure, then, ofmoral agency and the pervasiveness of sin are most
adequately expressed as an incomprehensible paradox for Niebuhr. Realism for
Niebuhr is at once the attempt to consider all perspectives, and at the same time to
accept responsibility for moral failures while expecting that those failures are
perennial to human life and is only finally remedied by God. Embracing such
realism is the most sufficient response to the paradox of human sin. Though
responsibility in moral action is interpreted differently by Niebuhr than it is by
o o
Milbank, it is inaccurate, as I have suggested here, to claim Niebuhr as post-
87
Niebuhr, Faith andHistory, pp. 107-108.
88 It seems at this point that Niebuhr would be inclined to include Milbank in the group he refers to as
"biblical idealists" inMoralMan and Immoral Society, a group he thinks possesses "genuine
alternatives and the critical insights of prophetic religion, but [that is] too unyielding in their
commitments to these "illusions" to offer any guidance for the real choices". See Lovin, Reinhold
Niebuhr and Christian Realism, pp. 98-99 and Niebuhr, MoralMan and Immoral Society, pp. 276-
277.
148
Kantian and morally irresponsible. What obtains from Milbank's depiction of
Niebuhr as Stoically pagan, liberal, unimaginative, and adherent to a predetermined
anthropology, is a representation ofNiebuhrian realism as finally hopeless, rather
than morally realistic. The question then becomes whether Niebuhrian realism can
even be classified as a theological ethic; for without hope, what distinguishes this
ethic from any other form ofphilosophical ethical enquiry? I would suggest that
Niebuhrian realism accurately interpreted reveals an ethic reliant on twentieth-
century ethical naturalism which serves as a basis for neither pessimism nor
optimism, but for theological hope. Before answering the question ofhow
naturalism and hope are related, though, it is appropriate to offer a few words
concluding our response to Milbank's interpretation ofNiebuhr.
5.10. Conclusions
We have considered Milbank's conclusions about Niebuhr's realism and
found them lacking on two counts. First, Milbank inaccurately represents Christian
realism with a kind of Stoic naturalism in Niebuhr's thought. While it is true that
there are certain features ofNiebuhrian realism that are similar to Stoic conceptions
of the natural law, Niebuhr is ultimately critical of Stoicism. Secondly, Milbank's
argument that Niebuhr adheres to a post-Kantian appreciation of evil misses the
broader point that Niebuhr and Milbank are actually closely aligned with each other
on the issue of evil.
Ifwe accept Milbank's criticisms ofNiebuhr, we likewise accept a latent
hopelessness in Christian realism. That is, Milbank's presentation leaves little room
for an understanding of Christian realism as an ethic grounded on a foundation which
can offer the realist a way of thinking theologically about hope. If this is correct, we
have good reason to suggest that Christian realism is not actually a Christian ethic;
for it is hope that God will overcome the fractious incidents of human existence that
gives us a basis for Christian ethics in the first place. This, I think, is the central
problem with Milbank's interpretation ofNiebuhr. As we now move on to the
second part of the thesis, we will consider the ways in which the framework of
Christian realism presents the Christian realist a way for thinking hopefully about our
task as moral agents and about the broken world in which we currently live.
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Part II: Theological Hope
Chapter Six
TRANSCENDENT HOPE
6.1 Abstract
In this chapter we will focus on the topic of theological hope in
Christian realism. It is impossible to give an account of theological
hope in Niebuhr's realism without also accounting for the Christology
in his theology. As such we will focus on those two areas for the next
tow chapter, which are the most important investigations carried out
in the thesis. In this chapter we will begin with a discussion of the
"impossibility" of theological hope, differentiating between what I
call "essential" and "existential" versions of hope. We will then
consider the role that the person of Christ plays in a realist
interpretation of hope, and we will observe how, for Niebuhr, Christ
occupies the place of objectivity (the "form") of the realist
discussions from the first part of the thesis. The chapter will conclude
with a discussion about how we move from Christology to theological
hope.
6.2 Introduction
We have already made the claim that the framework ofChristian realism
provides a foundation for theological hope. Part one of this thesis provided a
description and explored the key features of that framework. We focused on the
notion ofobjectivity in Christian realism in chapters two and three, and on the
dimensions ofhuman existence in chapters four and five. We will now move on to
our discussion of theological hope.
This chapter and the next are thus important for two reasons. First, they rely
on the framework ofpart one to explore both objective and existential dimensions of
hope. Both approaches to hope are ultimately related to Niebuhr's Christology.
Second, Niebuhr, as we will see in the discussion about the World Council of
Churches' 1954 meeting, is not often thought of as a hopeful theologian. This, I
think, is not a fair assessment. Realistic approaches to ethics are sometimes
mistaken for pessimism or cynicism, which is certainly true in the case of Christian
realism. As suggested in the second chapter, it is theological hope that gives the
critical distance between Niebuhr's Christian moral realism and other either secular,
or more generalised versions ofmoral realism. In other words, it is hope that makes
Niebuhrian realism theological, or even Christian, in the first place. It will therefore
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be the burden of this chapter and the next to give an account of the reasons that
Niebuhr's Christian realism offers framework for a theologically hopeful ethic. Let
us now turn to that task.
6.3. Is Hope Ethical?
For the Christian realist, hope is both essential and existential. That is, when
the realist hopes for something, she recognises that she is hoping out of her particular
existential contexts and placing her hope in the essential reality of God. But can
hope, theologically understood, be ethical? I do not here mean to ask whether or not
the act ofhoping for something can in itself be a moral or immoral act. We can
argue for and against this interpretation. For example, in most circumstances, we are
likely to say that to "hope" for another's public demise is an immoral act, while
"hoping" for stability in the Middle East is a moral act. Granted, these are both
nominal acts inasmuch as neither actually accomplishes much in terms ofbringing
about public demise or achieving stability in the Middle East, but they are indicative
ofparticular moral dispositions, and the disposition of the moral agent is an
important consideration in moral judgment.
What I am asking is whether or not the discussion ofwhat it is that we do
when we hope for something can plausibly be included in discussions about ethics.
That is, can discussions about what is good, right or just lead us to further questions
about what is to be hoped for in relation to these moral descriptors? Before that
question can be answered, it is important to define what is meant by the term hope in
the first place.
6.3.1. For WhatMay We Hope?
Hope is not hope unless that which is hoped for is impossible. It is illogical
for me to hope for those things which, by virtue of something like my own efforts, or
the manipulation ofmy co-workers, can be achieved.
Nobody says that he is 'hoping' for something that he can produce or
obtain himself.. ..People hope that there might never be another world
war; they hope for a good harvest, for the prosperity of their children,
for a long life, and so on. What is common to all these everyday
expressions is quite clear: what is hoped for is always something over
which the one who hopes has no real power—perhaps he can do a
little to help things along, but regarding what is decisive he is
powerless; he cannot simply cause, generate, manufacture, produce,
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or create the thing hoped for. Were that not the case, then no sensible
person would speak of hope.1
Hope is likewise not hope if the thing hoped for happens naturally. For
example, I might say that I "hope" for nightfall, but "does one 'hope' for the arrival
of night? Nobody would say such a thing. One does not 'hope' for something that
occurs anyway and necessarily, and particularly not for something that one is
convinced will necessarily come about". In other words, we can only hope for those
things that we do not already know will happen.
In the negative sense, then, the object of hope is neither something which can
be achieved bymy own efforts, nor is it a natural event whose occurrence I can
either hasten or prevent. More positively, it would seem that hope has both
transhistorical and historical dimensions to it. On the one hand, hope transcends
history because its referent is that which cannot be accomplished within history. On
the other hand—and paradoxically—the referent of hope is that which can be
realised in history, but not by the lone efforts of the one who hopes for it. In this
case, the object of hope requires a reciprocal relationship between those who hope
for something and those who bear some ability to bring that thing about. For
example, when I hope for the safe birth ofmy son and an uneventful labour for my
wife, I am placing those hopes in those people who bear responsibility for bringing
those events about. In other words, hopes within history are those ordinary hopes
which place a moral obligation on the moral agents involved.
There is, then, a distinction between kinds ofhope, particularly between
kinds of theological hope. First, if I say that I hope for something that cannot be
realised within history, I identify my hope with a kind of essentialism; I place my
hope in an essence beyond history. This is not an otherworldly hope that envisions
fanciful end-times dramas with rote scripts and automatons as actors. Otherworldly
dramas are not beyond history; they are alternative, false histories. Neither does
saying that my hope is placed in an essence beyond history mean that my hope is
therefore irrelevant to present history. Theologically, to say that my hope is in that
which is essentially beyond history means that my hope is in that essence which
1 JosefPieper, Hope and History: Five Salzburg Lectures, trans, by David Kipp, (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1967), p. 23.
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gives me my existence, God, and so is fundamentally bound to all history, because
all existence is derived from this essence. For the Christian, to place hope
theologically in the essence of God who gives existence is to say that our hope is in
the essence ofGod-in-Christ, "[f]or from him and through him and to him are all
things".3 As Niebuhr puts it, God "is the source of every aspect of existence".4
Second, to say that my hope is in that which is realisable in history means
that I identify my hope with a kind of existentialism. That is, my hope is placed in
something that can be realised within the exigencies of historical contexts. Again,
though, this does not mean that my hope is unrelated to that essence which is beyond
history. Even to be able to possess an existential hope of this sort presupposes that
hope is already related to that from which existence is derived, the essence of God.
But to say that hope is both beyond history and within history might appear
an aporetic device intended to confuse the issue, or even to avoid giving a
theological definition of hope in the first place. The point, though, is that by saying
that hope is both essential and existential we are emphasising that, for the realist,
there are different kinds of hope. In the first instance, what I have here referred to as
essential hope, Pieper describes as "fundamental hope" (a term he takes from the
research of Herbert Pliigge). Fundamental hope is "the hope for one sort of thing,
whose loss would mean that [the one who hopes] had absolutely no more hope and
would be purely and simply 'without hope'".5 On the other hand, what I have here
referred to as existential hope is similar to "the 'ordinary' or 'everyday' hopes...that
are directed toward something 'in the worldly future', toward an 'object belonging to
the world', toward something presumed to come to us from the outside, whether it be
a communication, a success, a useful commodity, or even a restoration ofhealth".6
The distinction, then, is that essentialist, or "fundamental" hope "appears to have no
object that can be found to exist in the world in this 'objectlike' way".7
2 Ibid, p. 22.
3 Rom. 11:36. Commenting on this verse, Augustine makes the same point, saying, "[ajccordingly,
my God, I would have no being, I would not have existence, unless you were in me. Or rather, I
would have no being if I were not in you..Augustine, Confessions, trans, by. Henry Chadwick,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 4.
4
Niebuhr, Faith andHistory, p. 53.
5
Pieper, pp. 25-26.
6 Ibid, p. 27.
7 Ibid.
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Theological hope thus embodies both of these essentialist and existentialist
characteristics. That is, the one who puts hope in the essence of God-in-Christ does
not do so at the expense of her citizenship in a world that continues to hope in false
absolutes. The Christian realist does not exchange essential hope for existential
hope because this realist acknowledges that it is only in the contexts of human
existence that we can understand what it means to hope for something in the first
place. That is, they recognise that "[w]hile the gospel which we preach reveals a
world which in its ground and its fulfilment transcends human history, it does not
abstract us from this present history with all of its conflicts and tragic
o
disappointments of arrogant hopes". It is with this definition that we can move
forward as we attempt to define what it means for the Christian moral realist to be
hopeful.
6.4. FrustratedHopes: Impossible Utopias?
Some difficulties present themselves when theological hope is defined as
existential, as that which hopes for what is said to be realisable in history. First, if it
is true that existential hope is that which is realisable in history, why is it that
injustice is not overcome, sin not eradicated? Why is something like the social
gospel ofRauschenbusch, as discussed in chapter two, which claims that the
kingdom of God can be realised in history, a frustrated Utopia, an unrealisable hope
in history? Second, the existential emphasis in this regard seems to abnegate our
primary statement that hope is not hope unless that which is hoped for is impossible.
With regard to the first objection, the answer Niebuhr initially gives for why
a Utopia like Rauschenbusch's is frustrated is that such Utopian visions do not take
seriously the problem of sin. This is true as far as it goes, but the more fundamental
problem is that the definitions given both to "history" and "hope" are false
definitions. To hope for the eradication of sin within history as we now know and
experience it is to give a definition to history which is unrealistic in the first place. It
is to understand history as "unfallen", which is to confuse the issue ofwhat history
really is. The problems with Rauschenbusch's hope for utopia-within-history would
be lessened if he construed historical life similarly to the way Bonhoeffer does with
8 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Christian Church in a Secular Age", in The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr, p.
85.
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what Bonhoeffer calls "natural life".9 Bonhoeffer tells us that "[njatural life is
formed life. The natural is the form that inheres in and serves life. If life severs
itself from this form, if it will not allow itself to be served by the form of the natural,
then it destroys itself down to its roots. Life that makes itself absolute, that makes
itself its own goal, destroys itself'.10 This is a realist statement. It is also a statement
with which Niebuhr agrees.11 "It is interesting", writes Niebuhr of this tendency to
be severed from the natural form of life, "how every religion which imparts a
superficial meaning to life, and grounds that meaning in a dubious sanctity, finally
issues in despair. Those who make the family their god must despair when the
19
family is proved to be only a little less mortal than the individual".
The natural, then, is life which independently exists from human conceptions
about it. It is also, however, the life to which all human existence is drawn, and the
essence out ofwhich all existence is borne. Natural life, in other words, is true life.
The point is that the natural life is life-in-its-essence; life as it ought to be. Put
theologically, the natural life is life-in-God, which is the natural order of life, but is
not life as we now experience or know it to be. In other words:
The natural is that form of life preserved by God for the fallen world
that is directed toward justification, salvation, and renewal through
Christ....The natural can never be a construct of some part or some
authority in the fallen world. Neither the individual nor any
community or institution in the preserved world can set and decide
what is natural. It has already been set and decided....13
The part of life that is preserved is that place where essence and existence
meet, the place ofwhat Niebuhr recognises as human transcendence. In other words,
where essence and existence meet is the place where the human is free to transcend
herself infinitely, and where she also knows that she is not as free as she originally
9 Lovin gives an account of the similarities between Bonhoeffer and Niebuhr, particularly on their
theologies of responsibility as the foundation for understanding meaningful moral life. See Christian
Realism and the New Realities, chapter six.
10 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, Vol. 6, ed. by Clifford J. Green,
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), p. 178.
" It is not insignificant that Bonhoeffer studied with Niebuhr at Union Theological Seminary prior to
his return to Germany and subsequent confrontations with German National Socialism. Though
"Bonhoeffer resisted Niebuhr's [teachings].. .once back in Germany [he] found himselfmore and
more drawn to questions of politics and ethics—perhaps in part because ofNiebuhr's example". Fox,
pp. 125-126.
~ "The Christian Church in a Secular Age", p. 84.
13 Bonhoeffer, pp. 174-175.
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believed. It is therefore the place where the human discovers that freedom is never
so absolute as once imagined; it is only relative freedom. When "this relative
freedom is misused a given entity in the fallen world sets itself up as absolute,
declares itself to be the source of the natural, and thereby corrodes natural life".14
Niebuhr makes the same point when he says that "[t]he problem of the
individual.. .cannot be solved at all if the height is not achieved where the Sovereign
source and end ofboth individual and communal existence are discerned, and where
the limits are set against the idolatrous self-worship ofboth individuals and
communities".15 Put differently, it is the discovery that God is the source of human
existence by which the human realises the limits of self-transcendence and against
which self-idolatry sins. Part of the problem with Utopian visions such as
Rauschenbusch's which argue that the kingdom ofGod can be realised historically,
then, is that they confuse the simulacrum of life ("unnatural" life; life as it is now)
for real life ("unfallen" life; life as it is supposed to be).
To the objection that an emphasis on existential hope necessarily leads to an
emphasis on Utopian visions that will be perennially frustrated, the Christian realist
responds that this happens only in those circumstances where the moral agent
confuses her definition of history, and exchanges the unnatural for the natural life. A
portion of the answer to the question ofwhy injustice and human sin are not
overcome for the one who, like Rauschenbusch, hopes for utopia-in-history, then, is
that this person has misidentified what history really is. Theological hope defined as
existential can only be related to history which is as yet incomplete. That is, true
history is to be identified with God, but with the God who absconds, the Deus
absconditus.16 The hopeful and realistic Christian, then, must place her hope in a
history which stands independently (and with God) of her conceptions about it, in
the same way that goodness stands independently of the moral realist's conceptions
about it.
The other part of the problem is that Utopian visions confuse definitions of
hope. Just as the Utopian exchanges unnatural for natural life, he also exchanges
14
Ibid, p. 176.
15
Niebuhr, The Children ofLight and the Children ofDarkness, A Vindication ofDemocracy and
Critique ofIts Traditional Defenders, (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd, 1945), p. 62.
16 Cf., Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 116.
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existential for essential hope. The act of hoping for that which is not possible in
history—essential hoping—is transmuted into hoping only for those things which
cannot transcend history—existential hoping. The problem is not that one type of
hope is given primacy over the other; the problem is that these hopes are wrongly
ordered, and thus misidentified. For the Christian realist, essential hope coincides
with natural life, while existential hope coincides with unnatural life. The order is
inverted for the Utopian. Essential hope coincides with unnatural life, while
existential hope coincides with natural life. What obtains is nostalgia for the realist,
sentimentality for the Utopian. Let us take just a moment to consider the differences
between nostalgia and sentimentality, and their respective relations to essential and
existential hope.
6.5. Catastrophic Hope: Nostalgia and Sentimentality
To Niebuhr, sentimentality is a blight on the potency of the Christian faith for
17effective social participation. The sentimentalist is one who, like the Utopian, "has
insisted that the law of love is a simple possibility when every experience proves that
the real problem of our existence lies in the fact that we ought to love one another,
i o
but do not". What results from this disposition is a false hope because "Christians
fatuously hope that Christian conference will speak some simple moral word which
will resolve by love the tragic conflict in the world community".19 Meaningless hope
leads only to a new form of legalism in which "[t]he most opportunistic statesman,
who recognizes the complexities which this sentimentality obscures, is a publican
who may enter the Kingdom of God before the Phariseeism which imagines that we
can lift ourselves above the tragic moral ambiguities of our existence by a simple act
90
of the will". Sentimental hope is hope which looks at the love of God-in-Christ and
thinks that with just a little more effort, such love can be reproduced. Not only are
17
Nevertheless, Hauerwas thinks Niebuhr's Christology is infected with sentimentality. "Christ
was.. .the symbol of sacrificial love for Niebuhr", says Hauerwas, "but the very language of symbol
was used to protect against any need to make classical christological claims that require trinitarian
displays of who God is. So in spite ofNiebuhr's reputation as one who attempted a recovery of
orthodoxy, his account ofGod remained more theist than Christian—that is, a theism combined with a
sentimental Christ". Stanley Hauerwas, A Better Hope: Resourcesfor a Church Confronting
Capitalism, Democracy, and Postmodernity, (Grand Rapids: Brazos Press, 2000), p. 34. I am not
certain what Hauerwas means by "trinitarian displays of who God is", but I think the point he misses
is that Niebuhr did not seek to protect classical Christological claims with a veneer of "symbolic"
language, but instead used symbolic language, assuming the truth of these claims.
18
Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 109.
19
Ibid, p. 110.
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the definitions of hope wrongly ordered for the Utopian sentimentalist; the
impossibility of the things for which essential hope hopes is denied. The Utopian is
21
guilty of this kind of hope.
22Recall the discussion of mimesis in chapter four, where we noted that
remembering the past does not mean that we can mimetically reproduce the past in
the sense that past experiences can be replicated as they once were. Moral
imagination allows us to remember the past, while at the same time "creating" new
history based on our past experiences. But history as we once knew and experienced
it can never be mimicked; what we once knew and experienced remains in the past
and, though we may have memory of the past, we are incapable of the complete
restoration of the past. That is, we cannot incarnate what no longer exists. This is
what the Utopian does not acknowledge, and what the Christian realist calls tragic.
Where the Utopian is sentimental, the Christian realist is nostalgic.
What makes Christian realism's hope nostalgic is the tragic nature of our
memories. There is a pain (nostos= "return home"; algos= "pain")—a longing for
something that cannot be repossessed—in nostalgic remembrance that is not present
in sentimentalism. Our lives in the present are only vestigial remnants ofwhat once
was (though this makes the present no less real). Thus, when we observe the
Eucharist, we painfully remember Christ's life—or, more literally, Christ's living, his
blood and flesh—through the partaking ofwine and loaf as representations of that
life. But our remembrances are never re-membermgs because we cannot reconstitute
what once was. All experience is finite and temporal and the past cannot be
recreated. Thus, the unnatural is only a signifier ofwhat is natural. Bread is not
flesh and wine is not blood, but taken in the context of the Eucharist, these elements
signify the natural life, the essentialness of Christ. All Easter celebrations are
20 Ibid.
21
Interestingly, Niebuhr actually thinks that Rauschenbusch's social gospel goes some way toward
correcting the kind of sentimentality that Niebuhr identifies with "pietistic" and "bourgeois"
individualism. This kind of sentimentality embraces Christian sectarianism and believes itself
"absolved of any concern for establishing justice in the intricacies of of an ever-growing technical
society". What is different between Utopian sentimentality and pietistic sentimentality is that the latter
abandons the aims of the former altogether. Rather than differentiating between essential and
existential hope, the bourgeois sentimentalist sees no need for existential hoping in the first place.
What the social gospel achieves is "a welcome release from this moral and spiritual complacency. [It]
insisted on the Christian's responsibility for justice in the community.. ..Unfortunately [it] was not a
fully sophisticated approach to social issues". See Niebuhr, Essays in Applied Christianity, pp. 102-
103.
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likewise painful because it is in our remembrances of the resurrected Christ that we
know resurrection follows death; and, consequently, we remember that our lives
must end in our deaths. Moreover, resurrection does not recreate what we once knew
and experienced. Even the resurrected Christ was not Christ as the disciples knew
and experienced him (Matt. 24:15-16), but he was still the essential Christ. As
Niebuhr's predecessor in Christian realism, John Bennett says, "all that we know of
the event [of the resurrection] is that visions of Christ after His death were the means
by which the disciples became assured ofwhat was essentially true—the continuing
presence ofGod as the Living Christ and as the Spirit in the work that Jesus had
23
begun". Death, in other words, is the ultimate sign of the unnatural life, and it is
this unnatural life which instils in us the sense that things are not as they ought to be.
But the tragic nature of nostalgia does not usher in despair. The hope of the
Christian realist is grounded in faith, which "can survive the vicissitudes of history,
can rescue human existence from the despair in which it is periodically involved by
its sinful pretensions, and the tragic disappointment of its facile hopes [i.e., "utopian
sentimentalism"]".24 More specifically, though, what nostalgic hope has us longing
for is the fulfilment of all of our essential and existential hopes, which can only
happen in the person of Christ, who makes possible those impossible things for
which we hope in the first place. Nostalgic hope is neither solely past, nor future-
oriented. When we long for something from our past (e.g., an experience from our
youth, the memory of time spent with a spouse who is now deceased, etc.), we long
in such a way that we yearn for those things to be a part of who we are now and who
we will be in the future. Nostalgic hope, then, is the combination ofboth existential
and essential hopes. That is, the things for which we hope are possible because we
can have new experiences. But they are also impossible because these experiences
can never be the same as they once were. Theological hope is hope that recognises
the nature of essential and existential hopes, and associates them with the natural and
unnatural life, respectively. Furthermore, as stated above, theological hope is hope
in the essence which gives us our existence, God-in-Christ, who is the "impossible
possibility". Hope, then, takes on a paradoxical character that the Christian realist
22 See pp. 97-99.
23 John C. Bennett, Christian Realism, pp. 137-138. Underlined word mine; italics Bennett's.
24
Niebuhr, "The Christian Church in a Secular Age", pp. 84-85.
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can appreciate. Niebuhr, in fact, identifies Christ as a paradox of the sentimental and
nostalgic hoper. "If Jesus ever had a faith in the possibility ofmaking the love ideal
progressively applicable to the present world [as in Utopian sentimentalism], it
belonged to the early days of his ministry and was transmuted into a catastrophic
9 S
hope as his own cross became imminent". What Niebuhr calls catastrophic hope,
and what I have called essential hope—hope that is placed in the essence of God-in-
Christ—is precisely the kind of hope which hopes for that which is impossible.
Niebuhr's Christology is thus obviously important to consider in order better to
understand the role of essential hope in Christian realism. We will now take a
moment to make this consideration.
6.6. "Christ, the Hope ofthe World"
Around the time when Niebuhr's mature theology was coming into focus, the
World Council of Churches (WCC) held its Second General Assembly in 1954 in
Evanston, Illinois on the theme, "Christ, the Hope of the World". It is not surprising
that, following the turbulent decades and both World Wars (the second ofwhich
forced the postponement of the official establishment of the WCC to 1948, after the
war's end in 1948), hope was selected as the theme for the meeting. Given the
tenuous post-war political climate and the escalation of the Cold War, the WCC
undertook the task of proclaiming Christian hope to a fractured world. The advisory
commission's report on the theme of the assembly makes this point clear:
We live at a time when very many are without hope. Many have lost
the hopes they had for earthly progress. Many cling with the strength
of fanaticism to hopes which their own sober reason cannot justify.
Multitudes ask themselves, 'What is coming to the world? What is in
front of us? What may we look forward to'? The answer to those
questions has been given to us in the Gospel.26
The theme was selected with the aim that it would "help the churches in their
relations with one another, and in their relations to the contemporary world. It [was
to] help them to face the world's problems and make clear to the world that its
97
problems are being faced". Theologians from Europe and North America assisted
25 Niebuhr, Reflections on the End ofan Era, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934).
?6212'
"Report of the Advisory Commission on the Main Theme" in Christ-The Hope of the World:
Documents on theMain Theme ofthe Second Assembly, (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1954),
ft7"David P. Gaines, The World Council ofChurches: A Study ofIts Background and History,
(Peterborough: The Richard R. Smith Co. Inc., 1966), p. 566.
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in the selection of the theme for the assembly, including notable names such as Emil
Brunner, Karl Barth and both H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr, a group which was
98
given the appellation of "the 25 hopeless theologians". As a participant in the
selection of the theme in a 1950 meeting, Niebuhr
proposed that the doctrine of redemption be considered, which, he
explained, combined the eternal message of the gospel with the
immediate needs of the world. 'We are confronted actually with false
schemes of redemption, which contain proximate solutions but are not
based upon any ultimate solution,' he said. 'We tend to deal with the
ultimate and disregard the proximate. In the Christian doctrine of
redemption we should be confronted with both'.29
Ultimately, however, the theme of redemption was not included in the 1954
conference, which may be one of the reasons Niebuhr was so displeased with the
final selection of the committee. In an article leading up to the meeting in Evanston
entitled "What Hope?", Time magazine, which refers to Niebuhr as the "pessimistic
Theologian", notes his displeasure with the selected theme, which he thought "was a
bad idea in the first place". Wrote Time:
It is silly, thinks Niebuhr, to advertise Christianity by insisting on
what, to the secular-minded, will seem 'fantastic', i.e., the Second
Coming. 'The New Testament eschatology is at once too naive for a
sophisticated world and too sophisticated for the simple-minded
modern man, who has become so accustomed to trying to make sense
out of life by measuring history in terms of some scheme of rational
intelligibility.. ..While the present seems a very strategic era in which
to restore a part of the New Testament faith which had become
discredited and obscured, we need only to analyze the needs of our
generation to recognize that it is not particularly redemptive to
approach a disillusioned generation with a proud 'I told you so' and a
fanciful picture of the end of history, or at least a picture which will
seem fanciful to our generation.. ..What would be more to the point is
to bear witness to our faith in terms...of watchfulness and soberness
... of faith and of love—which will appeal to a world in the night of
despair as having some gleams of light in it, derived from the 'Light
*5 f\
that shineth in darkness'.
28 David A. S. Fergusson, "John Baillie: Orthodox Liberal" in David Fergusson (ed.), Christ, Church
and Society: Essays on John Baillie and Donald Baillie, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), p. 153, n. 76.
Niebuhr was unhappy that Barth, with whom he already shared a fragile relationship, was
participating in the WCC discussions. Fergusson points out that Lesslie Newbigin recalls of the WCC
discussions that "Niebuhr...was so incensed by Barth that he threatened to walk out...". Ibid.
29
Gaines, p. 567. It is significant that Niebuhr made this recommendation because, as we will see
later in this chapter, the concept of redemption is bound to his understanding of Christological hope.
30 "What Hope"? in Time, June 28, 1954. No author given.
http://www.time.eom/time/magazine/article/0.9171.860894.00.html
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In other words, Niebuhr was discouraged by the committee's decision to
focus solely on hope as eschatological. The problem was that he thought that the
relationship of the church to society and the need for rapprochement between the two
was of utmost importance in those years following the Second World War. His main
concern, I think, was that the WCC not dither with meaningless interpretations of
theological doctrine (in this case, eschatology) at the expense of true social
31effectiveness. This much is made evident in an article written prior to the Evanston
assembly in The Ecumenical Review, in which he asked, "Is [the theme] to 'establish
the brethren' and create the broadest and most satisfactory biblical basis for our
ecumenical consensus? Or is the purpose of an ecumenical meeting to bear witness
to our faith in the world? That can hardly be our primary purpose but no one can
deny that what is said at the Assembly will be overheard in the world and will be
meant to be overheard".
The problem, to Niebuhr, with the theme of the conference was one of
relevance. To focus sole attention on eschatological hope would be to cloister the
assembly into a self-contained dialogue which was baseless for those who did not
share the same vocabulary as the ecumenical participants. But had the ecumenical
assembly opted instead to focus on the theme of redemption, Niebuhr would not
have questioned its relevance; for, all are in need of redemption, but not all are in
need of a theory of eschatology. The difference, in Niebuhr's mind, boiled down to
what was previously distinguished as essential and existential hopes.
This is made clear in another article that Niebuhr wrote for Religion in Life,
prior to the Evanston assembly. There Niebuhr delineates between what I have
called existential and essential hopes and he associates them with North American
and continental European theologians, respectively. Niebuhr notes that the
continental theologians, "who were chiefly responsible for formulating the theme" of
the conference, did so in order to counteract North American theological
understandings of hope, which were "a form of secularism". The continental
31 Remember Niebuhr's claim from chapter two that disagreements over metaphysics were to be put
aside for "moral potency".
32 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Hope Needs Faith and Love", The Ecumenical Review, vol. 5, no. 4 (July
1953): 363. Cited in Edward Duff, The Social Thought ofthe World Council ofChurches, (London:
Longmans, Green and Co, 1956), p. 301.
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theologians sought to "replace [the theme] with a biblical account ofChrist's second
coming, which in America [would be] regarded as a purely illusory projection of
hope to the 'end ofhistory', which cultured Christians had left to literalistic sects to
claim as their article of faith".33
North American theologians embodied existential hopes because of the
emphasis they placed on the notion that the things for which we hope are historically
realisable. Much like the utopianism of Rauschenbusch, Niebuhr saw the North
American theologians as naive sentimentalists. In contrast, continental theologians
exemplified essential hope because their understanding of hope was coupled with a
transhistorical interpretation that claims hope comes only at the end ofhistory in the
eshcatos. Niebuhr was dissatisfied with both approaches, but particularly with the
latter, because he thought that the exclusive emphasis on eschatological language
bore no relevance to the rest of the world. "The New Testament eschatology is at
once too naive for a sophisticated world and too sophisticated for the simple-minded
modem man, who has become so accustomed to try to make sense out of life by
measuring history in terms of some scheme of rational intelligibility".34 What was
needed, therefore, was a via media which could navigate the pitfalls of
sentimentalism on the one hand, and the irrelevance ofbiblical literalism on the
other. This Niebuhr located in an emphasis on Christ.
Niebuhr interpreted the WCC's choice of the theme ofhope as problematic
because of the eschatological definition given to hope, not because the assembly
associates this kind ofhope with Christ. Granting that the WCC sought relevance to
society through the theme, Niebuhr yet suggested that "the witness of faith, and of
love as a fruit of faith, is more important than the witness of hope".35 The problem is
one ofmeaning. No sense of life's meaning can be made for one who does not
understand what it means to have faith in that essence which is beyond history.
The situation seems to be that the Christian faith affirms that the
drama of each individual life and of the whole human enterprise is
played on a larger stage than the one-dimensional nature-history
which the historians chart.. .The only real but important proof of such
an affirmation is that the human self transcends all the sovereignties
33 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Christ, the Hope of the World: What Has History to Say?", in Essays in Applied
Christianity, p. 323.
34 Ibid, p. 329.
35 Ibid, p. 327.
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which are known, and that life does not make any sense if it is
measured in the dimension of the 'wisdom of the world'. We are
either driven to despair by its meaninglessness or to various types of
•3 z:
madness by trying to make sense out of it from our own standpoint.
In other words, it is faith—specifically, faith in the essence ofGod-in-
Christ—whence life derives its meaning. Only once this is recognised can any
discussion of essential hope be maintained because Christ is the basis of essential
hope. We should not read Niebuhr's insinuation that love trumps hope to mean that
hope is consequently irrelevant. Hope only becomes irrelevant when it is tied to
other irrelevancies. For instance, as Niebuhr sees particular interpretations of
eschatology as irrelevant, so also he sees hope that is tied to those interpretations as
irrelevant. Therefore, though WCC's theme was "an effort to recall the Church to
the hope as expressed in the New Testament" and was arrived at in "an appropriate
in
era in which to make [this] attempt", the theme of eschatology was, nevertheless,
"faulty statesmanship, if it was the concern of the Church to bear witness to its faith
before the world".38
The role ofChrist, then, is important to Niebuhr. With regard to the WCC,
had the emphasis on eschatology been replaced by a role on the hopeful redemption
found in faith in Christ, Niebuhr would not have thought the assembly's theme so
troublesome.
This excursus on the 1954 WCC meeting has been beneficial in terms of
locating Niebuhr's understanding ofhope in historical contexts. But it has also
helped to point to the fact that that Christ is significant for Niebuhr's theological
understanding of hope, a hope which is neither exclusively essentialist nor
existentialist, but is an amalgamation ofboth.
This Christological emphasis is worth exploring in detail because it both
revisits the earlier discussions ofmoral realism and ethical naturalism, and
anticipates the discussion to come in the final chapter. We will thus spend the
remainder of this chapter on the Christological hope in Christian realism.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, p. 339.
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6.7. Niebuhr's Christology
The WCC locates Niebuhr's understanding ofhope historically and it points
to the fact that Christology is important for understanding Niebuhr on hope. It was
stated in chapter two that in order for realism to be considered theological, it
required some sort ofmetaphysical basis to which it must appeal in order to validate
its claims. Without metaphysics, our claims about what is good, right or just become
for us little more than claims based on our own conceptions of goodness, tightness
and justness. They become, in other words, anti-realist. In the same way, in order
for hope to be considered a realistic hope—particularly a theologically realistic
hope—it must be grounded in something which transcends the act ofhoping in the
first place. Otherwise our hope devolves into sentimentalism.
For Niebuhr, I think the person of Christ saves Christian realism from
sentimentalism, while at the same time providing a basis for the kind ofnostalgic
hope that incorporates elements ofboth essentialism and existentialism into
1Q
realism's understanding ofwhat it means to hope theologically. In other words, it
is Christ on whom the entirety ofNiebuhr's theological and ethical thought depends
for its coherence. This, of course, is how it has to be ifwe are going to call
Niebuhrian realism Christian realism in the first place. But there are distinctions to
Niebuhr's Christology which need to be considered. I want here to focus
specifically on two things: "paradoxical" Christology in Niebuhr's thought, and the
notion ofChrist as the "form" for a realistic hope. Let us turn our attention to those
areas of discussion now.
6.7.1. Paradoxical Christology: Who is Christfor Niebuhr?
Criticisms ofNiebuhr's Christology have resulted in a notion almost
quotidian that Niebuhr's account of the person of Christ is little more than a retelling
of the liberal narrative which claims that Christ was a human uniquely in touch with
his calling as a representative of God, but (only) a human nonetheless. Thus, the
39 I am grateful to Kevin Carnahan for pointing me to the importance of Christology in Niebuhr's
realism. Carnahan has offered a compelling account of the "The Recovery ofChristology" in
Niebuhr's thought, and has linked Niebuhr theologically both to Rauschenbusch and Barth. See
Kevin Carnahan, Sin, Guilt, Justice and War: Paul Ramsey and Reinhold Niebuhr on the Moral
Frameworkfor Just War Thought, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Methodist University,
UMI Number: 3258700, pp. 54-61.
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incarnation is merely symbolic for Niebuhr. This reading ofNiebuhr's theology has
been popularised in the last few years, but it is not new 40 Even during Niebuhr's
life, some conservative critics hastened to point out that his theology lacked a
sufficient (read, "orthodox") Christology. In 1951, for example, Edward Carnell
suggested that Niebuhr's Christology commences in the right direction because, for
Niebuhr, "Christ is 'the Son ofGod' as well as the second Adam...".41 As such,
Christ is both a moral exemplar and the incarnated son of God. Nevertheless,
according to Carnell, because he cannot hold the dual-natured Christ in tension,
"[wjith obsequiousness, Niebuhr bows to both his liberal training and Kierkegaard,
for in both traditions a metaphysical statement of the incarnation is viewed as
absolutely paradoxical and a final offense to reason".42 What results for Niebuhr,
thinks Carnell, is the wholesale abandonment of orthodox Christology. "In other
words, the Jesus ofhistory appears merely to be a convenient locus to pin the Christ
symbol to.. ..But one must note that if Socrates had been more consistent in his life
and a little more successful in his oracular contacts with eternity, he could just as
well serve as the symbol of our faith. Our faith", continues Carnell, "then would be
the 'Socratic faith', and our hope, not the cross, but 'the flask ofhemlock'".43
Around the same time ofCarnell's criticisms, others defended Niebuhr's
Christology as the lynchpin to his entire theological and ethical thought. Chief
among these is Niebuhr's contemporary, Paul Lehmann, who writes that
40
Cf., Hauerwas, With the Grain ofthe Universe, p. 126. where he writes that "Niebuhr's
'Christology' begins and ends with his understanding of the cross as the historical revelation ofGod's
love, which always transcends history. In Jesus we see a 'remarkable coincidence of purpose and act'
because of his uncompromising conformity to God's will without reference to the relativities of the
human situation. The animating purpose ofhis life was to conform to the agape of God". In this
sense, Hauerwas thinks Niebuhr's Christology is reminiscent of theological liberalism's Christology
which saw in Christ the "Christ ofhistory" over against the "Christ of faith". When Niebuhr's
Christology is understood in this way, it is hard to see that Christ, the cross, the incarnation or the
resurrection are anything other than "symbolic" ways of appropriating the Chrisian faith into a rational
ifnot, sceptical metaphysical schema. I do not want here to deny that there are certainly times when
Niebuhr seems to fit this bill. However, it is an incomplete reading of both Niebuhr's early and later
theologies to suggest that he is ultimately bound to that particular Christology. The fact of the matter
is that Niebuhr's Christology demands a more careful reading than Hauerwas' pejorative use of the
inverted commas around the word Christology affords.
41 Edward John Carnell, The Theology ofReinhold Niebuhr, (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1951), p. 152.
42 Ibid, p. 154.
n Ibid, p. 155.
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"Christology is the leitmotiv of Reinhold Niebuhr's theology".44 Lehmann makes
this claim because he interprets the person of Christ as the fulcrum on which the
"relevance" of the Christian gospel balances with the "truth" of that gospel in
Niebuhr's thought.45 In other words, Lehmann sees Niebuhr's Christ as both a moral
exemplar and the incarnated son of God. There are three important characteristics of
Niebuhr's Christology, according to Lehmann: first "Christology is pivotal, not
peripheral.. ..Secondly, Niebuhr's ideas about the person and work of Jesus Christ
are rather more implicit than explicit.. ..And thirdly, Niebuhr's Christology is
reverse, not regular",46 The first two points being self-evident, what Lehmann
means by this third point is that though criticisms (like Carnell's) that Niebuhr relies
on the tradition of theological liberalism for his Christology are technically correct,
they do not track Niebuhr's thought far enough, because
as Niebuhr's thought develops, he reverses the Christological
orientation of theological liberalism. The theology of the nineteenth
century abandoned the orthodox distinction between the person and
the work of Christ as a scholastic construct and concentrated upon
what in the tradition had been called 'the work of Christ.' It is the
'Jesus of history' rather than the 'Christ of faith' who is the object of
theological investigation. Niebuhr, without surrendering the 'Jesus of
history,' and without returning to a scholastic Christological scheme,
nevertheless comes at the end to the view that Jesus' relation to God
is the basis of and the key to Jesus' historical significance.47
In other words, Niebuhr's developing Christology dissociates itself from one¬
sided theological liberalism in favour of a Christology which accords equal
importance to both the person and work of Christ. Christ is "pivotal, not peripheral"
in Niebuhr's work, then, because Niebuhr's Christology reflects his professional
interests: it is a marriage ofboth theology and ethics.
One would thus, I think, be correct to suggest that Niebuhr's Christology is
reflective of theological liberalism on the one hand, while another who might point
44 Paul Lehmann, "The Christology ofReinhold Niebuhr", in Kegley and Bretall (eds.), Reinhold
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, pp. 252-280. See also Gabriel Fackre, "Was
Reinhold Niebuhr a Christian?" in First Things 126 (October 2002): 25-27.
45 Ibid, p. 253.
46 Ibid, p. 255.
47
Ibid, pp. 255-256. Of course, part of the problem is that Niebuhr's mature theology differs from the
theology of his younger years, and Carnell was writing in a significant transitional period ofNiebuhr's
professional career. Nevertheless, both volumes of The Nature and Destiny ofMan, which contain a
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to the orthodox understanding ofChrist in Niebuhr's thought would be equally
correct on the other. Due to the length ofNiebuhr's career and the breadth of his
thought, the lack of consensus in the interpretations of, and associations with, even
the "implicit" elements ofNiebuhr's realism is to be expected.48
6.5.1.2 The Essential and Existential Christ
Whatever the case may be, Lehmann is right to suggest that there is a dual-
natured Christology in Niebuhr's thought which focuses on the "Christ of faith" and
the "Christ of history". Niebuhr made this much clear in a 1954 piece for The
Saturday Review. There—perhaps in response to Carnell's charge that Socrates and
Jesus are indistinguishable in Niebuhr's thought—Niebuhr offers a comparison
between Christ and Socrates. He concludes that though Christ and Socrates are
united because of their status as "moral exemplars", what separates them is the issue
of the "Christ of faith". "To assert that the Jesus ofhistory is the Christ, and that
'God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself,' is an affirmation of faith
which insists that the variance between man and God cannot be finally overcome by
the virtue ofman. All human virtue remains ambiguous to the end. It can be
overcome only by a 'suffering' God who takes the sins of the world upon
Himself'.49 Moreover, there is
a vast difference in seeing in Jesus an exemplar of the nobility of
vicarious suffering, from regarding the whole drama ofHis life as the
'light that shines in the darkness' as a revelation of the mystery of
significant amount ofNiebuhr's later Christology, had been published before Carnell offered his
criticisms.
48 So Carnahan suggests that Niebuhr's Christology is similar to his theological adversary, Karl Barth.
Writes Carnahan, "The core of.. .Barthian Christology [becomes] central in Niebuhr's own mature
moral theology". See Carnahan, p. 58. Others, however, have found that association dubious. Mark
Lovatt suggests that Niebuhr's Christology is borne out of his understanding of the human "will-to-
power" and is linked to any salvific notions in Niebuhr's realism. On the other hand, Barth's
dialectical theology interprets the salvation found in Christ as an "act of restoration, of completion, of
overcoming the ontological impossibility of sin.. .brought about by Christ's work on the Cross in
which the effects of sin were overcome and all humanity was redeemed in one event of salvation".
Consequently, "Niebuhr's views concerning the nature of sin, the meaning of grace and the work of
salvation were simply emptied of their meaning by Barth, who reduced the struggle against the will-
to-power to a pointless activity". See Lovatt, Confronting the Will-to-Power, pp. 68, 70; 117-119. As
we observed in chapter five, Niebuhr actually agrees that there is an "ontological impossibility" to sin.
In that case, Niebuhr and Barth are probably closer than Lovatt allows, but they may not be so close as
to be identical in their respective Christologies. Regardless, I think Carnahan is right to suggest that
Niebuhr and Barth did agree, at least in some respects, on the issue of Christology. This will become
more evident in the next chapter where the distinction between the "eschatos" and the "eschaton" in
Niebuhr's theology is drawn.
49 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Christ vs. Socrates: A Remonstrance for Christmas" in The Saturday Review
37, no. 51 (December 18, 1954): 37.
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God's justice and mercy as it comes to terms with the perpetual
rebellions of human ambitions against the divine will. To regard Him
as this key which resolves mystery into meaning is to look at the
whole drama of human existence without either obscuring the tragic
factors in man's persistent egotism or in seeking vain methods of
eliminating that egotism by mystical techniques of self-
annulment....50
The point is that the distance between understanding Christ as a moral
exemplar and asserting the most basic Christian doctrine that "Christ is Lord" is
covered by a "leap of faith". To make this latter declaration is also to aver that the
Christ of faith—God-in-Christ—is the one whose essentialness gives our existence
meaning. The problem with declaring that Socrates (or any moral exemplar for that
matter) is that the one who makes this declaration is ultimatelymystified by her own
existence. It is only God-in-Christ who can rescue humans from the despair of their
own existential angst.
The 'existing' individual ceases to be an observer of the world and
comes to terms with his own situation ultimately. This observation
might persuade us to say a qualifying word about Socrates. He is
supposed to be the fountain and source of all rational identifications
of virtue and reason. But after all it was Socrates who said 'Know
thyself.' By that much the view of Socrates and Christ share a
common 'existentialism.'...Either the self engages in the abortive
enterprise of regarding itself as ultimate (existentialism) or of losing
itself, and annulling its contingent existence, in the ultimate
(mysticism); or in finding itself in a dialogic relation with the divine.
The revelation of Christ has meaning only in the context of such a
dialogic relationship.51
In other words, those who understand Christ only in terms of the "Christ of
history", or as moral exemplar, make the mistake of losing the key—which is the
"Christ of faith"—to understanding the mystery of their lives as ultimately
meaningful.
The importance of this for Niebuhr's realism is that it is Christ who holds
Niebuhr's theology and ethics together. In this regard Lehmann is correct; Christ is
the lynchpin for the theology ofNiebuhr's early and later thought. The issues
discussed in chapters two to five—Niebuhrian realism as moral realism, the
50Ibid, p. 38.
51
Ibid, p. 39.
170
association ofNiebuhr's thought with a version of post-Vatican II Catholic theology,
the hermeneutics of Christian realism and the postmodern criticisms Niebuhr
continues to receive—all explored, in some sense, the metaphysical nature of
Niebuhr's articulation of Christian realism. Taken on their own, they each go some
way toward clarifying what Niebuhr means when he speaks of Christian realism.
But considered in light of the Christ of faith and the Christ of history, these various
aspects of Christian realism can be understood together; they collectively relate to
the Christ of faith or the Christ of history.
More importantly, though, the connection between Niebuhr's Christology
and the more metaphysical elements of his ethics—that is, the connection between
Niebuhr's theology and ethics—helps us to understand Christian realism as more
than just a social, political or theological ethic. With Christ at the centre, we can
interpret Christian realism as a type of hopeful social, political or theological ethic.
But the ascription of theological hope to Niebuhr's articulation of Christian realism
means something very particular. For Niebuhr, theological hope was always about
the redemption of the essential and existential components that mark human life.
We will explore that idea more full in the next chapter. Before we can do that,
though, there are some important ways Niebuhr conceives of Christ in regard to the
hopeful elements of Christian realism which we need first to investigate. To affirm
Lehmann's point, these are more implicit than explicit. We will look at these
implicit ways that Niebuhr understands the person of Christ before returning to the
question asked at the beginning of this chapter about whether or not theological hope
can be ethical.
6.8. The Essential Christ
Another way of speaking about the Christ of faith is to speak about the
"essential" Christ. First, the essential Christ is the Christ who exists before all time
because he is of the same substance (homoousias) ofGod and is, thus, the very
essence ofGod. Second, however, the resurrected Christ's continued, present
existence both transcends time and is ultimately related to us in time. In this sense,
he is the Christ who is affirmed in the declarations ofboth the Nicene and Apostles'
creeds that Christ "is seated at the right hand of the Father". Third, the essential
Christ is the Christ who exists as the one who "is to come" (Rev. 1:8). In these three
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characteristics of the essential Christ—the Christ who exists before, during and after
all time—is the Christ who is "the same yesterday and today and forever" (Heb.
13:8). Because the dimensions of time, transcendent and imminent, are assimilated
into the essence ofChrist, it is only he who is capable of redeeming and reconciling
the essential and existential elements of human life.
What is important about these three aspects of Christ's existence is that they
are the constituent parts of the metaphysical character of the Christ of faith. In his
later work, Niebuhr affirms the redemptive relationship of the essential Christ to
history, where he makes the distinction between transcendent (or "universal") and
imminent history. Universal history, Niebuhr tells us, "emerges by reason of the fact
that the divine sovereignty which overarches all historical destiny is not the
possession of any people or the extension of any particular historical power".52 The
obverse of universal history is the idea "that history is filled with man's proud and
pretentious efforts to defy the divine sovereignty, to establish himself as god by his
power or virtue, his wisdom or foresight". The tension established between these
two understandings ofhistory is only overcome, Niebuhr thinks, by God's revelation
in, and redemption of, history. In the Old Testament universal history is revealed to
particular history in God's self-revealing to Israel. This results in the paradox that
"the special destiny of a nation exposes it to a special peril of pride and that
capitulation to this temptation subjects Israel to a uniquely sever divine
condemnation.. ,".54 Israel's predicament is special, but not unique; it is only a
harbinger of the total human predicament made obvious by the ultimate revelation of
universal in particular history: the revelation of God-in-Christ. That is, universal
history was revealed in the essential Christ and humans have since that time
succumbed to the "special peril ofpride" to make their own particular history that of
God's universal history. Moreover, this conflict between universal history and
particular history made clear in the establishment of the new covenant of Christ with
humanity in the New Testament surpasses the same conflict established in the
covenant of the Old Testament between Israel and Yahweh. While the covenant in
the Old Testament is between a nation and God, the covenant in the New Testament
52
Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 118.
53 Ibid.
54
Ibid, p. 120.
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is between all people and God. The new covenant is thus a universal covenant. Its
universality, however, gives it its particularity. Thus, the covenant between
humanity and the incarnated God-in-Christ is a particular covenant because all
individuals experience the peril of pride and thus attempt to usurp the place ofChrist
as the meaning of all life. In the New Testament, then, Christ becomes central to
resolving and redeeming the essential with existential elements of human life.
While Israel does have a central place in the drama of history, it has
no special security...In the 'new covenant' or the 'New Testament'
the triumph of Israel as the clue to the meaning of history is even
more specifically denied. The revelation of Christ as the centre of,
and clue to, history's meaning, is both the negation and the fulfilment
of all partial meanings in history, as they are embodied in national,
imperial, and even world-wide cultures.55
Christ's special purpose of redemption and his unique position at the centre
ofhistory's meaning is denotative of the fact that when we say that hope is not hope
unless the things for which we hope are impossible, we mean that those things are
impossibly hoped for without Christ. Niebuhr makes precisely this point when he
says:
We must remember that all hopes and ideas conceived from within
the temporal process of a system of meaning which transcends the
temporal flux, are 'irrational'....The Christian hope is derived from
the Christian revelation of the meaning in the divine mystery. That
revelation is centred in the crucifixion and resurrection of
Christ....He is apprehended not only as a specific individual whose
life has power beyond the grave, but as the key to the ultimate
mystery ofGod and history.56
In other words, Christ, for Niebuhr, is the one in whom redemption between
the essential and existential elements of human life occurs. We can thus further see
that Milbank's charge from the last chapter that there are insurmountable obstacles
for Niebuhr between the real and ideal of human life is mistaken because, to
Niebuhr, the person of Christ not only can, but does overcome these tensions and is
thus "not irrelevant to all our fragmentary meanings".
"A.. .word", Niebuhr continues,
55 Ibid, p. 121.
56
Niebuhr, The Selfand the Dramas ofHistory, pp. 254.
173
must be said about the intimate relation between the hope of the
fulfilment of individual selfhood with the hope for the fulfilment of
the whole historical drama. How incredible and how valid this
combination of hopes is!...Its fulfilment is not possible without the
fulfilment of the whole drama, yet the fulfilment of the total drama
offers no adequate completion of meaning for the unique
individual....The hope of the forgiveness of sins and life everlasting
[redemption] is thus a fitting climax of the faith that there is a
meaning to the story beyond our understanding of its meaning
because it is grounded in power and purpose beyond our
comprehension, though not irrelevant to all our fragmentary
meanings.57
In other words, what we have here called impossible, or essential hope,
Niebuhr calls irrational, or incredible, and what we have identified as possible, or
existential hope, Niebuhr calls valid. Thus, the point made earlier stands: essential
and existential hopes combine to give us our understanding of theological hope. The
possibility of existential hopes (the "fulfilment of individual selfhood") is
fundamentally related to the impossibility of essential hopes ("the fulfilment of the
whole historical drama"). What binds the two is the person of Christ, in whom "the
hope of forgiveness of sins and life everlasting" is placed. More to the point,
though, is that the role that the person ofChrist (particularly the essential person of
Christ) assumes in Niebuhr's articulation of Christian realism begins to resemble the
way that the objective properties ofwhat was said could be called good, right or just
in the earlier discussion ofmoral realism from chapter two. This connection
between the Christ of faith and the guiding principle ofmoral realism is singularly
the most important connection to draw when trying to understand how moral realism
provides a basis for hope in Niebuhr's articulation ofChristian realism. For this
reason, we will explore this idea more fully before bringing the discussion of
essential hope and the Christ of faith to a close and turning our attention to the next
chapter.
6.8.1. The Christ ofFaith as the Basis ofHope
Christ is, for Niebuhr, the source ofunlimited moral meaning for human
existence. This is why we can say, in relation to essential and existential hopes, that
it is the person of Christ whose essence gives human existence meaning. More
57 Ibid, pp. 256-257.
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precisely, though, it is the Christ offaith, the incarnated Christ, who gives moral
meaning to human existence. Thus, it is the impertinent predication of
hermeneutical realism in relation to Christ's incarnation that gives human existence
its moral meaning. That is, the incarnation ofChrist accords meaning to human
existence "through the juxtaposition of logically and empirically distinct and even
58
contradictory claims". The logically and empirically distinct claims concerning the
incarnation are, of course, that Christ was both fully human and fully divine.
Moreover, it is the cruciform intersection of these two claims that come together to
form the basis of our understanding ofmeaning in human existence. Niebuhr picks
up on this theme from his earliest to most mature works and, though his elaboration
of the theme changes over time, the meaning of it does not. For example, the early
Niebuhr writes that "[i]f there is any lack of identity between the Jesus of history and
the Christ of religious experience [or, 'faith'], the Jesus ofhistory is nevertheless
more capable of giving historical reality to the necessary Christ idea than any
character ofhistory".59 In other words, Christ's essence (his divinity) is attested to
by the historical existence of Christ (his humanity). Later in his most theological
work to date, Niebuhr again affirms this idea and puts it in even starker terms with
regard to Christ as the meaning of life, when he says that
[f]rom the perspective of human history, which cannot be fully
comprehended from its own perspective or fulfilled by its own power,
the wisdom and the power in Christ is what gives life is meaning and
guarantees the fulfilment of that meaning....To say that Christ is the
'express image of his person' [Heb. 1:3] is to assert that in the epic of
this life and death the final mystery of the divine power which bears
history is clarified; and, with that clarification, life and history are
given their true meaning.60
Both of these statements are realist statements because they each make
claims to something objective and independent of human conceptions about it. In
this case, it is the incarnation which is objective and independent from human
conceptions (i.e., human history "which cannot be fully comprehended") about it.
However, as already indicated in chapter five, though, independence from cognition
58
Chapter four, n. 20.
59
Niebuhr, Does Civilization Need Religion?, p. 236.
60 Niebuhr. The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 55.
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is not indicative of irrelevance in relation to human existence. Indeed, reality's
objectivity is of supreme importance.
In addition to being the source of unlimited meaning, Christ is also the basis
of hope for Niebuhr. Hope stands apart from human cognition in the same way that
Christ does. We will see how momentarily, but first let us explore two ways in
which Christ is representative for Niebuhr of the kind of independent objectivity
discussed in the earlier chapters of part one. These include "Christ, the impossible"
and "Christ, the form ofmoral goodness".
6.9. Christ, the Impossible: Postliberalism and Christian Realism
Niebuhr's assertion that "there is a meaning to the story beyond our
understanding of its meaning" is, again, a realist statement. History (the "story"), for
Niebuhr, provides the framework within which the Christ of faith imparts meaning,
and out of which the act ofhuman self-transcendence occurs. But history is that wh
ich humans can know, that which does not stand independently of human cognition.
It is the meaning of history's story which stands apart from human understanding of
it, though it is still knowable.
It should be noted that though Niebuhr speaks of history as a story, his
account of Christian realism is different from recent narrative theologies like
"postliberalism". Postliberalism identifies God with the story of history, which is
told and interpreted particularly. That is, the "narrative" of history is usually related
to biblical texts, which are read and interpreted by particular people in particular
contexts at particular times. As George Lindbeck puts it:
The normative or literal meaning [of a text] must be consistent with
the kind of text it is taken to be by the community for which it is
important. The meaning must not be esoteric: not something behind,
beneath, or in front of the text; not something that the text reveals,
discloses implies, or suggests to those with extraneous metaphysical,
historical, or experiential interests. It must rather be what the text
says in terms of the communal language of which the text is an
instantiation....An intratextual reading tries to derive the interpretive
framework that designates the theologically controlling sense from
the literary structure of the text itself.61
61
George A. Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine: Religion and Theology in a PostliberalAge,
(London: SPCK, 1984), p. 120.
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In other words, the meanings of texts must be decided by those who are
interpreting the texts in particular circumstances. Christian realism differs from
postliberalism in this way: on the one hand, postliberalism emphasises the narrative
telling of the text which fluctuates within different contexts. The realist, on the other
hand, thinks of the meaning behind the story as that which gives coherence to the
story and to the contexts in which the story is told. In the case of Christian realism,
it is God who is the meaning behind the story of history, and who is interactive with
f\9
history, but who also operates independently of history. In Christian realism, then,
there is no loss ofmetanarratives; or, of a meaning behind the story which guides the
£•7
story along.
Why is this important for a discussion about hope in Niebuhrian realism?
Because it emphasises the elements that are important to understanding essential and
existential hopes. The meaning behind the story—God, for the Christian realist—is
the one in whom the realist places the impossibility of his or her essential hopes.
But in the story itself—history—the realist can hope existentially for the things
which are not impossible; that is why we say that they are historically realisable.
More to the point, though, postliberalism actually highlights some of the
important elements of Christian realism discussed previously. The issues raised by
postliberalism with regard to narrative readings and casuist interpretations of human
contexts are redolent of the kind of ethic Niebuhr himself advocated, particularly as
we observed when it came to the similarities between Christian realism and post-
Vatican II existentialism.
Additionally, Niebuhr actually does interpret history narrativally, with
"dramatic patterns", such as a classic story with plotlines, conflicts, denouements
62 Cf. Niebuhr, "History (God) Has Overtaken Us", in Love and Justice, p. 293 where Niebuhr
declares that God has acted independently of human decisions about whether or not to enterWorld
War II, and has taken "the decision out of our hands".
63 There are, however, still parallels between Niebuhrian realism and narrative theology. See, for
example, Christian Realism and the New Realities in which Lovin identifies Christian realism with
another kind of "realism" which he calls the position of "The Witness". The Witness, identified most
easily with Hauerwas's ecclesio-centric ethic, demonstrates its postliberal roots with its insistence that
"the truths ofChristian faith must be held in a community formed by a shared narrative, which shapes
individual character and makes shared moral judgments possible". Lovin's argument is that the
position of the Witness is not a reduplication of Christian realism, but can be closely identified with
realism because the Witness "is so clearly shaped by its explicit rejection of the Christian realist
understanding of faith and politics". Christian Realism and the New Realities, pp. 24, 21 respectively.
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and a resolution.64 Such an interpretation is why we can speak of the pain of the past
associated with the celebration of the resurrection and the Eucharist. Those
celebrations and memories would not be partially painful if they were not part of a
larger story. It is precisely because they are the elements that constitute a larger
story which has been lived and continues to be experienced that they can evoke such
emotion and that they have any meaning for us. Francesca Murphy is a realist who
makes this same point in her critique of narrative theology when she says that
[n]ot only [do] narrative theologies...not succeed on their own terms,
but...what they propose can feasibly be achieved without making
God a story... .An analogy is not just a vague reminder.. .but an actual
recollection....Analogies are cathartic, they are used at once
affirmatively and negatively.. ..An experience is called cathartic when
it is so awful that it is purifying. Such an experience puts us through
the reality of the experience it names or recollects so vividly that it
takes it out of us, by binding us to it.. ..The cathartic aspect of analogy
is its purging us of our ordinary perspective, showing us what the
world looks like upside-down, to us; for then we see, not only
realities, but the perfect source of realities.65
In other words, when we attempt to remember the past, we do so
analogically, which is just another way of saying that because we cannot recreate
what once was, the best we can do is relate our experiences to something that is
representative of our past. Murphy takes this one step further—and thus makes the
realistic point I have been stressing—by saying that remembering our past
experiences analogically is painful, but it is also a remembrance that points us to the
essence ofGod-in-Christ.
So, ifwe take the Eucharist analogically (and thus, with Murphy,
cathartically) we understand that its significance is that it binds us to the reality of
the experience of Christ's sacrifice by its awful, yet purifying effect on us. We are
thus bound to Christ himself, the "perfect source of realities". It is here where the
loss of the meaning behind the story is so dangerous because that loss results in the
ultimate loss of a basis for hope. Interpreting Christ as the meaning behind the story
is only one part of the approach that arrives at the basis for theological hope in its
64 Cf., Niebuhr, "The Self and the Dramas ofHistory" in The Selfand the Dramas ofHistory, pp. 56-
64.
65 Francesca Aran Murphy, God is Not a Story: Realism Revisited, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), pp. 315-316.
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essential and existential forms. As argued in chapter four, there are both "how" and
"what" components to consider in hermeneutics. If the interpretation of Christ as the
meaning behind the story answers what we are interpreting as the basis for
theological hope, then it remains for us to answer how we go about interpreting
Christ in this way.
6.10. Christ, the "Form" ofReality
As already indicated in chapter five, imagination plays a significant role in
the realist's social hermeneutic. There, following Lovibond's lead, we noted that the
imagination for the realist is related to an epistemic function that seeks to know and
interpret the present social realities in which the moral agent finds himself or
herself.66 Rather than being the result of a prescribed feature ofhuman nature
(Stoicism), the imagination, for the realist, serves a discursive function: it begins by
assessing social realities, thinks "practically" about them and then tries to imagine
ways in which those realities can, if needed, be appropriately changed, all the while
acknowledging that a creatio ex nihilo is not a possibility. That is, whatever "new"
social realities the realist imagines will not be altogether dissimilar from the realities
that were interpreted in the first place. Imagination, then, causes the realist to "go
out" from himself or herself (recall Niebuhr's emphasis on self-transcendence) in
order better to know the independent, objective facts of social realities. Moreover, in
this capacity to transcend the self imaginatively the moral agent is also met by the
objective realities that he or she seeks to know. "The imagination is both creative
f\7
and receptive". It "creates" new ways of interpreting realities, but those
interpretations are based on the information about the realities that the one who is
imagining has received from the realities. In the case of Christian realism, the reality
which meets the moral agent is the reality ofGod, whose transcendence is manifest
in the incarnation of Christ. In the incarnation "God speaks to man", and in the act
of self-transcendence which meets the incarnated God, the moral agent knows that
/"O
"[m]an is most free in the discovery that he is not free". The imagination, then,
plays a significant role for the Christian realist in terms of understanding the reality
of God.
66 See chapter five, pp.
67 Francesca Aran Murphy, Christ, the Form ofBeauty: A Study in Theology and Literature,
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), p. 7.
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Murphy has an important word to say on the way the imagination fosters the
critical ability to interpret the incarnated Christ of faith. She offers a realist
interpretation of this incarnation which is important because it emphasises the
independent, objective nature of Christ as an archetype, or "form". The imagination
for the realist, according to Murphy, is
unlike fantasy in that it is of or about something. Imagining is a way
of being related to facts. It is a means of knowing facts through
images. Such images are inbuilt perspectives on reality. Experience
is filtered through images. The type of world which we experience is
determined by their frame. We need those images which focus upon
the full density of facts. Our ways of imagining should allow us to
enter the world as concrete, and individual.. ..To experience the world
through narrow images is to be directed to particular facts.
Imagination thus turns facts into humanly apprehensible
forms....Images give shape to the relation between the self and the
world.69
In other words, images foster imaginative exploration. Realistic images—
artistic depictions, photographs, film, literary constructs, et al.—give us depictions
of things that are real, but that exist independently ofwhat we think of them. For
example, when I read Augustine's account of stealing pears, I do not have to live in
fourth century Tagaste to understand the emotions of avarice and shame and to know
that they are real. What this means for the relationship of the Christian realist's
imagination to the incarnation of Christ is that the person of Christ as the
representation ofGod, the Christ of faith, is apprehended by the receptive
imagination as the representation of God. Murphy suggests that this apprehension
occurs with a "realistic metaphysic" in place and after we attempt to "say how the
70
self is real". That is, as discussed in chapters two and four, respectively, once we
understand that there are objective realities, we can understand ourselves
existentially. From the acknowledgement of objective realities (essentiality) and the
effort to understand ourselves in light of those realities (existentiality) is borne the
"need to see how the imaginative grasp of form is met by One Who comes to meet it
from beyond human powers of exploration. The ultimate goal of the imagination's
71
search for meaning lies in the singular form of a supernatural Person".
68
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. I, pp. 147, 260 respectively.
69
Murphy, Christ, the Form ofBeauty, p. 7.
70 Ibid, p. 12.
11 Ibid, p. 13.
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This makes the point being stressed; namely that this "Person", the Christ of
faith, assumes the role of objective reality posited by Christian realism. As such, he
is the essential "form" ofGod, who has relevance to human existence. As Niebuhr
writes:
The God of the Christian faith is the creator of the world. His
wisdom is the principle form, the logos. But creation is not merely
the subjection of a primitive chaos to the order of logos. God is the
source of vitality as well as of order. Order and vitality are a unity in
Him. Even the logos, identified with the second person of the Trinity
in Christian faith, is more than logos. The Christ is the redeemer who
reveals God in His redemptive vitality, above and beyond the
revelation of the created order...He is the pattern, the logos of
creation. But he is also the revelation of the redemptive will which
79
restores a fallen world to the pattern of its creation.
In other words, it is the Christ of faith in whom objective reality is made
manifest to us. Murphy suggests, and Niebuhr agrees, that the Christ of faith is
understood in mythological terms. We will take a moment to explore what this
means, before coming to the conclusion of this chapter.
6.11. "The Truth inMyths"
To this point, I have deliberately not discussed Niebuhr's use ofmyth for two
reasons. First, the role ofmyth in Christian realism has been the source of not a
modest amount of attention and it has not been in my interest here to recapitulate any
commentaries on the topic. Second, Niebuhr's use ofmyth has not been relevant to
our discussion of his realism until now.
Niebuhr understands myth as that which bridges the gap between objective
reality and human existence because of its ability to express those "aspects of reality
which are suprascientific". Myth, in other words, speaks to those things which
cannot be explained by empirical investigations, but are nevertheless true. Thus,
myth is the language of imagination because it is "the sole linguistic mode adequate
for the elucidation ofmeaning in history".74 If, as stated, Christ is the meaning of
history, then it follows that Niebuhr would identify the incarnation as mythological
because "myth points to the relation between the self-transcending human reality and
a divine, or exemplary world.. ..The myth dramatizes the reciprocity between human
72
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. I, p. 28. Boldfaced words mine.
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Niebuhr, "The Truth in Myths", p. 16.
74
Gilkey, On Niebuhr, p. 46.
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openness toward the supernatural and the divine itself'.75 If the realist imagination
enables both the transcendence of the self-in-existence and the reception of essential
facts about external realities, then myth is the result of the meeting of these two
things which, for the Christian realist, occurs in the essence ofGod-in-Christ.
Niebuhr characterises the incarnation as mythical because this approach
captures that which cannot be understood rationally. "We are deceivers, yet true, [2.
Cor. 6:8]" Niebuhr writes, "when we affirm that God became man to redeem the
world from sin.. ..[I]t is impossible to assert that the eternal ground of existence has
entered existence and not sacrificed its eternal and unconditioned quality, without
76
outraging every canon of reason". To characterise the incarnation as mythical,
however, does not mean that the incarnation is therefore false. "The truth that the
Word was made flesh outrages all the canons by which truth is usually judged. Yet
it is the truth. The whole character of the Christian religion is involved in that
77
affirmation". The only way to preserve the truth in myths is to avoid attempts that
try to explain how a myth could literally be true. As one review noted about
Niebuhr's understanding ofmyth, "everymyth becomes falsehood the moment we
70
treat it as exact scientific statement". When the myth of the incarnation becomes a
falsehood, theology becomes absurd because it attempts "to define the two natures of
Christ and to distinguish between the temporal and the eternal in the mythical God-
man, [and to] prove how impossible it is to bring essential myth into the categories
of rationality".79
Thus, what myth gives the Christian realist is a way of expressing what
imagination can envision, but not articulate. For Niebuhr, "the Christ of Christian
faith is both human and divine. His actions represent both human possibilities and
on
the limits of human possibilities". When imagination leads the realist to the
conclusion that she is not as free as once thought, it is the reality, or "form", of
Christ with whom she is confronted. In this sense, Christ is "[t]he transcendent
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Murphy, Christ, the Form ofBeauty, p. 15.
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Niebuhr, "As Deceivers, Yet True" in Beyond Tragedy, p. 13.
77 Ibid, p.14.
78 W. Watcyn-Williams, British Weekly (July 21, 1938), n.p. Cited in Halliwell, The Constant
Dialogue, p. 170. Halliwell notes on the same page that by the time Niebuhr wrote "The Truth in
Myths" he "had become increasingly interested in myths as partly constitutive of reality...".
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source of the meaning of life [and] is thus in such relation to all temporal process
that a profound insight into any process or reality yields a glimpse of the reality
o 1
which is beyond it". What provides the "glimpse" in the case of Christ as the
transcendent source of life's meaning is the incarnation; that is, the person of God-
in-Christ presents a vision ofwho God is and how God relates to human existence.
"Thus a man becomes the symbol ofGod and the religious sense that the absolute
R9
invades the relative and the historical is adequately expressed".
It is precisely in this relation of Christ to human existence that we find the
basis for both essential and existential hopes. Before turning to our final chapter, let
us take a moment to explore how the Christ of faith provides this basis for hope.
6.12. From Christ to Hope
The consistent theme in the previous chapters has been that reality for the
moral realist is that which is independently good, right or just. It is also the impetus
for the realist's moral action. In this chapter, we have observed how, in Niebuhr's
understanding of realism, it is the Christ of faith who occupies the place of the moral
realist's reality. Rather than a generalised moral principle, it is the particularity of
God-in-Christ, from whom we understand what goodness, lightness and justness are
about. Furthermore, we have observed how the Christ of faith is the basis ofhope
and the one in whom essential and existential hopes are founded.
These statements amount to the following syllogism for Christian realists in
the Niebuhrian tradition: The Christ of faith is the impetus for us to act morally. All
of our hopes are ultimately reconciled in Christ. The ability to act morally therefore
springs from the hope that is Christ. Niebuhr summarised this succinctly by
claiming that "the Christ in us is not a possession but a hope".83 That is, though
Christ exists separately from how we conceive of him, he is the basis of our hope in
our moral acts because we know "that perfection is not a reality but an intention; that
such peace as we know in this life is never purely the peace of achievement but the
serenity ofbeing 'completely known and all forgiven'; [and that] all this does not
OA
destroy moral ardour or responsibility". When we understand Christ in these terms,
we understand that "[t]he meaningfulness of life does not tempt to premature
81 Ibid.
82
Niebuhr, Reflections on the End ofan Era, p. 287.
83 Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 125.
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complacency, and the chaos which always threatens the world ofmeaning does not
destroy the tension of faith and hope in which all moral action is grounded".85
It is thus appropriate to suggest, Niebuhr's abjurations notwithstanding, that
theology inhabits not only a place, but the place of highest importance for the ethics
ofNiebuhr's realism. From theology flows his understanding of ethics; from the
person of Christ, the basis of hope.
This is not, of course, how Niebuhr has always been interpreted. During and
since the time ofhis career, there have been a considerable number ofwritings about
the ethics of Christian realism, particularly its political ethics, but very few on the
theology of Christian realism, due in large part to the perception (summarised by
James Gustafson) that, for Niebuhr, "theology was in the service of ethics".86
Gustafson offers four "base points" to suggest Niebuhr prioritises ethics over
theology. "First, theological ethics, like other ethics, has to account for the
procedures used to come to a practical moral or social choice.. ..If one [compares] an
ethic of conscience and an ethic of cultural or social responsibility, it is clear that
on
Niebuhr's work fits the latter type". From this putative emphasis on social
responsibility comes Gustafson's second point, what he identifies as "the
o o
interpretation of circumstances". Niebuhr, according to Gustafson, interprets social
realities in light of his theological beliefs (understood mythically) so that "[t]he
importance of the Kingdom of God coming at the end of history is that the belief
assures hope, and thus Christianity does not lead to a finally tragic view of life".89
But this does not mean that Niebuhr gives priority to theology. It only means that
theology gives reason to avoid despair, but that it is still deferential to ethics. In
other words, Gustafson sees Niebuhr viewing hope only as the carrot at the end of
the stick, not as a component ofhis overall theologio-ethical project. Thirdly,
Gustafson points to anthropological emphases in Christian realism.90 Gustafson
points to the stress on experience in Niebuhr's thought as evidence that Niebuhr
84 Ibid.
85
Niebuhr, An Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, p. 106.
86 James Gustafson, "Theology in the Service of Ethics" in Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues ofOur
Times, (London: Mowbray, 1986). p. 44.
87 Ibid, p. 30.
88 Ibid, p. 35.
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gives precedence to ethics. Human experiences are "most accurately understood"
when they are analysed "biblically" for Niebuhr, but "[t]he test of the correct
analysis is its efficacy in leading to appropriate kinds ofmoral and political
actions".91 Therefore, it need not necessarily be the bible that analyses human
experience most accurately, just whatever is most efficacious. It is only after these
three points that Niebuhr, for Gustafson, arrives at the fourth point: the doctrine of
God.
For Niebuhr...the transcendence of God was finally accented more
than the immanence...[which] provided a basis for grasping the
relativities of historical experience....What he says about God and
God's relations to the world establish the conditions of possibility for
proper moral an political life: a principle of judgement in the light of
which all human activities are seen as finite and sinful; a principle of
mercy which enables human agents to be free to act prudentially; and
a principle of hope which militates against ultimate meaninglessness
and despair.92
In other words, Gustafson, not unlike Milbank in the last chapter, makes
these points to suggest that theology for Niebuhr is really just a gloss which attempts
to avoid an otherwise hopeless ethic, but that if something proved to be more
efficient at this than Christian theology, it would be just as "serviceable" for moral
enquiry.
Of course, Gustafson (like Milbank) is not entirely incorrect in his
summation ofChristian realism. Some of the areas Gustafson underscores I, too,
have emphasised as important for understanding Niebuhr. But what I have also tried
to do, particularly in this chapter, is to demonstrate that one can begin with a general
moral philosophical enquiry like moral realism and see how it correlates to Christian
realism. However, one cannot end with those comparisons because they inevitably
lead to four conclusions. First, the particularity of Christ replaces the more
generalised account ofmoral objectivity in Christian realism. Second, Christ, like
the generalised accounts ofmoral objectivity is thus both transcendent and
immanent in Christian realism. Third, Christ is the one in whom the Christian
realist's hopes are placed and, even when those (essential) hopes are said to be
"impossible", they are only impossible without the immanence of Christ. And
91
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fourth, hope, then, is not a gloss, but a reality in the full sense of the word as it has
been used here throughout.
6.13. Conclusions
In this chapter we have looked at several different facets ofwhat it means for
the realist to say that hope is not hope unless the thing for which we hope is
impossible. We compared what I have called essential and existential hopes and
concluded that though essential hopes are "impossible" as far as they go, they
become the impossible possibility when related to the Christ of faith. That is, it is
the incarnated Christ, both human and God, in whom impossible, essential hopes
become realities.
The Utopian hopes of Rauschenbusch were also considered and it was
determined that Niebuhr and Rauschenbusch would have been much closer on the
issue ofwhat can legitimately be hoped for if Rauschenbusch had not confused the
difference between essential and existential hopes, or the difference between natural
and unnatural life. The example of the Eucharist is instructive here because it
illustrates the difference between sentimentality which knows not what it hopes for
and nostalgia which hopes for those things that can only be made complete in Christ.
Following this was an excursus on the 1954 WCC meeting to demonstrate
Niebuhr's hesitancy in speaking about certain kinds ofhope. Hope associated with a
too-literal eschatology is problematic for Niebuhr precisely because it relies on a
depiction ofGod that is transcendent, not immanent to human life.
Nevertheless, the inclusion of Christ in the WCC theme was important and
led to our discussion ofChristology in Niebuhr's thought. We investigated Niebuhr's
understanding of Christ's paradoxical nature, as well as the essential and existential
components ofNiebuhr's Christology which, with Lehmann, we recognised as
central to Niebuhr's realism.
From the Christological emphasis emerged a depiction of Christ as the
"form" ofmoral goodness, which replaces the more generalised account of
objectivity in realism. It is here that Niebuhr's realism becomes specifically
Christian realism. Additionally, Christ as the objective reality of Christian realism
provides the basis for theological hopes in their essential and existential forms. It is
92
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Christ's immanence, his omnipresence in human existence that makes his basis of
hope possible. Without this, all hopes—essential or existential—would be
impossible impossibilities. But because transcendence becomes immanence in
Christ, we have impossible possibilities.
As we now move into the next chapter we will spend more time on what I
have called existential, or immanent hopes. Immanent hopes, we will see, are
related to Niebuhr's understanding of eschatology, which is very much unlike the
eschatology of the WCC that Niebuhr criticised. What differentiates the two is
"ontological eschatology" which leads to "redemptive hope" for Christian realism,
as we will see. Let us begin the ending now.
187
Chapter Seven
IMMANENT HOPE
"Reinhold Niebuhr.. .treated hope almost as an anesthetic, like a scotch at the end of
a hard day ofwork".1
7.1 Abstract
Immanent hope is the hope for those things which are realisable in
history. Having discussed transcendent hope in the previous chapter,
in this chapter we will explore immanent hope in Christian realism.
This discussion will be related to Niebuhr's understanding of
eschatology, and several areas of exploration will be necessary for
consideration. These include: the eschaton and the Eschatos; a
comparison with Barth on the issue of eschatology; an account of
what Charles Matthewes has called "ontological eschatology" and
how it relates to Niebuhr's realism; an Augustinian appraisal of the
proper orientation of love; and the location of repentance and
redemption in Niebuhr's thought. As with earlier chapters, the
discussion in this chapter will remain related to the realism that we
have identified with Christian realism.
7.2 Introduction
For Niebuhr, hope is, like the Christ of faith, both transcendent and
immanent. There are those kinds of hope that Niebuhr identifies as "catastrophic",
or what I have called essential, which are attached to those things that are impossible.
These are transcendent hopes; hopes which transcend our ability to fulfil them, and
which are identified with Christ. There are also the kinds of "everyday" hope, or
what I have called existential hopes, which hope for the types of things which are not
impossible (e.g., "Because I hope to deliver a good lecture on Tuesday, I must be
well-prepared"). These are immanent hopes; hopes for which we bear some
responsibility in order to see them become realities. Chapter six was spent
discussing what it means to say that hope is not hope unless the things for which we
hope are impossible. That was the beginning of the transition from the moral
philosophical elements of Christian realism that occupied part one of the thesis to the
theological concerns of part two.
1 Charles Matthewes, A Theology ofPublic Life, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.
239.
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In this final chapter, we will continue with the theological concerns begun
previously, but now turn our attention to a more dynamic account of existential
hopes and their relationship to Niebuhr's Christian realism. Several areas of interest
need covering in order to accomplish this task. We will first take a look at some of
the eschatological concerns of Christian realism. I have intentionally (and
appropriately) saved eschatology for last, not because it plays a small role in
Niebuhr's theology—though, to be sure, when he does speak of eschatology, he
tends to do so critically—but because the emphasis Niebuhr gives to moral concerns
ushers in a different understanding of eschatology than one might expect.
Here we will first discuss eschatology and the Eschatos (Christ) and the
importance of the differences between the two for Niebuhr's realism. This will be
useful for understanding the horizontal and vertical dimensions of transcendence in
Niebuhr's thought, which will lead into a comparison with Barth—a useful, if
unlikely interlocutor—on the issue of eschatology. Second, we will explore Charles
Matthewes's account of eschatology and how it provides important corollaries with
Niebuhrian realism, especially with regard to Augustine's notion of the need for a
properly-oriented love. Third, the notion of futurity in Niebuhr's eschatology will be
considered, particularly with regard to Niebuhr's criticisms ofUtopian liberalism.
Here it will be useful to take into account some expressions of liberation theology on
the issue of eschatology. Fourth and finally, two sections on redemption and
repentance will bring the chapter to a close. It will be demonstrated that Niebuhr
thought of redemption as the place where essential and existential hopes are
reconciled in the person ofChrist. Before we can get there, though, we need to make
our way through the other sections first. Let us do that now.
7.3. Beginning With the End; or, Ending With the Beginning
The essential Christ stands in distinction to the existential Christ, but the two
are still related. As Niebuhr notes, "[t]he idea that Christ is the 'essential' man, the
perfect norm ofhuman character" means that God-in-Christ (the "Christ of faith")
offers the basis for the assertion that life "can approach its original innocency only
2 Cf. Keith Ward's short, but helpful essay on Niebuhr's eschatology as it relates transcendentally and
immanently to his political theology. Keith Ward, "Reinhold Niebuhr and the Christian Hope" in
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by aspiring to its unlimited end",3 That is to say that because the transcendent Christ
is also the (perfect) immanent Christ, sinful life can regain its lost perfection by
"aspiring" to the perfection of immanent Christ, who is the "ultimate end" of life.
Whereas the essential Christ is the Christ of faith, the existential Christ is the Christ
of history. The essential Christ is also the theological realist's Christ who, as noted
in the last chapter, stands objectively apart from our conceptions ofhim. On the
contrary, the existential Christ exists in (but not solely in) human conceptions of
him—narrativally and historically constructed, and described in scripture. This is not
to posit a dualism between the natures of Christ, but to offer an account of the
different ways we have of conceiving Christ's existence in order that we might better
understand how the person ofChrist relates to the account ofhope that is in the
Christian (1 Pet. 3:15).
In chapter six the essential Christ, the Christ of faith, was related to the
essential hopes associated with those things deemed impossible. The counterpoint to
this, of course, is that the existential Christ is associated with the kinds ofhopes that
are not impossible because the status of our existential hopes as capable of being
fulfilled is associated with the historical Christ. The historical Christ is God-in-
Christ who no longer stands apart from human cognition. Neither, then, are the
hopes placed in the historical Christ any longer impossible. What is important about
God's transcendence of objective reality into historical existence is that it occurs in
the meeting of eternity with time. In this sense the existential Christ meets historical
existence eschatologically. That is, the Christ of history comes to human existence
as the one in whom all redemption of historical contingencies has occurred and the
one in whom they will occur; in a "realised" eschatology of sorts. This will be
discussed more fully momentarily, but first it is important to discuss what
eschatology means for Niebuhr.
7.3.1. Niebuhr and Eschatology
In chapter six, it was demonstrated that Niebuhr was strongly opposed to the
selection of the theme, "Christ, the hope of the world" for the 1954 meeting of the
World Council of Churches because of the attendant fevered interest in eschatology
he feared it could encourage. The choice of this theme, in Niebuhr's opinion,
Reinhold Niebuhr and the Issues ofOur Time, pp. 61-87.
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focused too much on knowing "the furniture of heaven or the temperature of hell", a
danger Niebuhr was always quick to criticise 4 The opposite position to this emphasis
was preoccupation with the immanence of Christ to the exclusion of Christ's
transcendence, a move for which Niebuhr found Rauschenbusch's social gospel
guilty.
In the only book-length treatment to date on the theme ofhope in Christian
realism, Robert Cornelison argues that Niebuhr, "in response to [Rauschenbusch's]
immanentism, counterposes an understanding of the vertical [transcendent]
relationship ofGod and world, while down-playing the horizontal [immanent]
elements of that relationship".5 In place of the stress on things such as human
progressiveness that was associated with liberalism from the early twentieth century,
Cornelison suggests that "Niebuhr emphasizes the 'otherness' and aseity ofGod.
God remains deus absconditus even in God's own revelation. God's freedom over
and against his creatures is absolute and final. God is thus related to his creatures in
a vertical sense, as a king is to his subjects".6 The notion of God's aseity—a theme
understandably integrated into Niebuhr's realism, given its foundations in neo-
orthodoxy—leads Cornelison to the conclusion that, with Niebuhr, "one gets the
sense that creation is a realm of immanent causal connections between historical
events with little room for intervention from supernatural sources".7 Moreover, "[i]n
such a view, the meaning of the world is continuous with God, but the eternal is
phenomenologically discontinuous with the temporal".8 In other words, and in
contrast to the theology of Rauschenbusch, the dimension ofNiebuhr's vertical,
transcendent theology prevails over any horizontal, immanent dimensions.
Cornelison is accurate to note the positioning of "verticality" in Niebuhr's
realism, but it remains to be seen that the importance Niebuhr accords to the
complete otherness of God results in the obliteration of continuity between God and
the world. In this sense, Cornelison goes too far with the vertical dimensions of
3 Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. II, pp. 76-77.
4
Niebuhr, The Nature andDestiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 294.
5 Robert Thomas Cornelison, The Christian Realism ofReinhold Niebuhr and the Political Theology
ofJiirgen Moltmann in Dialogue: The Realism ofHope, (San Francisco: Mellen Research University
Press, 1992), p. 41.
6 Ibid.
7
Ibid, p. 42.
8 Ibid.
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Niebuhr's thought and not far enough with the horizontal dimensions because, as we
have stressed in these last two chapters, Niebuhr incorporates both horizontal
(immanent) and vertical (transcendent) elements in his Christology. Langdon
Gilkey, who has written on the issues of vertical transcendence and horizontal
immanence in Niebuhr's realism, affirms Comelison's point about supernaturalism
when he notes that in "[Njiebuhr's thought both [divine activity and human freedom]
were effective in historical changes.. .[but] for him onlyfinite (secondary)
causes.. .effect these changes; hence historical developments are the result of
historical causes alone....No supernatural interventions into the scheme of finite
occurrences are to be expected".9 However, Gilkey goes beyond Cornelison's
conclusion when he adds that, "When God works in history—and for Niebuhr God
does so work—it is through these finite causes".10 On the one hand, according to
Gilkey, Cornelison is correct that Niebuhr does not ever anticipate a supernatural
intervention to transcend space-time causality in the sense that God breaks aseity and
acts on behalfof those who are themselves responsible to act in the first place. Such
an intervention would invalidate the freedom ofboth God and the individual because
God's intervention would mean that God were bound to natural causation while at
the same time obviating any need for human responsibility. On the other hand,
though, Cornelison misses the point that God's immanence in history is found in the
"secondary" causes ofhuman interaction and natural causation. Here Cornelison
completes the wholesale exchange of transcendence for immanence in Niebuhr's
thought. What results is a picture ofChrist who stands only independently of human
existence, rather than Christ who is "there among" those who gather in his name.
Cornelison does, however, give attention to an area where Gilkey's analysis
ofNiebuhr is weakest. Though he focuses too little on immanence, Cornelison
recognises that, for Niebuhr, when confronted with the fact of God's vertical
transcendence, the result is faith which "causes a person to recognize his or her
inability to find complete fulfillment in the created world. It breaks the vicious cycle
of self-centeredness by revealing the source of fulfillment to be outside of the self'.11
Moreover, it is in the acceptance of this faith that "the person's purpose and intention
9
Gilkey, On Niebuhr, p. 236.
10 Ibid. Underlined words mine; italics Gilkey's.
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are in the direction of Christ as norm [i.e., theological realism]".12 Gilkey, on the
other hand, does not go far enough here because the point of God's immanence for
Niebuhr is not only that there is a divine causality in finite human acts, but also that
the specificity ofGod's act in history occurs in both the Christ of history and the
Christ of faith. Overemphasis on either the vertical or horizontal nature of God's
involvement in history finally leads to a hopeless ethic because the essential and
existential elements are left unreconciled. Niebuhr makes this point when he notes
that
[i]f. ..the New Testament faith ends in the pinnacle of the hope of
the resurrection [i.e., with the essential Christ of faith] that is also
the final expression of a faith which sees no hope that man may
overcome or escape the contingent character of his existence; yet is
not without hope, for it is persuaded that a divine power and love
has been disclosed in Christ [i.e., the existential Christ of history],
which will complete what man cannot complete; and which will
overcome the evil introduced into human life and history by man's
abortive effort to complete his life by his own wisdom and
power.13
In other words, it is only the crucified and resurrected Christ who completes
the reconciliation of our imperfect existence with God's essential nature. Another
way of saying this is that we finally begin to understand the nature ofGod's
objective reality through Christ. But this reconciliation only occurs through Christ at
a time that is not ours and not yet. At the same time, this sense of futurity does not
lessen our present impetus to act morally. "[E]ven the most superficial estimate of
this 'vertical' dimension of experience suggests that the more 'horizontal' dimension
is implicit in everymoment of experience. Every action is bound both to its origins
[in God] and to its consequences [in history],. ..The completion of an act and a
responsibility always lies in an historical to-morrow and not merely in the eternal".14
Niebuhr, then, posits an eschatology which sees the reconciliation of all essential and
existential elements of life taking place in Christ.
11
Cornelison, The Christian Realism ofReinhold Niebuhr and the Political Theology ofJiirgen
Moltmann in Dialogue, p. 43.
12 Ibid.
13
Niebuhr, Faith and History, p. 170.
14
Niebuhr, Discerning the Signs ofthe Times, p. 93.
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Regardless of his overemphasis on vertical transcendence, Cornelison's
interpretation is helpful because it unknowingly highlights an important link between
Niebuhr and Barth. Recall that in the last chapter we mentioned the associations
between Niebuhr and Barth on the issue ofChristology. There I suggested that
though the two do not presume identical Christologies, they are at least similar when
it comes to the issue ofwho Christ is in relation to eschatology.
This is not just a point of triviality. Rather, it is important because it
demonstrates the influence on Niebuhr of a thinker widely hailed as indispensable to
twentieth century theology. Moreover, it illustrates that the chasm Niebuhr detects
with European theologians generally and Barth, particularly, on the issue of
eschatology may not be as great as Niebuhr believed. Because Barth's dialecticism
is representative of the kind of emphasis on vertical transcendence Cornelison finds
in Niebuhr, it is worth investigating what issues Niebuhr and Barth find in common.
7.4. Niebuhr and Barth on Eschatology
For Barth, Christ does not necessarily inhabit the same role of objective
reality that he does for Niebuhr. As John McDowell has noted about Richard
Roberts's interpretation of Barth's Christology, "Barth [for Roberts]... derives his
view of 'reality' from neither metaphysics nor.. .the social sciences".15 Instead,
"[Barth] develops [his view of reality] from God's Self-positing in Christ".16 That is,
according to Roberts, because God exists as wholly Other for Barth, God is likewise
wholly unknowable, except self-referentially. "God is known by God alone".17
Furthermore, ifGod exists as wholly Other, then there is a diminished sense of God's
immanence in present historical contexts because wholly Otherness is a state ofnon-
involvement. What results for Roberts, then, is the picture of Barth as a hopeless
theologian because, "[i]n eschatological terms, a failure to engage with [historical
contexts] could result in failure to incorporate all manner ofhuman hopes for the
contingent future into Christian hope, and/or to forsake participation in
15 John C. McDowell, Hope in Barth's Eschatology: Interrogations and Transformations Beyond
Tragedy, (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2000), p. 41. McDowell does not agree with Roberts's conclusion that
Barth interprets Christ "unrealistically", but he does affirm that Barth avoids the kind ofmetaphysical
enquiry that we have noted marked Niebuhr's realism.
16 Ibid.
17 Richard H. Roberts, "The Ideal and the Real in the Theology of Karl Barth", in Stephen Sykes and
Derek Holmes (eds.), New Studies in Theology I, (London: Duckworth, 1980), p. 165; cited in
McDowell, p. 42.
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transformatory practice in the present". In other words, Barth's dialecticism, in
Roberts's opinion, drives him to a position of at least moral ambiguity, if not moral
irresponsibility.
Niebuhr agrees with Roberts on this point, particularly with regard to what he
considers Barth's "undiscriminating neutrality" in reference to the issue of
totalitarian communism in Russia. Drawing attention to Barth's dialecticism,
Niebuhr writes that Barth's theology is "too 'eschatological' and too transcendent" to
be ofmuch practical use.19 In fact, Niebuhr thinks that Barth's "theological
framework is defective for wise political decisions.. .[because it] is too consistently
'eschatological' for the 'nicely calculated less and more' which must go into political
20decisions". This, to Niebuhr, is "an amateur intrusion of absolute religious
judgements into the endless relativities of the political order".21 In other words,
Barth's eschatology, to Niebuhr, is so far removed from existential concerns that "all
the distinctions which seem momentous on the 'earthly' level are dwarfed into
22
insignificance" from the realm of eschatology".
McDowell thinks that readings like Roberts's and Niebuhr's miss Barth's
eschatological point. Rather than emphasising God's transcendental detachment
from historical contexts Barth, according to McDowell, points to Christ as the one
who immanently transcends the divide between God and humans. God is thus,
through divine action in Christ, wholly related to humans at the level of their
existentiality. Independent objectivity is not the issue for Barth; God's involvement
with humanity through Christ is. There is a sense of futurity that is important to
Barth's eschatology but, according to McDowell, this futurity does not exist outside
of human contexts. Instead, the future already exists in the present alongside, and
because of, the actuality of Christ, who has come into the present, and who is himself
the end, the Omega of history. Because "redemption has come in Christ alone... [it]
remains an eschatological concept (i.e., futurefor us)".23 But this does not mean that
Barth disregards the present, a fear Niebuhr harbours with regard to any discussion
18
McDowell, p. 44..
19
Niebuhr, "Why is Barth Silent on Hungary?" in Essays in Applied Christianity, p. 184.
20
Ibid, p. 186.
21
Niebuhr, "The Moral and Political Judgements of Christians", in Christianity and Crisis, 19 (July 6,
1959): 101, cited in Biggar, The Hastening That Waits, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 23, n. 81.
22
Niebuhr, "Why is Barth Silent on Hungary?", p. 184.
23 McDowell, p. 56.
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that involves eschatology. "Talk of the presence of the Future [i.e., Christ],
therefore, does not mean that the eschatological Future is being emptied of
significance, or time; it refers instead to Christ's personal presence".24 In other
words, God remains separate from us transcendentally, but does still come to us
9 S
immanently in the person of Christ. It is in this regard that Barth understands Christ
as the Eschatos, the "last" One in whom is grounded the obligation to act morally in
the first place. Thus,
Barth does not intend to speak prematurely about the details of the
content of the Future, but rather grounds Christian hope's practice
'realistically' in Christ; shapes hope's direction by what hope knows
of Christ as Eschatos\ and sustains its confidence and provides its
momentum during hope's critically interrogative and transformative
performance for society's humanisation, in the time of eschatological
provisionality.26
In other words, Barth's eschatology avoids the kinds of concerns Niebuhr has
with regard to talk about eschatology becoming too "other-worldly". This is so
precisely because Barth grounds his understanding of eschatology in a disposition
which is both "this-worldly" and which seeks to understand the obligation of the
moral agent to act in present historical contexts under the aegis of a future-oriented
Christological eschatology that is immanently present among us. In this respect,
because of the claim that the future comes into the present, Barth's eschatology is
founded on a Christological emphasis similar to the one accorded to Niebuhr in these
last two chapters. That is, Barth's emphasis on Christ as "future" can also be
understood as what I have here called Niebuhr's "essential" Christ, the Christ of
faith who comes to us from afar.
Despite the fact that Niebuhr ultimately thinks of Barth's eschatology as
being too involved with the absurdities of otherworldliness, he does acknowledge
that Barth's eschatology at least begins heading in the right direction precisely
24 Ibid, p. 55. Underlining mine; italics McDowell's.
25 Cf. chapter five, pp.
26 McDowell, p. 56. McDowell's use of "realism" here does not mean the same thing as Niebuhr's
use of that term as it has been employed throughout this thesis. What McDowell appears to mean is
not that Barth locates hope in an objective, independent reality (though he surely is not denying that
Barth does this, either), but that the Christology intrinsic to Barth's eschatology means that the moral
agent can ground his or her hope in Christ who is immanently present in the socio-political "realities"
of everyday existence.
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because of the note of realism that Barth sounds and that McDowell highlights. As
Niebuhr writes of Barth's eschatology, "Let us acknowledge with gratitude that we
have here no new escape from the world of reality. The true Christian according to
Barth continues to look upon the brutalities ofhistory with wholesome contrition.
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He knows that he is a part of a world and that his sins have helped to create it".
Nevertheless, Niebuhr thinks that though Barth's eschatology is well-founded, Barth
ultimately misunderstands the application of a realistic ethic to eschatology. "I still
insist", says Niebuhr, "that if the Barthians gave themselves more vigorously to the
social task they would not be quite so pessimistic about history, because vigorous
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moral activity creates its own eschatology". This is the exact reading that
McDowell seeks to correct by suggesting that Barth's eschatology is only intelligible
when Christ is interpreted as the Eschatos (with the essential Christ existentially
present) and eschatology is not some effort at end-times conjecture, but is related
specifically to historical contexts, and thus gives us a basis for hope grounded with
Christ presently and in the future.
When interpreted in this way, the troubles Niebuhr finds with Barth's
eschatology are alleviated. Moreover, eschatological reflections that emphasise the
importance ofwho Christ is for us now invite the opportunity to reflect more
seriously on the nature ofwhat kind of eschatology is apropos to a realism such as
Niebuhr's which seeks to take seriously the existential nature ofChrist's presence
without losing any of its essential, or metaphysical import. Let us consider how such
an interpretation of eschatology relates to Christian realism and how it is instructive
for better understanding the ways in which Niebuhr's Christian realism is ultimately
a hopeful ethic.
7.5. Niebuhr and Eschatological "Unity"
McDowell's interpretation of Barth's eschatology as grounded in the realities
ofhuman existence, yet hopefully bound to Christ's essential and existential natures
is a helpful corrective for two reasons. First, it points to the similarities Niebuhr and
Barth share on the issue of eschatology's importance for present historical contexts,
especially when understood Christologically. Second, and more importantly, it
highlights the fact that for Niebuhr, eschatology is relevant only on the condition that
27
Niebuhr, "Barth—Apostle of the Absolute" in Essays in Applied Christianity, p. 146.
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eschatological reflections remain bound to historical exigencies. Simply put,
Niebuhr is only interested in an eschatology that is incarnated, that is "made flesh".
But this does not mean that the metaphysical concerns of realism are lost in
the wake of the more practical demands of everyday existence. On the contrary,
realist metaphysics is the lens through which those practical concerns are
understood. Not only that, but theologically realistic metaphysics offer the basis for
a hopeful realism, at least in Niebuhr's articulation of Christian realism. In this
regard, realist metaphysics offer a "unity" of essential and existential concerns. As
Lovin notes, "The meaning ofmoral life, like the meaning of life as a whole, is
9Q
eschatological. It is known in hope, but not reducible to theory". In other words,
life points toward an eschatological end, a telos, in and by which we understand the
meaning of life. This end is not yet, and therefore can only be understood in hope.
Thus, for the realist, moral obligations in the contexts ofhuman existence are
understood because of the practical outworking of realist metaphysics in our
everyday lives. But for the theological realist, the unity of essential and existential
concerns is an "eschatological unity" and is found in the essential and existential
Christ who is altogether transcendent and immanent. Moreover, as with Barth,
eschatology points us to a hopeful ethic which is to be understood in the reality of
human existence.
"More needs to be said", Lovin continues, "about how this eschatological
TO
unity is anticipated 'in concrete life and human action'...". The extension of that
discussion is exactly what these final chapters seek to accomplish: bringing together
the essential and existential components ofNiebuhrian realism, and seeking to
"know them in hope". What I propose is that we can better attend to the hope that
comes from Niebuhr's eschatology by reading Niebuhrian realism through the lens
of "ontological eschatology", a task to which we will turn after introducing a
contemporary thinker to help frame the discussion.
7.5.1. A Contemporary Reading ofHope
Charles Matthewes's creative (and amusing) quote at the heading of this
chapter confers on Niebuhr the often used appellation of a "hopeless" theologian.
28
Ibid, p. 148.
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Lovin, Christian Realism and the New Realities, p. 191.
30 Ibid.
198
Matthewes recognises his association with others who similarly critique Niebuhr
when he notes that "Niebuhr's work is often criticized for exploiting the Christian
faith to underpin a kind of 'muscular' involvement in society, for ends that are never
explicitly articulated but that seem to be fundamentally conservative and stabilizing,
11
or 'realistic'". That criticism is justified, Matthewes thinks, because Niebuhr's
"account ofhope seems to support that interpretation; for in some way Niebuhr's
account is really about providing a kind of high-ampere yet moderating motivation
for men-in-power—as he put it, 'The final wisdom of life requires, not the
annulment of incongruity but the achievement of serenity within and above it'".
That is, on Matthewes's reading ofNiebuhr, hope is palliative; it counters our
inclinations to despair in the face of the brutalities of existence and bolsters our
capacity to cope with the fact that "we are men and not God". But hope, according
to Matthewes, serves no social function for Niebuhr, offers no basis of "political
mobilization" because it provides nothing more than a "political anesthetic, a
societal pressure-release valve.. .".34 It thus palliates the problems of human
existence but, as with all anaesthetics, this kind of hope is only temporary.
What Niebuhr intends by the statement Matthewes quotes, however, is that
all of our efforts at involvement in society are attenuated—not strengthened—by an
optimistic (and ill-founded) resolve which fails to recognise the limits of the self
within history, rather than inculcating a "humble acceptance of those limits".35 This
is the hope of the sentimentalist from chapter six. In fact, Niebuhr follows the
statement quoted by Matthewes with the declaration that "[njothing that is worth
31
Matthewes, p. 239.
32 Ibid. Citations to Niebuhr from The Irony ofAmerican History, p. 54. It is not clear what
Matthewes means when he refers to Niebuhr's "account of hope". Niebuhr did not give an account of
hope in the sense of a systematic treatment, the manner ofwhich one would expect from a theologian.
Moreover, his references to hope in Irony ofAmerican History are directed precisely at the kind of
"general liberal hope of redeeming history" that he had similarly criticised with Rauschenbusch's
social gospel. Cf., pp. 56-61.
33 Matthewes's reading ofNiebuhr's as a "muscular" Christianity is not altogether dissimilar from
Hauerwas's claim (particularly since both Matthewes and Hauerwas draw on The Irony ofAmerican
History) that Niebuhr understands his assignment to provide a theological justification for "making
America work". See Hauerwas, A BetterHope, p. 29. Hauerwas's criticism, though, is part of his
larger critique of the assimilation of specifically theological ethics into more general "religious"
ethics, and the tendency of religious ethics to be based on philosophical accounts of ethics. Cf., Ibid,
pp. 58-64. On the other hand, Matthewes provides what, for all intents, seems to be as much of a
philosophical as theological account of ethics. Perhaps for this reason, though he is critical of
Niebuhr, Matthewes nevertheless offers a helpful framework through which to understand the
eschatological nature ofNiebuhrian realism.
34 Ibid, p. 238.
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doing can be achieved in our lifetime; therefore we must be saved by hope". In
other words, our lives presently can only be ordered by the placement of our hopes
in that which is impossible, that which stands with the transcendent essence ofGod.
Nevertheless, Matthewes is correct that on his (Milbankian)37 reading of
Niebuhr on social involvement and its attendant hopes, "[Niebuhr's] desire for
'serenity' can sound dangerously Stoic, confusing hope with a wilfulness that is not
■7 O
really hope at all". But this is only the case ifone reads Niebuhr to mean that hope
remains palliative and offers no reason for the moral agent to act confidently (but
still realistically) for social redemption because of his or her assurance of the
immanent love ofGod-in-Christ, which is, after all, the basis for the Christian
realist's social ethic. If, on the other hand, Niebuhr's realism is read as the basis for
theological hope, as I think it ought to be, we can see that there are actually
similarities between the hope latent in Christian realism and Matthewes's account of
hope. This is particularly so with regard to eschatology, as we will now see.
7.5.2. Niebuhr andMatthewes on Ontological Eschatology
His criticisms ofwhat he understands to be unsubstantiated hope in
Niebuhr's realism notwithstanding, Matthewes offers compelling reflections on
hopeful eschatology which are helpful for better understanding Niebuhr's own
eschatological approach and which, as with Barth, carefully avoid the kinds of
concerns about eschatology that Niebuhr had.
The eschatology that Matthewes and Niebuhr share I will here refer to as
ontological eschatology (which will be defined below). I am not unmindful of the
fact that from the mid-twentieth century onward there is a tradition, particularly in
Continental philosophy, focused on ontology and eschatology, which defines
ontology as the "being-in-the-world" as a condition for the eschatological
•7 Q
"possibility" of hope. Matthewes's and Niebuhr's accounts, as we are about to see,
are not dramatically different from this interpretation, since any ontological
35 Niebuhr, The Irony ofAmerican History, p. 55.
36
Ibid, p. 54.
371 do not mean here to imply that Matthewes is necessarily "radically orthodox", but that the charge
of Stoicism is strikingly similar to Milbank's that was discussed in chapter five. However, Matthewes
is certainly (critically) sympathetic with Milbank, particularly on their readings ofAugustine's
importance for pluralistic social engagement. See Matthewes, pp. 121-129.
38
Matthewes, p. 241.
39 Cf., Chris Thornhill, "Utopian Emancipation: Bloch", in Simon Glendinning (ed.), The Edinburgh
Encyclopedia ofContinental Philosophy, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999): 483.
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eschatology is at root about social hermeneutics; that is, it is about reflection on the
import of ultimate hopes in the midst existential concerns. However, a more
theological account of ontological eschatology seeks the kind ofunity referred to
above by Lovin as an eschatological "unity". But it is an eschatological unity that
endeavours to understand the transcendent ultimate hopes for the realist within the
social contexts of that realist. As such—and in keeping with the themes of these last
two chapters—this kind of ontological eschatology is centred on the person of
Christ, rather than solely on the individual in his or her social contexts, and is as
much about the future (properly understood, as we will see), as it is about the
present.
But this does not mean that concern for the self is overlooked for, as Niebuhr
notes, "[ajbsolute self-negation is impossible because the self is never in rational
control of all the unconscious stirrings of selfhood".40 Instead, centring on the
person of Christ means that the self is graciously able to forget itself, which provides
"ultimate redemption from self-regard [salvation, for Niebuhr] by the infusion.. .of
divine grace into the dynamics ofhuman selfhood".41 That is, an ontological
eschatology which focuses on the person ofChrist embodies the kind of emphasis on
God's immanence that, as has been stressed thus far, is so important for
understanding Niebuhr's realism because the individual knows herself by forgetting
herself in light of God's immanence. She, in other words, loses her life and thus
finds it (Matt. 16:25). Moreover, a theological approach to ontological eschatology
mirrors the kinds of concerns addressed in this thesis: how the objective nature of
morality, identified with the transcendent nature ofGod, is immanently present in
human existence, and how it serves as the basis of hope for the realist.
7.6. Ontological Eschatology
Matthewes begins his eschatological enquiry which leads to a hopeful
theology for the Christian by asking the kinds of questions which we have thus far
asked ofNiebuhr's Christian realism: "What does it mean to say that we live in
hope? And what are the theological preconditions and implications of a life so
lived?"42 He answers:
40
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In hope, we see the world as revelatory of more than its immediate,
and superficial, self-presentation. In hope we affirm our confidence
in God's sovereignty, and our conviction that God will be all in all.
In hope we see the world as intelligible only as God's story—not
properly a 'world', with the spurious posture of autonomy that the
word conveys, but rather as Creation, an event, irrepressibly
expressing a self-transcending reference, the act of a loving Creator.
We see the world as significant...and we live in the world...in
hope...by treating the world as not exhaustively immanently and
immediately significant, but as crucially transcendentally and
eschatologically significant.43
In other words, to hope theologically means to look toward the end ofhistory
for the meaning ofhistory, and to understand that God is immanent in, but also
transcendent in, history. Niebuhr agrees with Matthewes's presentation of revelation
as a portrait of God who stands eschatologically at the end of creation's history,
which is "the story ofGod":
The form [of revelation] is that of a story, an event through which the
meaning of the whole of history is apprehended and the specific
nature of the divine sovereignty of history is revealed. It is presented
as the last in a series of God's 'mighty acts', and one which has a
particularly definitive character. Whatever may happen in subsequent
ages nothing can occur which will shake the faith of a true believer in
God's sovereignty over all history... .The revelatory power of this
whole story.. .requires that it be viewed not as a spectator might view
an ordinary drama.. ..[The drama] require[s]that it be apprehended by
man in the total unity of his personality and not merely by his
44
reason.
In short, it is not until the "end" of the revelatory story that we can know the
meaning of life in its entirety. The "total unity of personality" is Niebuhr's
expression for the combination of the essential with the existential person. As with
the Christ of faith and the Christ of history, the human is a creature whose essence
stands ultimately with God, but who is at the same time a finite creature. The
Christian realist thus acknowledges that her being resides with God, but that this
does not absolve her of responsibility for citizenship in her current contexts. Only
once this acknowledgement is made does the revelation ofGod-in-Christ make
sense, and give life its meaning. "[Revelation] will not touch [the human] essentially
43 Ibid.
44
Niebuhr, Faith and History, pp. 159-160.
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if he does not recognize that its form as revelation challenges him as a rational
though finite creature who is incapable of giving meaning to the total dimension of
his individual and collective history.. ,".45 This, then, is the definition of ontological
eschatology as it will be used for the remainder of the chapter: the acknowledgement
of God-in-Christ as transcendent over, and immanent within history as a reflection of
the humanity's own essential being-with-God and existential citizenship in present
historical contexts. Put briefly, ontological eschatology is about the future being
brought into the present. It is incarnate eschatology concerned with "life in the
world".46
There are several points which form the foundation of ontological
eschatology and which Matthewes addresses. For the sake of the present argument,
though, I will only address the most important of those.
Matthewes offers an Augustinian understanding of citizenship in the world.
He notes that life in the world today is typically lived at cross purposes and that "we
are living so far beyond our means that our present behavior threatens to consume
our future".47 The antidote to this despairing analysis, Matthewes thinks, is to revisit
the Augustinian distinction between "using the world" and "loving the world". He
recognises that the terminology of "using the world" today is cause for unease
among many people because one's use of the world demonstrates a putative
willingness to be unconcerned with the injustices of the world, or to be "wantonly
rapacious" of the world's resources. Those who criticise the notion ofusing the
world do so on the basis that it results in an "otherworldliness" of the kind that
Niebuhr criticises in his appraisals of eschatology. That is, users of the world
manipulate the world's resources and citizens because their concern is not for this
world, but for a world that is not yet known; a Utopia.
These critics counter the notion ofusing the world with "loving the world"
which essentially means "a respectful recognition of and sensitivity to limits, a
recognition that human aims must be restrained by some absolute boundaries, that
human desires may simply not be justifiably realizable".49 This sounds very much
45
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like Niebuhr's realism because of the emphasis on living within one's limits and
recognising that there are objective boundaries to human existence which are put in
place by God. In fact, the denial of limits and boundaries is precisely why Niebuhr
thinks that Western society existed in a state of "political and social confusion" in
the years following World War II. "The interpretation of our present disorder",
Niebuhr writes, "is usually.. .involved in the error of assuming that it is possible to
define the order of God in detailed and specific laws and rules ofjustice". It is true
that "[tjhere are basic conditions set by God to which human life must conform. But
these cannot be identified with any particular social or political organization".50
In light of this, then, Niebuhr might plausibly be read to be suggesting
something similar to those who advocate "loving the world" in the way Matthewes
has described the term. The problem with this disposition, as Matthewes notes, is
that
[s]uch claims echo ancient Stoic demands that we live in accord with
nomos, and that such life primarily involves a practice of restraint on
our part. But this is wrong. Of course we should recognize the
propriety of limits, of basic commandments that must not be violated,
basic covenants that cannot be broken. But God's desire for humans
is not fundamentally proscriptive, concerned with setting limits.51
On this point Niebuhr agrees with Matthewes. As Niebuhr notes, "The
natural limits of geography, language, and ethnic affinity [limits Niebuhr thinks of as
determined by God] always remain as one factor of cohesion in the human
community; but they are determinative in the negative sense. Positively the law of
human existence for man as free spirit, who transcends natural limitations, is the law
52of love". Moreover, says Niebuhr, "[t]he transcendent perspective of religion
makes all men our brothers and nullifies the divisions, by which nature, climate,
geography and the accidents of history divide the human family". In other words,
Niebuhr (with Matthewes) thinks that though there are natural restrictions that
humans cannot transcend, they are nevertheless essentially free creatures who do
50
Niebuhr, "God's Design and the Present Disorder of Civilization" in Faith and Politics, p. 105.
51
Matthewes, p. 77. It is interesting that Matthewes offers the same criticism of those who advocate
"loving the world" as Milbank does ofNiebuhr's realism. While Matthewes is not speaking
specifically about Niebuhr in this instance, he is, as noted above, critical ofNiebuhr on the issue of
hope. Nevertheless, there are similarities between the two thinkers that are worth considering.
52 "God's Design and the Present Disorder of Civilization", p. 105.
53 Niebuhr, MoralMan and Immoral Society, p. 71.
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operate under a law, but that the law is the law of love. The problem is that
"[m]an.. .always is contradicting and defying the law of love",54 which results in
misuse of the world's citizens and resources.
Matthewes offers an Augustinian critique of those who would have us love,
rather than use the world by suggesting that the distinction Augustine draws between
the use and love of the world drives not a schism between the functions of using and
loving an object but, in fact, draws these two functions closer together. "[W]e
should seek not fundamentally to limit our desires, but to have them reoriented to
their properly infinite end. We should care about the world not more, but in a
different way than we currently do. Our loves must be not restrained but
reoriented",55 What does drive the schism between these functions is the misuse of
love. "To know what a man's disposition is in regard to a particular object, we need
to know not only whether he 'loves' it or not but also, or rather, in what way he
'loves' it. For the love of something for its own sake.. .as the finally satisfying
quelling of one's longing is very different from the 'love' of something desired as a
means to something else".56 That is to say that the proper love and use of the world
can only be achieved when one orient's one's love to its proper ends in the first
place, and only then can the functions ofusing and loving be understood as
complementary.
7.7. Reoriented Love
This reorientation of love takes on a distinctively ontological (and existential)
character, and two ideas that have featured prominently in the chapters so far serve
to inform the nature of this ontology. The first of these is the notion that, according
to Matthewes, love itself undergirds the basis of an Augustinian ontological
reorientation of love. Human existence, that is, "creation[,] is a work of love, and
[it] shows the marks of love—so much so that love is itself the fundamental
ontological truth about creation".57 This idea is what Niebuhr associates with what
he calls the "law of love" which, as noted in chapter three, is the natural law. Not
only this but, more specifically, love is the basis of human nature in this
54
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interpretation of an Augustinian ontology. "Love.. .is the 'root' of the soul, and
when the soul is properly oriented in the love that is caritas, it is a unifying force,
equally for our own self-integrity, our relationship with God, and our relationship
58with our neighbour". In Matthewes's reading of Augustine, when love is "used"
properly, it orients the individual properly to God, neighbour and self.
Love, of course, commences its reorientation in the self and go forth from
there. In this sense, "[t]he egocentric perspective may be where we start from in this
fallen life, and we may be generally teleological in our behavior.. ..While we are
entrusted with the care of ourselves in a special way, not only are genuine self-
concern and genuine other regard compatible, but the former even requires the
latter".59 In other words, the self cannot be disregarded in consideration of love. The
self is as much a part of a loving relationship as that which is the object of love.
Without the self, love cannot exist. Niebuhr agrees, but he sees a danger in self-
idolatry in a too-absolute formulation of this doctrine. "Augustine", says Niebuhr,
"wants us to love the neighbor for the sake of God, which may be a correct
formulation; but he wants us to prove the genuineness of our love of God in the love
of the neighbour, or by leading him to God". The problem with this, as Niebuhr sees
it, is that "it does not answer another important question: when I love a person or a
community do I love myself in them or do I truly love them?"60 Here we revisit the
aforementioned issue of vertical transcendence. To Niebuhr's mind, only the Christ
of faith is capable of loving sacrificially {agape), which is exemplified in his death
on the cross, "a scandal in the field of rational religion".61 In this sense, the vertical
transcendence of God over all ofhistory's contingencies emphasises the human
tendency toward idolatry because nothing can stand in starker contrast to the nature
ofhuman sin than the perfect love of God-in-Christ. But the recognition of this
actually inspires hope in the human. As Niebuhr says, . .Christ and the Cross
reveal not only the possibilities but the limits of human finitude in order that a more
ultimate hope may arise from the contrite recognition of those limits".62 In other
58
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words, once we recognise our limits, our hope can rightly be placed in God as the
one who overcomes those limits for us through love. The recognition of our limits
paradoxically frees us from those limits when we understand that Christ is the one
who breaks these limits on our behalf.
Daniel Rice observes that Niebuhr's "view [is] that both love, which is the
law of life, and self-love, which is a violation of that law, speak.. .radically and truly
about the heights and depths of existence...". Moreover, "Niebuhr saw the vertical
dimension of sin between the self and God in terms of idolatry.. ,".63 In other words,
when the self tries to love God through others, its temptation is to usurp God and
love the self instead, resulting in idolatry; thus, Niebuhr's concern about loving the
other as an expression simply of loving the selfwrit large.
Niebuhr's reading ofAugustine, I think, misses the point here.64 What
Niebuhr does not consider is that Augustine is mindful of the fact that the improper
orientation of love leads to the problem of inordinate love of the self—either by
seeking to love the self in the other, or by replacing God with the object of one's
love—which is idolatry.65 This is precisely the problem Augustine addresses when,
in the Confessions, he writes of the despair he suffered following the death ofhis
close friend; despair that resulted from the improper orientation of his love. "The
reason why that grief had penetrated me so easily and deeply was that I had poured
out my soul.. .loving a person sure to die as if he would never die. The greatest
source of repair and restoration was the solace of other friends, with whom I loved
what I loved as a substitute for you.. ,".66 But Augustine is not actually addressing
the problem that Niebuhr thinks he is. The problem with Niebuhr's interpretation of
Augustine is that Niebuhr assumes Augustine to be speaking about love idealistically
when, in point of fact, for Augustine
there is nothing idealistic in the word [love]. We have not leaped
with one bound to that love which 'bears all things, believes all
things'....To invoke that love prematurely has often been a
63 Daniel F. Rice, Reinhold Niebuhr and John Dewey: An American Odyssey, (Albany: State
University ofNew York Press, 1993), pp. 236-237.
64 To be fair, Niebuhr does think that love is the basis of human nature, not egoism. See An
Interpretation ofChristian Ethics, p. 39. He just does not view love in the same "premoral" fashion
as Augustine; it is always already tainted by the original sin ofpride.
65 Cf. Oliver O'Donovan, The Problem ofSelf-Love in St. Augustine, (Eugene: Wipf and Stock
Publishers, 2006), pp. 29-32.
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temptation in Christian reflection on society, signaling...a
forgetfulness of the sting of sin. For Augustine the love that forms
communities is undetermined with respect to its object, and so also
f # ii« 67undetermined with respect to its moral quality....
In other words, what Augustine intends when he speaks of love is that love is
simply an ontological reality, without which we cannot understand our relationships
/-o
to another person because we do not know what it means to love (or, hate) that
person. No moral value is accorded to love on these terms. At least not yet.
7.7.1. Resolving Idolatry
This is not to suggest that idolatry and sinfulness are never potential
problems in Augustine's conception of the use of love; they are.69 But the way those
problems are addressed is through the second necessary disposition regarding the
reorientation of love: the recognition that the function of love is related to God, who
is both transcendent and immanent. Matthewes notes that the "dialectic of divine
immanence and transcendence so basic to [Augustine's] theology and
ontology.. .serves at the metaphysical link between the basically theological
language of 'sin as idolatry' and the.. .language of 'sin as disordered loves'".70 That
is, God's transcendence and immanence (which, as we have observed, occur in the
"Christ of faith" and the "Christ ofhistory", respectively) provide the lens through
which we can properly know what it means to be idolatrous or sinful. On the one
hand, when we try to take the place of the Christ of faith as lord, we are idolatrous.
On the other, when we fail to love God by loving our neighbours as the Christ of
history did, we are sinful. In either case, this dialecticism reminds us that "Christ is
what we ought to be and also what we cannot be".71
67 Oliver O'Donovan, Common Objects ofLove: Moral Reflection and the Shaping ofCommunity,
(Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2002), p. 22.
8 As O'Donovan notes, "[EJvery determination of love implies a corresponding hatred. For a
community to focus its love on this constellation of goods is to withdraw its love from that". Ibid.
69 This is particularly the case in Augustine's famous distinction between the founding of the two
cities ofGod and humans, which "have been created by two loves: that is, the earthly by love of self
extending even to contempt of God, and the heavenly by love ofGod extending to contempt of self'.
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An ontological eschatology, then, requires first that the moral agent
understands love as the "law" on which all human nature is based; and second, that
the acceptance of the dialectic of divine transcendence and immanence prevents that
law from perverting love into the idolatry that Niebuhr worries so much about. "The
dialectic of transcendence and immanence", in other words, "serves as a critical tool
against all forms of idolatry, both those that implant God too immanently within the
world [by loving others in place of God], and those that remove God too
79
transcendently from it [by replacing God with the self]".
This Augustinian appraisal of citizenship I have called ontological
eschatology for two reasons. "Ontological" because it regards love as the basis of
7T
human nature and relationships between humans. It is ontological, in other words,
because it understands love as the very ground of being. Moreover, love exists
prima facie without the distinctions for what kinds of love are involved in those
relationships which make up our relationships with others. Love only becomes
idolatrous or sinful as it is oriented improperly; as it "goes out" from us and is
directed toward many ends. This is why Niebuhr astutely observes that "[t]he
weaknesses of the spirit of love in solving larger and more complex problems
become increasingly apparent as one proceeds from ordinary relations between
individuals to the life of social groups".74
This Augustinian appraisal is also "eschatological" because it is concerned
with the ends to which our love is directed. In a properly oriented eschatology, we
understand the "reality" of Christ through the other person because our love is given
over to Christ by our love for the other person. It is Christ, not the other person, who
is the "end" to whom we devote our love, but we can only understand this
orientation of love through our existential contexts. Thus,"[t]he reality that we grasp
existentially.. .is the otherperson, who is at once our door to ontology and to
ethics.. ..to grasp the reality of the other person is to grasp that there is a reality apart
12
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from ourself [realism]; so the other person is a 'universal horizon'".75 That is,
1f\
devoting our love to our neighbours (or, our enemies) is the way that we apprehend
that we are known in love by God and, thus, that we know that "God is love". But
because love can be devoted to more ends than other humans only (i.e., to a cause, to
a possession, to a nation, etc.), in order for that orientation to occur, the realist's love
must be directed to the proper end, who is, as observed above, Christ; the last "one",
or the "Eschatos".77
This is what I take "eschatological unity" to mean for the Christian realist.
As Niebuhr says, "[t]he unity of God is not static, but potent and creative. God is,
therefore, love. The conscious impulse ofunity between life and life is the most
adequate symbol of his nature. All life stands under responsibility to this loving
no
will". In other words, we understand God's transcendent love (in Christ) as
immanently present in our existential contexts, and through the unity of love we
achieve with others. This love demands of us moral responsibility. Before moving
on, we need to consider the "eschatology" of ontological eschatology.
7.8. Projecting Hope: Futurity and Christian Realism
In the years following the conclusion ofWorld War II, the voice Niebuhr had
given to Christian realism and, for that matter, the neo-orthodoxy ofNiebuhr's
contemporaries began to be ostracised among those who posited a more radical
assessment of a Christian social ethic for relevance social contexts. This was
particularly true in the case of liberation theologians from Latin America.79 The logic
among those who were dissatisfied was that their predecessors, the theologians of the
mid-twentieth century, had not offered an adequate social ethic which gave way to
hope in their respective neo-orthodox theologies. While neo-orthodoxy provided
75
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insightful accounts ofhuman nature, of biblical hermeneutics and of the abiding
importance of Christian doctrines in the midst of an increasingly technological and
scientifically-minded world, to the minds of liberation theologians, it failed to
provide an insightful reason for hope in the present. To this point, A.J. Conyers
notes that in the 1960s,
[i]t was becoming apparent to a growing sector of the theological
world that neo-orthodoxy, while releasing the biblical message from
its often calamitous bondage to historical criticism, was not wholly
capable of expressing itself then in relation to the concrete historical
community of men except through the medium of a privatized and
timeless religion. It seemed that to the extent it abandoned its
moorings in concrete historicity it likewise became inapplicable to its
concrete social and historical context.80
In other words, to the liberation theologians—neo-orthodoxy in general, and
Christian realism in particular—was ensnared in the tortuous habit of "moral
reflection" instead of the more practical undertaking of "moral deliberation"; it was
concerned more with the evaluation of "facts" than the contemplation of "acts".81 As
Conyers notes, "[i]f there is a common point of departure for these [liberation]
theologians, it consists in the conviction that [the neo-orthodox], whatever the merits
of the lines of reconstruction they undertook, failed to preserve the dynamic, world-
R9
shattering character of Christian eschatology". In a word, liberationists found their
neo-orthodox counterparts "hopeless" because they thought that the neo-orthodox
offered no substantive eschatology which could provide a basis for Christian hope.
An adequate eschatology to the liberation theologians was one which sought
to interpret the realities of injustice in any given social context in light of the fact
that those injustices were not representative of the kinds of contexts in which
O-l
humans are intended to live. The gospel, they believed, promised the perfect reign
80 A.J. Conyers, God, Hope, andHistory: Jurgen Moltmann and the Christian Concept ofHistory,
(Macon: Mercer University Press, 1988), p. 50.
81 For more on this, see O'Donovan, Common Objects ofLove, pp. 1-9.
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ofChrist in the future, but also in the present. It was, in this sense, that theirs was a
vision of social utopianism—stressing the existential elements of human life—which
they believed that neo-orthodoxy, and Christian realism like it, failed to provide.
Theirs was also, though, a vision not entirely distinct from the eschatology of the
European theologians from which the liberation theologians sought so vigorously to
dissociate; particularly the ubiquitous "realised eschatology" of their time period.
Due to the limitations of this project we will not here consider the history of
realised eschatology, which was given a contemporary interpretation by C. H. Dodd
during the middle of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, it is a helpful way of
thinking about eschatology's relationship to the way hope has been described here.
Briefly stated, realised eschatology argues that the kingdom of God,
actualised in the person of Christ, has come with the "Christ of history" and will
come again in the "Christ of faith". This may sound amenable to the account we
have given on Christian realism's hope thus far, but Niebuhr himself is actually
critical of accounts of realised eschatology: "The modern theory of 'realized
eschatology' according to which the coming of Christ effectively fulfils Messianic
prophecies and reduces the promises of a second coming in the New Testament to
insignificance", Niebuhr tells us, "must be challenged. The strain of thought
embodied in the New Testament hope of a 'second coming' is indispensable for the
Christian interpretation of history and for a true understanding ofNew Testament
thought".85
The problem, as Niebuhr sees it, is that reflections in the vein of realized
eschatologies fail to account for the basic message ofNew Testament eschatology:
that the Christ of faith is coming again. Niebuhr is not here genuflecting to a
literalism of the sort he at other points chastises. Literal interpretations of scripture
have the unfortunate, if ironic, tendency of seeing the trees, but not the forest, a fact
ofwhich Niebuhr is well aware. Niebuhr thinks this is especially true with regard to
the issue of Christ's "second coming". "We are therefore deceivers, yet true, when
84 For an account of the interactions and eventual rupture that took place between Latin American
theologians and their European counterparts, see Jiirgen Moltmann's Experiences in Theology: Ways
and Forms ofChristian Theology, translated by Margaret Kohl, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000),
pp. 217-220. See also Moltmann's important letter to Latin American theologian, Jose Miguez
Bonino, "An Open Letter to Jose Miguez Bonino" in Christianity and Crisis 36 (1976): 57-63, which
was largely responsible for kicking off a decade of discontent between the two sides.
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we insist that the Christ who died on the cross will come again.. ..We do not believe
that the human enterprise will have a tragic conclusion; but the ground of our hope
lies not in human capacity but in divine power and mercy, in the character of the
o/r
ultimate reality, which carries the human enterprise". That is, the point of a second
coming is not tied to some kind of divine foretelling, but to the hope that is placed in
Christ. But disregarding the central message of Christ's return is only one part of the
problem for realised eschatology, according to Niebuhr.
The other, more significant, issue with realised eschatology is that it
misinterprets what history is. "The full implication of the double idea that the
07
'Kingdom of God has come' and that it is 'coming' is that history is an interim".
History, in other words, exists both after Christ and anticipates Christ's return, but it
is not accorded any real meaning of its own in the time between. The problem with
this is, to Niebuhr's mind, the person of Christ is relegated to a position of
irrelevance. "In thus conceiving history after Christ as an interim between the
disclosure of its true meaning and the fulfillment of that meaning, between the
revelation of divine sovereignty and the full establishment of that sovereignty, a
continued element of inner contradiction in history is accepted as its perennial
00
characteristic". The fleeting character of history—that is, history made up of the
absurdities of human existence—takes on a more permanent nature when one
interprets present history as an interim because it fails to account for both the
transcendent and immanent Christ of hope. History is meaningful, but it stands to
lose its meaning when the immediate context is considered as only an interim and
OQ
not as part and parcel to the whole ofhistory's meaning, which is found in Christ.
Indeed, it is Christ who, for Niebuhr, resolves the problem of the loss of history's
meaning, and who saves us "by hope":
[The] fact of death threatens life with meaninglessness unless man is
'saved by hope' and understands life in such a way that neither his
involvement in history nor his transcendence over it destroys the
meaning of life. To understand life and history according to the
Niebuhr, "As Deceivers, Yet True", p. 24. Italics mine.
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meaning given it by Christ is to be able to survey the chaos of any
present or the peril of any future, without sinking into despair. It is to
have a vantage point from which one may realize that momentary
securities are perennially destroyed both by the vicissitudes of history
and by the fact of death which stands over all history.90
That is to say that the immanent Christ fills the lacuna left in realised
eschatology's "interim" of history by according a certain viewpoint from which all
future and present historical exigencies are interpreted. There is, then, no part of
human history that is lost in meaninglessness or despair because it is the reality of
Christ who gives both meaning and hope to human existence.
I have made mention of the relationship between Christian realism, neo-
orthodoxy and liberation theology precisely because I think that the criticisms the
liberation theologians levelled at the neo-orthodox theologians—and, by extension,
Christian realism—for their eschatological viewpoints highlight the important areas
ofNiebuhr's thought that we have been discussing for the past two chapters; namely,
the role that the Christ of faith and Christ ofhistory play as a foundation of hope in
Niebuhrian realism.
My point in this, though, has been to stress that Niebuhr, like liberation
theologians, is critical of realised eschatology, but for different reasons. Whereas the
liberation theologians thought of their (mostly) European counterparts as focusing
too much on the futurity inseparable from eschatological discussions, which was
evident in realised eschatology, Niebuhr thinks of realised eschatology's focus as
improperly construing futurity. But he does not want to discard the importance of
futurity all together. Rather, he thinks that the hope found in the notion of Christ's
"return" is the capstone to any eschatology which can help us give meaning to
present historical circumstances. The irony, which is no doubt appreciated by the
Niebuhrian realist, is that Niebuhr here is critical of realised eschatology not because
it is too future-oriented, but because it is not future-oriented enough.
Commenting on the doctrine of the resurrection of the body which coincides
with the second coming ofChrist, Niebuhr stresses the importance of eschatological
"futurity" when he states that . .to insist that the body must be resurrected is to
understand that time and history have meaning only as they are borne by an eternity
which transcends them. They could in fact not be at all without that eternity. For
90 Ibid, pp. 51-52.
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history would be meaningless succession without the eternal purpose which bears
it".91 Put differently, Niebuhr thinks that it is the transcendent Christ (in whom
eternity is bound up), who is immanent among us that gives meaning to life. This
dialectic of transcendence and immanence is how Niebuhr's eschatological
reflections must be interpreted because it is through this dialectic that we come to
understand Niebuhr's realism as an expression not of a despairing, but a hopeful
Q9
Christian ethic. As James Gustafson notes, "Niebuhr [has] confidence in a final
outcome beyond tragedy, and the hope that this ensures is critical to his
QT
interpretation of the human prospect...". That is, the final outcome ofhistory
(which is in the future) is the hopeful method by which we interpret our present
existence.
But this is only the case if by "eschatology" we mean what I have described
in this chapter so far: that discussions of eschatology are first and ultimately
discussions about the Eschatos, Christ who, though transcendent, is "eternally
present" among us; and, second, that a method of "ontological eschatology" which
orients our love its proper ends, Christ in the other person, and by which we
understand the "law of love" discussed in chapter three, is the best way to understand
what Niebuhr's eschatology means. Both of these lead to more hopeful
appreciations ofNiebuhr's realism which, I think, is made especially clear in his
comparisons of liberalism and Marxism with democracy.
7.9. Overcoming Utopia
As previously noted, the problem Niebuhr finds with Rauschenbusch's social
gospel liberalism is that it identifies too easily with a sentimental utopianism that
Niebuhr thinks anathema to a realistic Christian ethic. However, the other form of
utopianism during the time ofhis writing (and the one most influential for the
91 Niebuhr, "The Fulfilment of Life" in Beyond Tragedy, p. 302.
92
Thus, pace Gilkey, who posits a strict divide between those who associate eschatology with
concerns about the future and Niebuhr, who he thinks of in terms of "this-worldliness" only, I am
suggesting that the concerns about the future in eschatology cannot be discarded in Niebuhr's realism.
Indeed, they give us part of our understanding about the bases of hope for Niebuhr. See Gilkey's
"Niebuhr's Theology of History", p. 363.
93 James M. Gustafson, Intersections: Science, Theology, and Ethics, (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press,
1996), p. 30.
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liberation theologians),94 Marxist communism, Niebuhr does not think of as
completely sentimentally Utopian.95 In fact, Niebuhr distinguishes between
liberalism and communism by referring to them as "soft" and "hard" utopianisms,
respectively.96 Perhaps because of the earlier influence ofMarxism on his thought,
97Niebuhr finds at least some amity with Marxist social analyses, though he
ultimately finds them lacking for several reasons. For our present purposes, we will
only consider the most important of these, which is what Niebuhr calls Marxism's
QO
"manipulation of destiny". By this he means that Marxism is guilty of determinism,
of "underestimating the freedom ofman and of emphasizing the determined
character of his culture and his convictions..Marxism's positing of a
"revolutionary act" in which humans "intervene in the course of history and thereby
change not only history but the whole human situation" means that the human loses
her humanity. That is, "after this act [of revolution] man is no longer both creature
and creator ofhistory but purely the creator who 'not only proposes but also
disposes'".100 The problem with this is that such a position, like realised eschatology
above, leaves a cavity where eternity cannot become immanent in historical
circumstances. Of course, Marxists are not likely to fret over the presence of
theological lacunae, but Niebuhr's criticism of the "hard" Utopians on this point
underscores the point made above: for Niebuhr our understanding of objective
realism's transcendence into our immanent social contexts is to be grounded in a
theological understanding of the essential Christ's existential presence. McCann
makes this point when he notes that, for Niebuhr, the problem was not only that
94 For a brief, helpful analysis on the influences ofMarxism on Latin American theologians, see David
McLellan, Marxism and Religion: A Description andAssessment of theMarxist Critique of
Christianity, (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1987), pp. 148-156.
95 It should be noted that Niebuhr does not think Marxism is devoid of sentimental hope altogether.
"The hope that there will ever be an ideal society, in which every one can take without restraint from
the common social process 'according to his need,'" Niebuhr says, "completely disregards the
limitations of human nature. Man will always be imaginative enough to enlarge his needs beyond
minimum requirements and selfish enough to feel the pressure of his needs more than the needs of
others". Niebuhr, MoralMan and Immoral Society, p. 196.
96 See Niebuhr, ReinholdNiebuhr on Politics, pp. 12-36.
97 See especially Niebuhr's MoralMan and Immoral Society, pp. 142-199 and Does Civilization Need
Religion?, pp. 124-164. Dennis McCann offers a helpful delineation of the "stages" of thought
Niebuhr goes through with regard to his appreciation ofMarxism. See Dennis McCann, "Niebuhr and
Maritain on Marxism" in The Journal ofReligion, 58:2 (April, 1978): 145-153.
98 Niebuhr, Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics, pp. 30-31. See also, "The Master ofDestiny" in The Irony
ofAmerican History, pp. 56-76.
9
Niebuhr, ReinholdNiebuhr on Politics, pp. 30-31.
100 Ibid, p. 31.
216
Marxism provided an alternative eschatology to Christianity, but that it was an
inadequate eschatology altogether because it undermined the whole "genius" of
Christianity in the first place. Thus, for Niebuhr,
Christianity and Marxism were not to be compared simply formally,
as two alternative eschatologies, one religious, the other secular.
Beyond the formal comparison, Niebuhr saw that the Christian myth
transformed the problem of meaning in history by providing human
activity with a transcendent point of reference in a God who
reconciles humanity to himself.1 1
Put succinctly, Marxism cannot provide an adequate account of how God
transcends history and exists immanently in that history. This is the basis of
existential hope, which gives impetus for moral action, a notion Niebuhr captures
precisely with his statement that "[t]he hope of Christian faith that the Divine Power
which bears history can complete what even the highest human striving must leave
incomplete, and can purify the corruptions which appear in even the purest human
aspirations, is an indispensable pre-requisite for diligent fulfilment of our historic
tasks".102
1 Q"3Niebuhr offers a "vindication" of democracy as an antidote to the hopeless
void left by Marxism and liberalism. More specifically, he suggests that American
democracy is representative of the kind political system that goes some way toward
correcting the problems of hopelessness and despair that he perceives in Marxism
and liberalism.
This defence of democracy is, of course, what begets the charge that
Niebuhr's political theology is too "muscular" to be considered the basis for
Christian hope because he appears to be offering little more than a gloss of political
conservatism over a tough-minded liberalism that has dulled with time. Of course,
conservatives and liberals alike are happy to claim Niebuhr as their political ally,104
but the veracity of a claim is never proven in the simple assertion of the claim itself.
Whether or not Niebuhr is an agent provocateur for either liberals or conservatives is
101
McCann, p. 147.
102
Niebuhr, The Children ofLight and the Children ofDarkness, p. 128.
103
"Hopeless" because Niebuhr sees the goal ofMarxism and liberalism as reducible to one, false
hope. "That hope is that man may be delivered from his ambiguous position ofbeing both creature
and creator of the historical process and become unequivocally the master of his own destiny".
Niebuhr, The Irony ofAmerican History, p. 57.
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rather an ancillary argument, at least for our present concerns. The criticism that
Niebuhr champions a muscular Christianity, aligned with his defence ofAmerican
democracy, rather misses the point that Niebuhr is trying to make in that defence;
namely that a liberal democracy is one way of offering the necessary framework for
understanding the meaning of history, not that God is immanently operative in
history only through such a political programme.
Niebuhr thus defends liberal democracy, I think, because he believes that it is
through the democratic principles of liberty and equality that we understand that the
transcendent God becomes immanent in human history; and, as we have seen,
because ofGod's immanence we have a foundation for our hopes. But democracy
only helps understand the foundation of hope if those who support the idea do so
with humility: "Democracy therefore requires something more than a religious
devotion to moral ideals. It requires religious humility.. .[which] springs only from
the depth of a religion which confronts the individual with a more ultimate majesty
and purity than all human majesties and values.. .".105 Moreover, democracy only
gives voice to an appropriately construed eschatology, but is not itself an adequate
eschatology. That is, to Niebuhr, democratic ideology avoids (at least, ideally) the
problem ofbecoming the "master" of its own destiny, and is thus better suited to
understand the function of a proper eschatology.
This does not mean that Niebuhr offers blind endorsements ofAmerican
democracy as an instrument for God's rule in history. In fact, he argues "against the
idea that America, in contrast to communist tyrannies, offer[s] a favorable climate
for Christianity".106 What he does endorse, though, is a political programme which
gives way to a "prophetic eschatology.. .the theological concept by which [he
maintains] the tension between two themes, neither ofwhich he would surrender: the
requirements of political activity and the demands of Christian love".107 In other
words, democracy provides a theoretical framework by which eschatology is
104 Cf. Andrew J. Bacevich, "Prophets and Poseurs", World Affairs, Vol. 170, No. 3 (Winter 2008):
24-26.
105 Niebuhr, The Children ofLight and the Children ofDarkness, p. 104. For an intriguing account of
the humility in Niebuhr's incidental writings, see Dennis E. Lambert, "Discerning a Christian Realism
for Today, with Special Reference to the Attitudes ofHumility in Niebuhr's Incidental Writing, 1941-
1952, Unpublished PhD thesis, University ofEdinburgh, 2004.
106
Roger Shinn, "Realism, Radicalism, and Eschatology in Reinhold Niebuhr: A Reassessment": 420.
107 Ibid: 421.
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understood to fill the hollowness ofUtopian eschatologies like Marxism and
liberalism. It does this by proffering an understanding of God as immanent in
history. But this is not an eschatology for Christians only; it likewise informs how
we understand "secularity", ifby that term we mean that "space" where God-in-
Christ has acted, still acts, and will act. As O'Donovan notes about Israel's
understanding ofhope and what can be understood from this interpretation today:
Refusing, on the one hand, to give up what it knew ofGod, itself, and
the world, accepting, on the other, that what it knew was incomplete
and demanded validation, Israel understood itself and its knowledge
and love of God as a contradiction to be endured in hope.
'Secularity' is irreducibly an eschatological notion; it requires an
eschatological faith to sustain it, a belief in a disclosure that is 'not
yet' but is absolutely presupposed as the inner meaning of what we
know already. If we allow the 'not yet' to slide toward 'never,' we
say something entirely different and wholly incompatible, for the
virtue that undergirds all secular politics is an expectant patience.
What follows from the rejection of belief is an intolerable tension
between the need for meaning in society and the only partial capacity
of society to satisfy the need. 08
O'Donovan's is a restatement of realised eschatology that Niebuhr can
appreciate. That is, it is the middle ground where the "inner meaning" is known
already that we have our impetus for moral action and our basis for hope, but it is
also this area which Marxism and liberalism pass over on their respective journeys to
Utopia. O'Donovan thus indirectly captures Niebuhr's criticism ofMarxism and
liberalism on the issue of eschatology. This middle ground, what Niebuhr
recognises as a "terra incognita",109 is the area where Christ is immanent in the
Christian realist interpretation of history. It is also the place where Christ redeems
history. Let us discuss this briefly before bringing this chapter to a close.
7.10. Redemption
Part ofNiebuhr's problem with Utopian dreams, be they soft or hard, Marxist
or liberal, is that their chiefUtopian end is a particular kind of redemption of history.
Redemption for the Utopians is, according to Niebuhr, the idea ".. .that human
history ultimately answers all its unsolved problems and overcomes all its earlier
insecurities, that history is itself a kind ofprocess of redemption, has gained such a
i°8
O'Donovan, Common Objects ofLove, p. 42. Italics mine.
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strong hold upon modern man because it is actually partly true and because all the
tremendous advance of science, technology, and intelligence seemed to justify the
belief'.110 But the problem with this redemption is that it is self-referentially
incoherent. That is, when the human is the creature and creator of human existence,
as Niebuhr claimed about the Utopian, whatever redemption that Utopian considers
necessary is, in reality, not, because redemption only occurs between those who are
at odds with one another; i.e., God and humans. The individual is not a divided
entity unto himself or herself. In other words, as Niebuhr says, ".. .[tjhere can be
nothing purely intrinsic in life [like the "individual"], since all things are related to
each other. What seems intrinsic is that aspect of existence which does not wait
upon some future development for its meaning, but has that meaning, not within
itself, but within itself in relation to.. .the ultimate source of the meaning of our
life".111
The realised eschatology adopted by the Utopians does not resolve the
problem because it leaves an empty space, a "badlands" where redemption in history
does not occur because it looks instead to a future-oriented redemption which offers,
Niebuhr thinks, no basis for hope in this present existence. Redemption for Niebuhr,
then, comes only in the person of Christ who is immanently present in human
existence.
Niebuhr is not often associated with the perspective that God is redeeming
history presently through Christ, a fact Niebuhr's contemporaries were quick to point
out as a deficiency in his theology, and a mantle of criticism contemporary
112
commentators have carried willingly. Nevertheless, the present redemption of
history in Christ is an idea already present in others' enunciations of Christian
realism prior to Niebuhr's reception and articulation of it, and it is an idea that
110
Niebuhr, Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics, p. 19.
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Niebuhr, Discerning the Signs ofthe Times, p. 87.
112 Halliwell notes that even H. Richard Niebuhr is critical of Reinhold on this point. "Indeed, in a
1933 letter to his brother, Richard outlined six crucial points that he believes separates his and
Reinhold's temperaments". Chief on the list was the claim "that Reinhold's God transcends history,
whereas for Richard, God is embedded in time, acting in a creative and redemptive way through
Christ". Halliwell, The Constant Dialogue, p. 121. See also H. Richard Niebuhr, "The Only Way into
the Kingdom ofGod", Christian Century, 6 (1932) in which Richard makes this same point. Cited in
Halliwell, p. 121 n. 90. See also Rachel Hadley King, The Omission of the Holy Spirit from Reinhold
Niebuhr's Theology, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1964), pp. 79-121. Contemporary criticisms
of the same theme are best represented by Hauerwas's With the Grain ofthe Universe.
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Niebuhr does not dismiss.113 This is not to say that Niebuhr posits an evangelical
personalism; he does not. But God's activity in history is not excluded from
Niebuhr's understanding of redemption. It is, moreover, precisely because God does
work in history that the realist has any foundation for hope.
7.11. Repentance
In the final chapter ofReflections on the End ofan Era, Niebuhr offers what I
think is one of his more significant contributions to the notion that God's
transcendence over and, immanence in, history provides a basis for hope in our
moral actions because it anticipates many of his theological insights in his later
works.114 Niebuhr concludes the penultimate chapter of that work with the statement
that "[tjhere is no place in either radical or liberal utopianism for the 'experience of
grace'. The [false] hope of realizing perfection in history has made such an
experience unnecessary".115
The "place" where grace is experienced is, as noted above, in human
contexts. After detailing the various problems he finds with liberalism and
modernity, Niebuhr gives an account the ethical import of Christianity for social
ethics if the grace of God in history is to be taken as fact. He defines grace
realistically; that is, as "the apprehension of the absolute from the perspective of the
relative".116 In other words, the grace of God stands apart from our conceptions of it,
but it is nevertheless immanently present among us.
The rest of the chapter is spent analysing how grace is understood as present
in both Christian orthodoxy to Christian liberalism, and Niebuhr is never clear on
which side he comes down. At times he speaks as though he is representative of the
liberalism against which he argues in the majority of his work with statements like
"[i]t is significant that in the Christian religion, Jesus, who in his own life incarnated
the spirit of pure love to a unique and remarkable degree, became for Paul the
symbol and revelation of a divine forgiveness which knew how to accept human
113
E.g., John Bennett notes both that "God is the Lord ofHistory" and that "God is the redeemer" of
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intentions for achievements".117 Elsewhere, though, he writes as if from a position of
Christian Orthodoxy: "The fact that Christian orthodoxy relates and fastens the
experience of grace.. .to the one fact of the incarnation need not lead to a magical
118and unmoral interpretation of grace". Despite the fact that Niebuhr never comes
down too forcefully on one side or the other,119 his concluding statements from that
chapter are significant. There Niebuhr writes that
[i]n classical Christianity it is suggested again and again that
repentance is the beginning of redemption, even that it is synonymous
with redemption. This is a profound insight; for the evils and
frustrations of life and history would be, in fact, unbearable if
contrition did not reduce the presumptions and pretensions of the
self....Classical religious faith is always saved from despair because
it knows that sin is discovered by the very faith through which men
catch a glimpse of the reality of spirit.. ..The knowledge of the depths
within the self saves from pride, prevents a bitter criticism of the sins
of others and makes a sullen rebellion against the imperfections of
nature and history impossible; the knowledge of the heights keeps
profound self-knowledge from degenerating into bitter
disillusionment.120
Put differently, repentance occurs when humans (realistically) apprehend
God's existence through faith and acknowledge their status as sinners; repentance
begets redemption; redemption keeps us from despair.
This theme is decidedly more developed in Niebuhr's mature theology, in
which he locates the idea of redemptive hope in the person ofChrist, and, more
specifically, in the properly ordered love of Christ through our neighbours, which is
121what it means to say that Christ is present in history in the first place. We see this
with Niebuhr's statement that "[t]he Christian church is a community ofhopeful
believers.. .which does not fear the final judgement, not because it is composed of
sinless saints but because it is a community of forgiven sinners.. ,".122 Once this
117 Ibid, p. 279. For a helpful essay on this tendency ofNiebuhr's, see Henry Nelson Wieman, "A
Religious Naturalist Looks at Reinhold Niebuhr" in Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and
Political Thought, especially pp. 339-344.
118
Niebuhr, Reflections on the End ofan Era, p. 281.
119
Though he does write that liberalism and orthodoxy have failed to account for the place of ethical
tension where grace is experience. Ibid, p. 292.
120 Ibid, p. 295.
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forgiveness is acknowledged, repentance commences and hope is instilled: "The
human situation is [thus] not.. .hopeless; for wherever men recognize the reality and
the power of self-love.. .the power of self-love may be broken. In so far as it persists
men live in the hope and faith that God will overcome what they cannot
overcome".123 That is, humans live with the knowledge apprehended by faith that "it
is Christ himself who becomes the judge at the final judgment of the world" and that
his final judgment is also merciful.124
But the reality of this hope is that it is unrealisable without the Christ of
history, who stands as the Eschatos of history, as defined above. More to the point,
the agape ofChrist, exhibited on the cross, is the norm of life and the basis of this
hope. It is thus Christ, "whose sacrificial love seeks conformity with, and finds
justification in, the divine and eternal agape, the ultimate and final harmony of life
1 c
with life". But "the eternal and divine [are not in] absolute contradiction to the
temporal and historical. There are, therefore validations of agape in actual history,
i oz
in so far as concern for the other elicits a reciprocal response". In other words,
God's transcendence does not supplant God's immanence in history. In fact, the two
are concomitants of one another, demonstrated any time the sacrificial love ofChrist
is reciprocally shared by those who exist as God's creatures, not as the creators. Any
time, that is, "where two or three are gathered" in the name of Christ is Christ "there
among them" (Matt. 18:20).
7.8. Conclusions
Eschatology, particularly an eschatology which does not elide hope in
existential contexts, means several things for Niebuhr's realism. First, it is an
understanding not of the "last things", but of the "last one", the Christ of history, the
Eschatos. This emphasis Niebuhr shares with Barthian dialecticism (though there is
very little else the two have in common). The recognition of Christ as the last One
takes Niebuhrian realism in the direction of what I earlier called ontological
eschatology. This is the concept of the future being brought into the present in the
Christ of faith and the Christ of history. It is, in fact, Christ who provides the
"eschatological unity" that allows the realist to understand how the future is brought
123 Ibid, p. 225.
124
Ibid, p. 262.
125 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 81.
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to bear on the present. We noted that in ontological eschatology, the most important
feature is a proper orientation of love toward others, which ultimately means that our
love is oriented to Christ. Despite the fact that Niebuhr overworries the "idealness"
ofAugustine's love ethic, he nevertheless still appropriates it for his understanding
of eschatology.
Moving forward from the discussion of ontological eschatology, we noted
how Utopian liberals and Marxists provide helpful conversation partners for
understanding Niebuhr's eschatology. As discussed, Niebuhr does not think that
eschatology can be "realised" in the sense that history is in an interim, or that we
have experienced the "already" and are awaiting the "not yet". Instead, eschatology
is as relevant for present contexts as it is for any future we might anticipate. It is, in
this sense, an incarnate eschatology.
The discussion ofUtopians led to our discussion of redemption in Christian
realism. Niebuhr thinks of repentance as one and the same with redemption. Once
the human affirms God's grace-as-forgiveness which is the basis of redemption, he
or she begins to repent. Repentance involves properly ordering one's loves so that
our love is oriented to Christ, through the love of the other. Loving Christ through
the loving of another is what it means to say that Christ is present in history in the
first place.
The Christian realism developed by Niebuhr during the tumultuous decades
of the twentieth century offered stark analyses of the problems of human life. It also
faithfully continued to deliver the promise that though we do not know God fully,
we are fully known by God. Niebuhr's realism, that is, "afflicted the comforted and
comforted the afflicted". More importantly, though, it offered a framework by
which theological hope can be understood to mean that Christ stands
transcendentally with God, and immanently with us in history; that is, that Christ is
"all in all" (Eph. 1:23).
Some concluding remarks in the next chapter will now bring this thesis to a
close.
126
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Chapter 8
CONCLUSIONS
8.1. Synopsis
I have argued in this thesis that Reinhold Niebuhr's interpretation of Christian
realism provides a framework for theological hope. The world Niebuhr inhabited is
not the one we inhabit today; his realities are not our own. But that fact is not reason
enough alone to leave the volumes of his thought unopened in our libraries. The
mineshaft may have changed, but we are still canaries searching for daylight. This is
one of the reasons this thesis focuses at first on the foundational elements of
Niebuhr's realism. Circumstances and social realities change, as do the ways in
which we interpret foundations. There are realities which transcend our own
existences, and the problems of sin and misjudgement are perennially and
ineradicably a part of human existence. But the knowledge of these facts is
indispensable to the disposition it creates.
This is why chapters two and three focused on framing the groundwork for
understanding the foundational concerns ofNiebuhr's realism and the ways in which
those concerns are highlighted against the backdrop ofpost-Vatican II moral
theological developments. Chapter four demonstrated how the foundational issues
are important for inculcating particular dispositions with regard to the ways in which
a realistic social hermeneutic is developed, which in turn led to the reconsideration of
Milbank's criticisms ofNiebuhr's realism because Milbank criticises Niebuhr
precisely on these foundational and hermeneutical elements. Milbank's presentation
ofNiebuhr's realism is ultimately the presentation of a hopeless realism because
Milbank is convinced that the foundations ofNiebuhr's thought are different than the
ones presented in the earlier chapters, and that they adhere to a liberal narrative
which knows nothing of a true Christian ethic. It was Milbank's criticisms that
inspired the consideration of hope in Christian realism in the first place.
Just as the reality which transcends existence is timeless, so is the need for
hope in human existence. It is true that the world Niebuhr inhabited in the mid-
twentieth century is not our world, but it is equally the case that there are realities of
our world ("wars and rumours ofwar") that underscore the basic human need of
hope. The Christian realist cannot tell people what to hope for; human contexts are
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too variable and varying for that, and telling someone else what to hope for is
potentially symptomatic of the selfish pride Niebuhr castigates. But the Christian
realist can offer an analysis of how to hope as well as a word about the one in whom
to hope. This was the point of chapters six and seven. Christian life is ultimately
about discerning how to live caught in the sometimes intolerable tension of despair
over the problems of existence and the hope that is promised to us in the gospel of
Christ. In sum, Christian life is lived at the crossroads of essential life and human
existence. Chapter six focused on the essential hopes that are placed in the
transcendent Christ. Chapter seven then focused on the counterpoint to the previous
chapter's arguments; namely, that theological hope is also to be understood
existentially with the Christ who is immanent among us. This discussion was tied to
Niebuhr's interpretation of eschatology as relevant both in the present and the future,
an appropriate way to bring the thesis to a close.
8.2. The Situation Today
As mentioned in the introduction, Christian realism, particularly as
understood by Niebuhr, has been experiencing something of a renaissance over the
past several years. Most of the work written during that time has been (helpfully)
concerned to demonstrate the ways in which Niebuhr's realism impacts on today's
political contexts. This focus on the political does not mean, however, that hope
cannot be considered right alongside the political debates surrounding Niebuhr's
realism. In fact, I think it of chief importance that we give an account of hope as a
part of our understanding of Christian realism today. There are at least three reasons
for that.
First, an account of theological hope keeps Christian realism realistic. This is
especially so in the negative sense. That is, a hopeful realistic ethic keeps our moral
ambitions in check and prevents us from exchanging Utopian or sentimental hopes
for a more realistic ethic which lives in the tension between sin and grace. Thus
hope, realistically understood, reminds us ofwhat not to hope for, which
consequently avoids the problems Niebuhr found in the progressive liberalism of
those like Rauschenbusch. In other words, realistic hope acknowledges that though
we can strive for justice in our social contexts, we will always only achieve
modicums of that justice.
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The second reason that hope is important for better understanding Christian
realism today is paradoxically related to the first. Theological hope keeps Christian
realism's ethics ethical. That is, ifwe know that we are always only going to
achieve modicums of justice we are, in a sense, more free to act for justice. For
example, if I know that I might fail in efforts to bring about community awareness
concerning the need for racial reconciliation, I am consequently freer to make
whatever changes can possibly be implement, even if they fall far short of the goals
with which I first set out. This freedom is rooted in the realistic hope that says that
ultimately it is God-in-Christ who gives our lives meaning (which is how we know
what racial injustice is in the first place) and who ultimately overcomes that which
we cannot. Hope, realistically understood, is thus a basis for our moral acts.
Third, theological hope keeps Christian realism Christian. Ifwe declare that
our hope is in God-in-Christ who overcomes our finite and sinful existence, we make
a theologically hopeful claim that the transcendent Christ is the one in whom
injustice ceases to exist. This is a universalising claim that Christ will be "all in all"
for all people at all times. Furthermore, the hopeful realist, as we saw in chapter
seven, likewise claims that Christ is already immanent among us, particularly where
our loves are properly oriented and where there is no lack of justice.
These three understandings of hope—that it is realistic, ethical and
Christian—are of the reasons that discussions of Christian realism today needs to
give an account of the theological hope that evolves from the frameworks of realistic
thought.
8.3. Looking Forward
If, as I think is likely, there continues to be an interest in Christian realism
generally, and Reinhold Niebuhr's interpretation of it specifically, new avenues of
research and enquiry will continue to open. Given the evolving nature of the
globalised world, this is particularly true. With regard to the issues of theological
hope and Christian realism, at least one particular avenue of research should be
considered. This is what Charles Matthewes calls "hopeful citizenship".1
As was noted in chapter seven, Matthewes is critical ofNiebuhr for lacking a
properly theological account of hope, treating it instead as an anaesthetic to the
1 Charles Matthewes, A Theology ofPublic Life, pp. 214-260.
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problems of evil and human sinfulness. I do not agree with that assessment of
Niebuhr, but as chapter seven indicated, I do think the framework for what was
referred to as ontological eschatology finds much in common between Niebuhr and
Matthewes. Similarly, Matthewes's outline of hopeful citizenship provides a helpful
starting point for relating to a hopeful Christian realism. Matthewes suggests three
things that are important for hopeful citizenship. First, hopeful citizenship begins
with a critique of "intellectuals' general failure to offer a credible 'post-utopian'
hopefulness, and identifies the root problem as their failure to present a picture of
evil.. .that can comprehend the profundity and complexity of the challenges that
subvert all Utopias". Second, the basis of such a criticism builds on Augustinian
appraisals of charity. Third, hopeful citizenship encourages "citizens' participation
in their polity's public life and to the churches' formation of their members as
eschatologically minded pilgrims during the world".
All three of Matthewes's suggestions resemble some part of the enquiries that
have been carried out in this thesis. First, Niebuhr offers criticisms ofutopianism
and a response to the problem ofprivative evil (chapter five) that fits Matthewes's
above suggestion. Second, one of the features in chapter three that was highlighted
against the backdrop of post-Vatican II natural law was the issue of charity which,
for Niebuhr, provides a "possible ideal" for moral action. Third, as chapter seven
discussed, eschatology, properly understood, provides a way of interpreting hope
both in the present and the future.
Because the areas that Matthewes suggests as a basis for hopeful citizenship
are so much aligned with much of the work that has already been completed in this
thesis on hope and Niebuhr's realism, it seems a natural and logical step to consider
how the two agree and disagree in the development of such citizenship.
Putting the theoretical discussions ofhope from this thesis into conversation
with the practical concerns of citizenship would open up new avenues in which the
current work on Niebuhr's political ethics could be considered in light of the
theological themes of Christian realism. Moreover, it would keep the important
theological concerns of realism to the fore, which will prove important if Christian
realism is going to continue to be a valuable exchange of ideas.
2 Ibid, p. 218.
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8.4. Final Words
Niebuhr's interpretation of Christian realism will continue to be important for
the conversations about how best to interpret our fractious and fractured lives.
Understanding the foundations on which Christian realism is built is crucial if that
interpretation is to make sense, and ifwe want to understand what light realism has
to shine down the mineshaft. Long after the places smooth where Niebuhr's name
was once etched, this central fact will remain: Christ, who exists "before all time, and
now and forever" (Jude 24), is the one in whom all hopes—possible or impossible;
now, or in the future—are placed. While the etching is still visible, though, it seems
appropriate to give Niebuhr the last word:
Thus, wisdom about our destiny is dependent upon a humble
recognition of the limits of our knowledge and our power. Our most
reliable understanding is the fruit of 'grace' in which faith completes
our ignorance without pretending to possess its certainties as
knowledge; and in which contrition mitigates our pride without
destroying our hope.4
3 Ibid.
4
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny ofMan, Vol. II, p. 321.
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